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1 Introduction
1.1  Subject of the study
The history of the use of information technology in organizations shows that
information technology has had an enormous impact on the functioning of
organizations. The roots of these changes can be found in (1) information technology
developments (the supply side) as well as in (2) organizational needs (demand side)
(Scott Morton, 1991; Simons & Verheijen, 1991).
1.1.1  Developments in the supply of information
‘Information technology’ (IT) usually refers to some sort of collection of computer
hard- and software and the knowledge about its use, which can collect, store, process
and disseminate information
1.
In the past, processing capacity and storage capacity of hardware have especially
changed, while IT costs dropped simultaneously (Madnick, 1991; Breukel, 1996).
Moore’s Law indicates that costs associated with comparable units
2 of information
technology are reduced by an order of magnitude every five years (Gazendam, 1997).
This means that the capacity that took a million dollars in the 1960s (a mainframe
computer) can be realized with a one thousand dollar personal computer (PC) in the
1990s (Cash, McFarlan & McKenney, 1988).
Nowadays, information technology’s storing and processing capabilities are still
progressing. But the technology of collecting and disseminating information (also
referred to as information and communication technology [ICT] or telematics
3) is
changing too. Technological advances have resulted in new communication media
(optic cables, satellites), increased capability of input/output devices, et cetera. Because
of the efforts of industry associations and groups of organizations, technical standards
have been developed and/or accepted. These advancements in technology and standard
                                                          
1 A more precise definition is given in chapter two.
2 Measured in MIPS, millions of instructions per second.
3 Telematics is a compound word, consisting of ‘telecommunications’ and ‘informatics’.2
setting have coincided with the liberalization of the now very competitive data
communication industry.
Besides changes in hardware, changes in software have occurred. The emergence of,
among other things, all kinds of object-oriented programming environments, tools, and
standard yet configurable software packages have boosted the productivity of software
development. Furthermore, probably due to the increased popularity of the Internet,
communication software has improved drastically.
As a result of the changes in hardware as well as in software, information exchange in
and across organizations has sunk per cost of unit. “In brief, the development of high-
performance, high reliability, comprehensive communication networks, both
intraorganizationally and interorganizationally, is occurring at a rapid pace”, comments
Madnick (1991, p. 31).
According to the literature, these information technology developments have severe
consequences. A typical statement that supports this claim is provided by Senn:
“Information technology is itself a driver of globalization, enabling virtually any firm to
overcome the fundamental business barrier of geographic distance, as long as it deploys
and leverages the technology in an effective fashion” (1994, p. 444). Morgan claims that
“(…) there can be little doubt that information technology is among the most important
forces reshaping the modern organization” (1988, p. 97).
The statements by Senn and Morgan are modest illustrations of sometimes quite bizarre
claims in the literature. Some care must be taken to avoid jumping to tendentious
conclusions. Holland, Lockett and Blackman respond to the kind of turbulence-
reporting claims stated above: “(…) [t]his tends to lead to a series of war stories and
apocryphal tales which may miss much of the underlying richness and long-term
developments and trends” (1992, p. 540).
Notwithstanding the sometimes quite eccentric claims in the literature, it can be argued
that the emergence of new information and telecommunication technology poses new
challenges to an organization and especially to its structure, planning and strategy
(Levinson, 1994). However, it must be noted that technological impulses only account
for a part of all new challenges to an organization’s information resource structure,
planning and strategy. Furthermore, the history of information technology shows that
information technology has had an enormous impact on the functioning of
organizations, but also that the results to be accomplished immediately are
overestimated and that long term consequences are underestimated (Strassman, 1985,
cited in Holland, Lockett and Blackman, 1992).
1.1.2  Developments in the demand for information
Apart from developments in the technology, it is also possible to identify developments
in the demand side of information technology. Sometimes the literature is plagued with
descriptions of ever decreasing product life cycles and increasing turbulence, which,
according to the authors, necessitate more and better information technology. Mintzberg3
(1994), however, has demonstrated that this turbulence is not at all a contemporary
phenomenon. The organizational literature since the 1950s (that is, before information
technology gained momentum) has reported an ever increasing turbulence in the
environment of organizations. Furthermore, he notes that the turbulence of a past
period, previously labeled turbulent, is later on described as moderate.
However, other authors provide different impetuses for applications of information
technology. For example, Scott Morton (1991) describes numerous changes in
organizational structure, organizational strategy and individual roles/skills
4. These
changes are elaborated in the debate on the relationship between IT and
centralization/decentralization (see section 1.2.1), the debate on strategic IT (Breukel,
1996) and the debate on upgrading/degrading of labor as a result of the application of IT
(Steijn & de Witte, 1996; Cunningham & Tynan, 1993).
One theme that is pervasive in the literature is the theme of new organizational forms
that are emerging (for a brief introduction, refer to Schwarzer, Zerbe and Krcmar,
1997). Here, ‘new organizational forms’ refers to the use of coordination mechanisms
other than the traditional hierarchy (within organizations) and markets (between
organizations) (Ring and Van de Ven, 1994). These new organizational forms of
coordination are now being described in the literature and are referred to as:
·  ‘Information partnerships’ (Konsynski & McFarlan, 1990)
·  ‘Interorganizational systems’ (Barrett & Konsynski, 1982; Cash & Konsynski,
1985)
·  ‘Hybrid arrangements’ (Borys & Jemison, 1989)
·  ‘Interorganizational configurations’ (Levinson, 1994)
·  ‘Modular organizations’ (Kastelein, 1985; Tully, 1993)
·  ‘Networked organizations’ (Miles & Snow, 1992; Powell, 1987)
·  ‘Team-based organizations and virtual organizations’ (Davidow & Malone, 1992)
·  ‘Learning organizations’ (Drucker, 1987)
·  ‘Electronic integration’ (Venkatraman & Kambil, 1991)
·  ‘Value added partnerships’ (Johnston & Lawrence, 1988; Henderson, 1990)
·  ‘Organic networks’ (Morgan, 1989)
5
As a result of the emergence of these new organizational forms, interorganizational
relationships are highlighted. An interorganizational relationship, according to Van de
Ven, occurs when “(…) two or more organizations transact resources (…) among each
other” (1976, p. 24). Most authors implicitly speak of interorganizational relationship
when resources are transacted recurrently and the relationship lasts for a period of time,
although it does not have to be a continual exchange (Oliver, 1990).
                                                          
4 Note that these various impetuses are not independent of each other.
5 For a more complete enumeration, refer to Bensaou & Venkatraman (1994),
Fredriksson & Vilgon (1996) and Ching, Holsapple & Whinston (1996).4
Interorganizational relationships can be governed by a variety of coordination
mechanisms: discrete market transactions and hierarchical arrangements being extremes
on a continuum (Ring and Van de Ven, 1994). Examples of these intermediate forms are
to be found in both the private and public sectors. In the private sector, it is reported that
autonomous firms cooperate with respect to joint research and development projects,
joint product development, joint manufacturing, shared distribution and service, etc.
Government is sometimes portrayed as a monolithic actor. However, if one rejects this
rather radical view of government (see, for example, de Vries, 1992; Kickert, 1993;
BIOS-3, 1995; Gazendam, 1997; Kickert, 1997), it is very well possible to discern
network structures and interorganizational relationships in public sectors, too.
One explanation for the interest in interorganizational relations is based on
Nooteboom’s observation that “relations of cooperation are incurred from an
expectation of value (…) now and in the future” (1993, p. 13). Often, this premise is
interpreted as the possibility of decreasing the costs
6 of specific products if certain
activities are outsourced to other organizations, thus resulting in interorganizational
relationships between focal organizations and, for example, component suppliers. This
explanation is “(…) consistent with the argument that efficiency is an underlying
determinant of interorganizational relations” (Oliver, 1990, p. 245).
However, Van de Ven (1976) contests this interpretation. His basic premise is that
resources and expertise needed to cope with problems by organizations are contained
within organizations and vested interest groups. Using this line of reasoning,
interorganizational relations “(…) occur for the purpose of pursuing common or
mutually beneficial goals or interests” (Oliver, 1990, p. 244).  By means of exchanging
resources in interorganizational relationships, goals of individual organizations that
were unachievable for individual organizations are now attained (Van de Ven, 1976).
Van de Ven’s explanation highlights the role of organizations as vehicles for goal
achievement. Relations between organizations can be seen as artifacts for goal
achievement, created, adjusted and terminated by stakeholders in order to pursue goal
achievement. Alexander notes: “(…) it is common sense to realize that an organization
can induce other organizations to bias their actions in a direction it desires if it can offer
them incentives in the form of resources, especially if the relevant resource is essential
for the other organization’s survival” (1995, p. 9).
Summarizing, this explanation assumes that interorganizational relationships can
improve the individual organization’s goal attainment. This explanation of the
occurrence of interorganizational relationships is referred to as the effectiveness or
reciprocity explanation (Van de Ven, 1976; Oliver, 1990).
The above explanations refer to efficiency and effectiveness, respectively, as primary
drivers for interorganizational relations. But there are also other hypotheses that have
been proposed in order to account for the occurrence of interorganizational
                                                          
6 Here, not only production costs are meant, but also the costs incurred by haggling and
learning (so-called transaction costs).  See also section 3.3.4.5
relationships. For example, a hypothesis that more or less originates in critical
organization theory states that, especially in government, hiving-off
7 is not so much
pursued in order to economize on costs
8, but rather to detach high-risk activities from
the focal organization, thereby safeguarding the interests of the focal organization’s top
management or politicians
9. This ‘risk averse’ hypothesis, however, has gained only
limited empirical support.
In an attempt to survey and summarize the literature on interorganizational
relationships, Oliver (1990) has identified six rationales or reasons for organizations to
participate in interorganizational relations (Figure 1)
10.
                                                          
7 By means of hiving-off, execution of government activities is changed by attributing
or delegating authority to a newly-established or an already-existing organization which
has a certain legal status as an independent unit with a relatively high degree of
economic independence (Künneke, 1991; Ter Bogt, 1998).
8 Economizing on costs as a rationale for interorganizational relationships is a style of
reasoning typical to economic organization theory. For details, refer to section 3.3.
9 Here, political efficiency rather than economic efficiency is the decision criterion. See
Ter Bogt (1998) for a more complete discussion.
10 The theoretical background of this summary includes specific renditions of economic
organization theory (see section 3.3) and political organization theory (see section 3.4),
but also theories of class hegemony and institutional theories. A complete discussion of
these theories goes beyond the scope of this thesis. For more information, refer to Oliver
(1990).6
Source Rationale Description
Internal
processes
Efficiency The formation is prompted by the
organizations in order to improve their
internal input/output ratio.
Effectiveness The formation occurs in order to pursue
common, mutually beneficial goals or
interests.
Environment Necessity The formation is the result of enforceable
laws, drafted by a legislator.
Legitimacy The formation is the result of an attempt by
organizations to increase their legitimacy in
order to justify their existence in agreement
with prevailing norms, rules, beliefs or
experiences.
Stability The formation is the result of an attempt by
organizations to reduce environmental
uncertainty.
Asymmetry The formation is the result of the potential of
an organization to exercise power and control
over another organization or its resources.
Figure 1: Rationales for interorganizational relationships (adapted from Oliver,
1990)
From the figure above, we conclude that there are many rationales for organizations to
participate in relationships with other organizations, efficiency and effectiveness being
examples of rationales. These interorganizational relationships do not necessarily have
to lead to merger of the participating organizations. The literature describes a variety of
forms of cooperation between organizations that do not nicely fit the markets/hierarchy
dichotomy. However, the rationales for the occurrences of these various forms of
interorganizational relationships result in conflicting explanations. Obviously, the
literature on the origins of interorganizational relationships in both private and public
sectors is rather fragmented (Oliver, 1990; Alexander, 1995).
1.1.3 Synthesis
It has been argued that the above developments (IT-related trends and increased
attention to interorganizational relationships) are not independent of each other. The
causality between IT trends and the emergence of interorganizational relations has been
subject to some discussions. Markus and Robey (1988) distinguish two opposing
perspectives:
·  The  technological imperative, in which new technology drives organizational
changes. The literature on information technology often takes this stand. It is7
argued that technological developments cause or enable changes in or between
organizations. Examples of this stream in the literature are the writings on IT-
enabled new organizational forms (for example, the statements by Senn and
Morgan [see section 1.1.1], or the writings of Schwarzer, Zerbe, Krcmar [1997]).
Critics state that this type of logic underestimates the variety in profiles of
organizations using information and telecommunication technology (Fredriksson &
Vilgon, 1996).
·  The organizational imperative, in which the use of (new) technology is determined
by organizations or changes in organizational parameters. The organizational
literature customarily takes this point of view by mentioning the use of telematics
as an important factor. This line of reasoning has been criticized for not studying
the IT phenomenon in an in-depth way: for example, by not differentiating different
types of technology or by not considering other relevant contextual factors
(Kubicek, 1995).
Van der Heijden (1995) points out that the discussion about the causal relationship
between interorganizational and technological changes bears some resemblance to the
discussion about the relationship between structure and strategy (Mintzberg, 1990,
1994) and between strategy and environment (‘environmental determinism’ versus
‘strategic choice’ [van den Bosch, 1993]). In these debates, the direction of causality
between variables is questioned: does the strategy an organization wishes to pursue
affect the organization’s structure, or is an organization’s strategy determined by its
structure? Does an organization’s environment determine its strategy, or is an
organization able to control its environment by pursuing a different strategy? From the
discussions and debates, no clear-cut answer has yet been formulated; obviously, the
relationships between these variables are quite complex.
The initial motivation for this study stems from the complexity of the relation between
IT and interorganizational relations. In section 1.2, research endeavors that have
addressed this theme are discussed and the motivation for the current study is
elaborated. This leads to the formulation of the main research goal in section 1.3. Then,
in section 1.4, the preliminary theoretical orientation and research questions are
presented. Section 1.5 presents various alternative research designs and the motivation
for the research strategy to be used. The remaining part describes an outline of the rest
of the thesis as a whole.
1.2  Motivation of the study
The relationship between IT as a technological variable and interorganizational
relationships as an organizational variable has been scrutinized many times in the
disciplines of organization studies and information systems. In this section, two8
classical controversies and subsequent research in the discipline of information
systems
11 are presented.
Firstly, research on the relationship between IT and organizational parameters is
discussed (section 1.2.1). Secondly, research on the relationship between IT and
interorganizational relations is addressed (section 1.2.2). These controversies are
discussed and the core of the dispute to which further research activities are to be
addressed is summarized. The motivation of the current study stems directly from these
controversies.
1.2.1  Research on the relationship between IT and organizational
parameters
The relationship between information technology and its context, customarily
organizational parameters, has been scrutinized many times. One of the first themes that
was investigated was the effect of information technology on centralization as an
organizational parameter (Kubicek, 1975; see also Kubicek, 1995). This information
systems research theme was an attempt to chart systematically the field of information
technology and organizational parameters by using research models and techniques that
stretched beyond the scope of very descriptive models.
George and King (1991) have surveyed the literature and identified theories that
produce conflicting explanations about the relationship between information technology
and centralization. One stream in the literature clearly reported that introduction of IT
leads to a centralization of decision-making authority. Drucker (1987) assumed that the
introduction of information technology leads to elimination of middle management and
that lower hierarchical levels could be increasingly directed and monitored by
management using information technology. Crozier analogously assumed that
information technology in general threatens the autonomy of workers as opposed to
management (Bemelmans, 1987).
For the situation in the Netherlands, Frissen argued that the introduction of information
technology in governmental agencies leads to bureaucratization (and thus to increased
formalization and centralization): “Complexity and interdependencies in the policy field
and political responsibilities imply centralization in relation to informatization”
(Frissen, 1989, p. 245).
Schrama (1991) described how, in general, the earliest information system researchers
found that the use of computers resulted in centralization in organizations. The rationale
for this proposition was found in the increased capabilities of information technology to
monitor and control the behavior of organization members (control-by-IT or
surveillance explanation). The centralization thesis has also gained support in Lee
(1965) and Whisler (1970).
                                                          
11 Sometimes referred to as ‘management information systems’ (Breukel, 1996). This
discipline combines insights from organization science and computer science.9
However, there is also a stream in the literature that claims that, in general, information
technology leads to decentralization. In this line of reasoning, information technology
can be used to perform complicated calculations or simulations
12 so that individual
workers are no longer dependent upon higher hierarchical levels or support staff
(empowerment-by-IT explanation). Another line of reasoning behind the
decentralization thesis is that information technology enables monitoring and control
without the need to control and monitor in a direct, tangible way (pseudo-
decentralization-by-IT explanation). Surprisingly, the decentralization thesis has gained
empirical support too (van der Heijden, 1995; see also Meyer [1968], Klatzky [1970]
and Blau, Falbe, McKinley & Tracy [1976]).
For example, Frissen’s general observations have been criticized. “I could observe that
this [Frissen’s bureaucratization thesis] conclusion was mainly based on a specific and
rather bureaucratic computerization project, while in the long run a more person-
oriented information management approach combined with an equilibrium policy (…)
led to a decrease in bureaucracy” (Gazendam, 1993, p. 9). Gazendam (1993) and de
Jong (1994) have described the development of information technology in terms of
political configurations. They provided well-documented cases in which the application
of information technology led to decentralization. Schrama shows that in general, the
first empirical results indicating centralization were followed by studies that detected
the opposite tendency, towards decentralization (Schrama, 1991).
Various authors have tried to reconcile the above (partial) explanations. Gazendam
(1997) states that the centralization tendency was especially vigorous in the 1970s,
when relatively high information technology costs (as compared to labor costs)
necessitated concentration of information technology, and, with that, centralization of
decision making. When the information technology costs dropped in the 1980s and
1990s, concentration of information technology no longer was the only viable option
and hence, the accompanying centralization tendency did not occur anymore.
Breukel (1996) proposes a different explanation, based on an exhaustive literature
review. Breukel mentions organizational structure and IT as equal aspects of the
organization with no one-way causal relation between these aspects. Breukel argues that
“feasible set[s] of equally effective, internally consistent patterns” (Drazin & Van de
Ven, 1985, p. 335) can be defined. This means that IT and structure are variables of
which some combinations of values are assumed to be consistent and other
combinations are assumed to be inconsistent. Note that in this line of reasoning, no
explicit preference for either organizational imperative or technological imperative is
stated. Rather it is assumed that organizational and technological variables are either
consistent or inconsistent and that in order to change a ‘non-consistent’ situation into a
‘consistent’ situation, either the technological or the organizational variable can be
                                                          
12 The technology that is used for these purposes is the technology of decision support
systems and expert systems (Heesen, Homburg & Offereins, 1995; Heesen, Homburg &
Offereins, 1997).10
changed. This perspective is referred to as the ‘emergent’ perspective (see also van den
Bosch, 1993; van der Heijden, 1995). Van der Heijden explicitly supports this view of
the relationship between technological and organizational variables. “(…) [T]he
emerging perspective seems to be valid for many relationships that concern strategy,
structure and environment. These relationships also include the relationship between the
use of information technology and organizational design” (Van der Heijden, 1995, p.
20). Note that the technological imperative and the organizational imperative are limited
forms of the emergent view.
Finally, Schrama (1991), Delehanty (1967) and Robey (1977) concluded that it is
possible to distinguish various IT configurations and various organizational
configurations, and that organizations have a certain degree of discretion (freedom of
choice) in choosing these configurations: there is no deterministic relationship between
IT and structure.
The debate on the relationship between IT and organizational parameters is summarized
in Figure 2.
Author Hypothesis
Lee (1965); Whisler (1970);
Drucker (1987); Frissen (1989)
IT leads to centralization in organizations.
Meyer (1968); Klatzky (1970);
Blau, Falbe, McKinley & Tracy
(1976); Gazendam (1993)
IT leads to decentralization in organizations.
Delehanty (1967); Robey (1977);
Schrama (1991)
Organizations have a considerable degree of
discretion in designing structure and applying
IT.
Danziger, Dutton, Kling &
Kraemer (1982); Breukel (1996)
There are various consistent combinations of IT
and structure.
Figure 2: Summary of the debate over IT and organizational structure
It can be concluded that the relationship between IT and organizational structure has
been scrutinized many times, but that theoretical and empirical research has resulted in
contradictory findings.
1.2.2  Research on the relationship between ICT and
interorganizational coordination
Analogous to the relationship between IT and organizational parameters, a new research
theme has emerged recently and is now being discussed thoroughly. The debate
concerns itself with the relationship between information and communication
technology (ICT) and the emergence of interorganizational relations, or, more
specifically, the coordination mechanisms chosen. It is a theme that is especially11
relevant since the application of ICT has boomed (see section 1.1.1) and organizations
are considering new configurations for their interorganizational relationships (see
section 1.1.2).
In a classic article, Malone, Yates and Benjamin (1987) argue that in general, ICT
lowers information and coordination costs. Using transaction cost logic
13, Malone et al
claim that by using ICT, markets (‘electronic brokerage’) are favored over hierarchical
coordination mechanisms (‘electronic integration’). Davenport, Eccles and Prusak
restate this claim by hypothesizing that “(…) as organizations make widespread use of
information technology, information will flow freely and quickly eliminate hierarchy”
(1992, p. 54). Malone, Yates and Benjamin themselves state that “(…) in the long run,
the significant additional benefits to buyers possible from the electronic brokerage
effect will drive almost all electronic markets toward being unbiased channels for
products from many suppliers” (1987, p. 492).
The nature of the claim shows some resemblance to the early claims in the information
system discipline regarding the impact of information technology on structural
parameters. And, also analogous to the centralization and decentralization theses,
conflicting conclusions are drawn from empirical studies. Studies by Brynjolfsson,
Malone, Gurbaxani and Kambil (1993), Malone and Rockart (1992) and Ebers (1992)
support the markets-over-hierarchies claim.
On the other hand, Steinfield, Kraut and Plummer conclude that “(…) both the
theoretical arguments and the empirical evidence lead us to believe that firms will use
[ICT] to build tight relationships with their trading partners, rather than to select
suppliers on a transaction by transaction basis from a large pool. (…) Our review of the
literature shows that both electronic hierarchies and markets have been observed in
practice, but the former are, in fact, more commonly observed in business to business
networks” (1996, hypertext quotation). The observations by Steinfield, Kraut and
Plummer are supported by research findings by Johnston and Lawrence (1988) and Hart
and Estrin (1991), who also suggest that ICT can be used to favor more hierarchically
based interorganizational forms
14. Furthermore, Steinfield, Kraut and Plummer quote
research by Brousseau, who reviewed 26 situations in which two or more organizations
exchanged data electronically, finding that most ICTs served to reinforce already
existing hierarchical relationships among organizations.
                                                          
13 Transaction cost economics will be explained in chapter three.
14 Steinfield, Kraut and Plummer remark that the use of the term ‘hierarchical’ is
probably misleading, as it implies an authority relationship between autonomous
organizations (which is a contradiction or at least a paradox). However, in chapter three,
it is shown that hierarchy can also be based upon commonly agreed upon procedures. In
this context, hierarchy is used to suggest that partner organizations are tightly coupled
rather than linked only by ephemeral market-like transactions.12
Ribbers, Ekering and van Zutphen (1994) argue that a specific use of ICT, namely
EDI
15 systems, leads to more hierarchical coordination mechanisms because
organizations commit each other to specific standards and working procedures.
Steinfield, Kraut and Plummer, however, claim that the more extensively firms used
interorganizational networks, the more hierarchical were their relationships with partner
organizations, even when using highly open and ubiquitous public data network
infrastructures: “(…) even open networks are typically used to support hierarchical
relationships among firms” (1996, hypertext quotation).
In addition to the Malone-Yates-Benjamin claim (markets-over-hierarchies) and the
Steinfield-Kraut-Plummer claim (hierarchies-over-markets), Clemons, Reddi and Row
(1993) have formulated the ‘move-to-the-middle’ hypothesis. Based on evidence from
the automobile industries and banking sector, the authors predict that application of ICT
will affect production costs and transaction costs in such a way that longer term
interorganizational relationships with a smaller set of organizations will appear
predominantly.
In an attempt to reconcile contrasting results from various empirical studies, Holland
and Lockett remark that ICTs “(…) do not affect directly the evolution of governance
structure such as markets or hierarchies, which are instead determined by asset
specificity, market complexity and strategic choice. However, [ICT] can affect all of
them in some way enabling a much greater flexibility of outcome both in the short and
longer terms. (…) In essence, [ICTs] enable organizations to do what they want much
more efficiently and flexible” (Holland & Lockett, 1994, p. 409)
16. This thesis is
referred to as the ‘anything goes’ explanation. Note that the markets-over-hierarchies,
hierarchies-over-markets and move-to-the-middle hypotheses are competing hypotheses
whereas the ‘anything-goes’ explanation can supplement any of the three explanatory
schemes mentioned above.
                                                          
15 EDI (electronic data interchange) is a specific application of ICT.
16 Holland and Lockett speak of interorganizational information systems instead of ICT
or telematics, the terms that we have used thus far. This is a terminological difference
which is addressed in section 2.2. Although many definitions of ICT and
interorganizational information systems overlap, interorganizational information
systems include a knowledge aspect which is absent in most definitions of ICT. For the
moment, however, these terms are assumed to be synonymous.13
Author Hypothesis
Steinfield, Kraut & Plummer (1996);
Johnston & Lawrence (1988); Hart &
Estrin (1991); Ribbers, Ekering & van
Zutphen (1994)
ICT favors hierarchies over markets.
Malone, Yates & Benjamin (1987);
Brynjolfsson, Malone, Gurbaxani &
Kambil (1993), Malone & Rockart
(1992);  Ebers (1992)
ICT favors markets over hierarchies.
Holland & Lockett (1994) ICT can favor any governance structure.
Clemons, Reddi & Row (1993) ICT enables intermediate governance
structures.
Figure 3: Summary of debate over ICT and interorganizational coordination
In Figure 3, the debate over the relationship between ICT and interorganizational
coordination is summarized.
Not surprisingly, the research that has generated these contradictory findings has been
criticized for a number of reasons, which will be elaborated below.
·  Firstly, research has been criticized because of empiricism (or, in this case, more
precisely theoretical poverty) and ideological prejudice. Zuurmond (1994) states
that many researchers have speculated on the existence of trends and have tried to
illustrate (rather than validate) these trends by means of case studies. However,
Zuurmond does not illustrate his proposition by mentioning specific research
projects and does not refer to the key references in the debate mentioned above,
which have a clear theoretical orientation and can hardly be accused of having a
ubiquitous ideological orientation.
·  Secondly, there is criticism of a more or less technical-methodological nature. This
type of criticism states that large quantitative studies especially are based on
secondary data (i.e., data that was gathered for other purposes). A traditional
disadvantage of such an approach is that secondary data often does not contain the
variables one requires, or that the data is not gathered at the appropriate level of
analysis. For example, analyses conducted at the industry level do not necessarily
speak to the way organizations deploy information technology and telematics
(Steinfield, Kraut and Plummer, 1996).
·  Thirdly, and somewhat more fundamentally, is the observation that the application
of telematics is also likely to be influenced by pre-existing relationships among
organizations (a so-called ‘reinforcement’ hypothesis, see, for example, Danziger,
Dutton, Kling & Kraemer [1982]). This explanation, in which the direction of
causation in the debate on technological and organizational variables is reversed, is
not addressed in many empirical studies.14
·  Fourthly, there is also criticism of the choice of variables in explanatory models.
Steinfield, Kraut and Plummer (1996) emphasize the importance of locus of control
in interorganizational information systems and, related to this factor, the
deployment of interorganizational information systems by partner organizations as
a focal point of research. They state furthermore that these aspects are usually
lacking in current research on the relationship between information technology and
interorganizational relations.
Here it is necessary to elaborate on the more fundamental reasons for criticism: (1) the
criticism of doubt as to the direction of causality and (2) the criticism regarding choice
of variables.
The criticism of doubt as to the direction of causality is probably addressed best by
proposing an emergent perspective for describing the phenomena under scrutiny (see
also section 1.2.1).  The emergent perspective states that there is a relationship between
variables in a logical sense
17, although unilateral causal inferences are not stated (see
van den Bosch [1993], Mintzberg [1994] and van der Heijden [1995])
18.
The criticism of doubt regarding the choice of variables, and, more specifically, the
neglect of ‘locus of control’ is addressed especially in the literature on information
management (for a definition and more complete discussion, refer to chapter two). For
now, information management is loosely defined as strategic decision making regarding
IT in and between organizations
19.
In the studies mentioned above, it is hypothesized that ICT by itself yields effects.
However, it has been proposed that the same type of ICT yields different effects
whenever it is subject to different control models, whenever it is put to a different aim
(e.g. its functionality is changed), or whenever the architecture that determines how
various components are related is changed (Gazendam, 1993).  In this line of reasoning,
ICT is malleable. In fact, the term ICT is no longer used and it is customary to replace it
with the term interorganizational information systems. As will be explained in section
2.2.2, the term interorganizational information system captures better the fact that
technology is always used in a specific organizational context.
According to this view, the decision making that surrounds interorganizational
information systems in terms of actors involved and their respective tasks in the
development process is far more important than the technology itself. This point of view
is adhered to by, for example, George and King (1991), who, with reference to the
debate mentioned in section 1.2.1, have emphasized the role of managerial action and
decision making. With reference to the debate mentioned in section 1.2.2, Webster
                                                          
17 That is, it is assumed that there is a subset of the Cartesian product space over
operationalized variables.
18 For a discussion of ‘consistent’ interorganizational coordination forms, see Alexander
(1995).
19 In section 2.2.3, a more elaborate definition is presented.15
(1995a, 1995b) claims that by explaining the debate solely in terms of ICT, “(…)
[q]uestions still arise as to how much information is shared, how access is controlled,
who is excluded from certain information exchanges, and to whose relative advantage.
(…) These issues are subject to management choice rather than technological
imperative” (Webster, 1995a, p. 40). Kubicek (1995) also explicitly adheres to this point
of view. He states that information technology is still treated as one property and
criticizes the technological imperative that is often immediate in the literature. “Again,
technology (telecommunications, networks, standards) is supposed to have a great
impact. The literature rarely differentiates types of EDI systems, or considers other
relevant contextual factors, and there is almost no analysis of the actors involved and
the organization of the development process” (Kubicek, 1995, p. 76). Kubicek
furthermore hints at differentiation that is possible with respect to managerial action.
However, Kubicek does not state how this differentiation is achieved (what different
kinds of roles exist, what different kinds of organization of the development process
exist, etc.).
The emphasis on decision making and managerial action in the field of
interorganizational information systems has a number of antecedents in theory and
practice. The Dutch Ministry of Interior has published a number of policy documents
(BIOS documents) in which the role of managerial action is stressed as a means of
improving effectiveness and efficiency in the fulfillment of organizational tasks. In
these documents, attention is also given to interorganizational information systems:
“[f]or effective (electronic) communication between firm and governmental agencies
and between various governmental agencies, not only the technology itself is involved,
but communicating partners also have to commit each other to certain agreements”
20
(BIOS-3, 1995, p. 50). In the BIOS-3 policy document, it is claimed that it is necessary
to draw up agreements (regarding content) with respect to the exchange of structured
information. Since 1988, information structure outlines
21 have been introduced in order
to structure information technology within various policy fields: “Information structure
outlines must provide a sense of the direction in which information systems within a
policy field have to be developed”
22 (Algemene Rekenkamer, 1997, p. 13).
Furthermore, the idea behind information structure outlines is not specific to
governments. In general, the explicit direction of information systems has gained a lot
of attention, both by scholars as well as by practitioners.
                                                          
20 “Voor effectieve (electronische) communicatie tussen het bedrijf en de overheid en
tussen overheidsinstanties onderling komt meer om de hoek kijken dan techniek alleen,
er moeten ook allerlei afspraken gemaakt worden tussen de communicatiepartners”.
21 In Dutch: informatiestructuurschetsen.
22 “Structuurschetsen moeten de richting aangeven, waarin de informatievoorziening
binnen een deelgebied zich dient te ontwikkelen”.16
However, the attention that is given to information management in theory and practice
must not be interpreted as unconditional support for information management in all
circumstances. Practical experiences and research activities have demonstrated that
information management is not at all a trivial activity. Neither information system
research nor experience from practice has provided uncontested evidence that
structuring of information systems by means of policy pronouncements or bilateral
agreement is working well. In the BIOS-3 policy document, it is stated that information
management must receive attention in discussions about organizational effectiveness
and efficiency, but also warns not to overestimate this role. In 1997, the Netherlands
Court of Audit
23 investigated the effects of managerial action (i.e., what happened to
twenty policy fields that were designated as targets for information structure outlines).
In fact, such an outline was eventually drafted in only nine policy fields. In practice,
these nine outlines were often seen as being too abstract, too limited or one-sided.
Furthermore, in many of the cases in which an outline existed, it did not direct the
information systems development in the organization, partially due to impediments in
existing legislation
24.
It is possible, of course, possible to characterize the experiences with information
structure outlines as symptoms, signs of resistance of a temporary nature. Breukel
(1996) provides criticism of a more fundamental nature on managerial action towards
information systems. In his research, Breukel assumed that an explicit, formal,
centralized form of information management (called SISP: strategic information
systems planning) resulted in an organization’s strategic performance through
established alignment in an organization
25. Breukel rejected the hypothesized positive
relationship between the presence of this form of managerial action and alignment in
organizations.
Summarizing, the relationship between interorganizational information systems and
interorganizational relations is a complex one. The debate on the effects of
interorganizational information systems on interorganizational relations yielded
divergent results, and therefore the original research design with two variables, ICT and
interorganizational coordination, should be adjusted. In their discussion of the debate
between ICT and interorganizational coordination, Steinfield, Kraut and Plummer
(1996) proposed two possible adjustments.
Firstly, shift the focus to managerial action with respect to information systems rather
than focus on the underlying technology in order to meet the criticism of lack of
                                                          
23 In Dutch: Algemene Rekenkamer
24 The Chamber of Audit did not investigate effectiveness of information structure
outlines. It nonetheless reports that profiles are useful for facilitating deliberation and
promoting mutual understanding in a policy field.
25 In fact, the relationship between (1) alignment between IT, structure and strategy and
(2) strategic performance was corroborated; the hypothesis that the presence of SISP
causes alignment, however, was rejected.17
attention to ‘locus of control’. This provides the opportunity to follow Breukel’s
recommendations for further research, e.g., investigating “(…) the possibility of further
differentiating SISP” (Breukel, 1996, p. 242).  By analyzing “(…) the way in which the
decision-making processes take place (who are committed, which items are discussed),
and the communication flows that can be detected (who triggers the decision-making
process?)” (1996, p. 244) and the way the results of the above-mentioned decision-
making processes are stated “in terms of policy statements about IT and the
organizational configurations required” (1996, p. 244), various approaches to
information management can be distinguished, meeting Kubicek’s criticism.
Secondly, unilateral causal inferences between variables are not assumed. Rather, based
on the theory of information management and interorganizational relations,
combinations of information management approaches and interorganizational
coordination can be scrutinized and consistent combinations can be identified.
1.3  Preliminary research goal
The elaboration of the controversy over interorganizational information systems and
interorganizational coordination by identifying consistent patterns of information
management approaches and types of interorganizational relationships is the core of the
motivation of the current study. Although the motivation stems quite directly from the
wish to sharpen theoretical constructs in order to be able to contribute to the debate on
interorganizational information systems and interorganizational relations, there are also
numerous practical considerations in addressing this problem. Nowadays, there are
many challenges for EDI systems in public and private firms. Despite the technological
advances mentioned in section 1.1.1, initiatives to exchange data often face unexpected
and mindboggling resistance. Hopefully, the results of this research can contribute to a
better understanding of these phenomena.
In this study, the focus is on interorganizational information systems and how they are
managed in specific interorganizational relationships. Therefore, the focus is not on
individual organizations but on relations between two or more autonomous
organizations. The scrutiny of appropriateness of management approaches in
interorganizational relations has not been pursued often but is not new either (see, for
example, Alexander [1995], Grandori [1997]). For example, Grijpink (1997) assumes
that decision making on what he refers to as value chain computerization and
interorganizational characteristics has to be aligned
26.
Thus, the level of analysis is not so much the individual worker, group, department or
organization with principally clear boundaries, limited relations with others, and a focus
on internal efficiency and effectiveness (Konsynski, 1993, p. 111; Homburg &
Gazendam, 1997), but rather the level of analysis is the relationship between
organizations. In this way, the environmental niche of interorganizational arrangements
                                                          
26 “Keteninformatisering en coordinatiebehoefte moeten goed op elkaar zijn afgestemd”
(Grijpink, 1997, p. 42).18
can be examined to determine appropriate information management approaches not only
within specific participating organizations but also within the configuration of the
interorganizational network as a whole (Levinson, 1994). Using this line of reasoning,
emphasis on the organization is replaced by emphasis on the partnership of two or more
organizations, including matters of how coordination takes place within
interorganizational relations (Cunningham & Tynan, 1993).
In section 1.2, the core argument has been summarized and the motivation of the study
has been presented. The objective of this study is to contribute to the theory of
information management regarding interorganizational information systems and
especially  to attain more insight into combinations of various information management
approaches and various types of interorganizational relations. The outcome desired is
thus a theory relating characteristics of information management on the one hand and
characteristics of interorganizational relations on the other hand. This theoretical
framework may be used in the field of information systems to explain the
appropriateness of information management practices in various contingencies. In the
field of interorganizational relations and networks of organizations, the framework may
be used to indicate which coordination mechanisms are congruous with specific
information management approaches.
In the following sections, the research objective will be worked out, eventually into a
research design that guides the research activities.
1.4 Research  questions
Inspired, in particular, by the debate mentioned in section 1.2.2 and subsequent studies
(for example, by Holland & Lockett [1994]), it is necessary to elaborate on the initial
relationship between ICT and interorganzational relations, albeit by proposing a number
of refinements.
Firstly, ‘ICT’ will be replaced by the variable ‘information management’ as the
important variable in the research next to ‘interorganizational relations’. Information
management as a variable provides the opportunity of highlighting the fact that
information systems can be deployed differently in different settings, and can be subject
to different control models and architectures. Hence, it is probably more appropriate to
speak of interorganizational information systems instead of ICTs.
Secondly, it is desirable to avoid the universalistic bias that has been frequent in
organizational and interorganizational research (Grandori, 1997) by trying to identify
consistent combinations of information management approaches and interorganizational
coordination mechanisms. This is achieved by providing an explanation for the
appropriateness of various information management approaches in various ‘contingent’
circumstances: that is, characteristics of interorganizational relations.
This line of reasoning is comparable to, for example, the study of Burns and Stalker
(1961). In their study, it is asserted that a ‘mechanistic’ structure which features strong
hierarchical control is consistent with control conditions of task certainty, whereas an19
organic structure, featuring loose hierarchical controls, mutual adjustment and
widespread use of discretion, initiative taking and participation is consistent with
conditions of task uncertainty. Related studies are described by Woodward (1965),
Perrow (1970) and Lawrence and Lorsch (1967).
The studies mentioned above have been criticized for a number of reasons.
Firstly, Zuurmond (1994) criticizes the prediction that in complex, turbulent
environments, so-called professional organization structures must exist. This is,
however, an example of a normative theoretical statement, which is inspired by design-
oriented versions of systems theory but which is not representative of the vast majority
of empirically-oriented studies.
Secondly, another stream of criticism has developed from the point of view of
organizational ecology (Hannan & Freeman, 1977; Donaldson, 1995). The core of the
criticism is that organizations are not always capable of adapting to consistent patterns
but that they ‘survive’ when consistency between variables exists or ‘die’ if there is
inconsistency. However, the population-ecology perspective in its most pure form
shows some internal inconsistencies (Péli, Bruggeman, Masuch & Nualláin, 1994), it
lacks empirical support (Donaldson, 1995) and in a later version of the population-
ecology theory, redesign (as a kind of managerial action) became possible (although it
was seen as the start of a new organization [Breukel, 1996]).
Using the above line of reasoning, it is possible to rephrase the research objective as the
identification of ‘fits’ or ‘gestalts’
27 of information management approaches and various
types of interorganizational relations. To reach the research goal, a number of research
questions are stated.
The first research question relates to information management, or, more specifically, the
differentiation that is possible with respect to information management (see section
1.2.2).  It has already been mentioned that, customarily, information management
denotes an explicit, formalized and centralized management activity. However, Kubicek
has argued for a more differentiated concept of information management (i.e., more
decentralized), although he did not indicate how such an information management
approach differs from the ‘traditional’ approach.
1.  What approaches to information management for interorganizational information
systems can be defined?
The second research question refers to the variety that exists in interorganizational
relations. As the Malone-Yates-Benjamin thesis, which served to inspire the current
                                                          
27 ‘Fit’ and ‘gestalt’ are often used synonymously. The word ‘fit’ is often used in
quantitative research, whereas the word ‘gestalt’ is customarily preferred in qualitative
research.20
study, focuses on the coordination between organizations as the most important attribute
of an interorganizational relationship, this study attempts to explain why various types
of coordination between organizations exist.
2.  What types of coordination between organizations can be defined?
With research questions one and two, the variables of the research framework are
identified, but an explanation of ‘appropriateness’ (in terms of ‘internally consistent
patterns of variables’) is not available yet. Such an explanation, in terms of propositions
and hypotheses, is addressed in the third research question. On the basis of information
management theory, to be discussed in order to answer the first research question, and
the theory of interorganizational relations, to be discussed in order to answer the second
research question, ‘plausible’ combinations of information management approaches and
interorganizational coordination forms are identified. Note that these hypotheses
together form the theory of information management regarding interorganizational
information systems which is the stated objective of this study.
3.  Which hypotheses relating interorganizational information management approaches
and  characteristics of interorganizational relations can be constructed?
Thus far, research questions hint at the construction of a theory on information
management of interorganizational information systems. This emphasis on theory
construction is consistent with the research objective (see section 1.3). However,
confrontation of hypotheses with empirical data is the ultimate test for any theory. The
fourth and last research question addresses the empirical validation of the theory
developed from the first three research questions. With this research question, it is
possible to investigate if, in practice, strategic decision-making processes are taking
place in accordance with the motives identified in information management theory and
theories of interorganizational relations, or if the hypotheses identified in research
question three should be adapted or even rejected.
4.  Is there empirical validation for the hypotheses relating information management
approaches and characteristics of interorganizational relations?
This framework is in a way rather eclectic. The attribute ‘eclectic’ signifies that the
framework draws on various theoretical perspectives without necessarily integrating
them into a grand meta theory. By taking various stances and arguing from a number of
different, sometimes even contradictory, perspectives, it will be possible to provide
much richer insights, compared to simply arguing from one theoretical position.
Moreover, as Schwarzer, Zerbe and Krcmar (1997) note, studies that incorporate both
information technology aspects as well as organizational aspects not only highlight the
complexity of the research area but also show that it is nearly impossible to find one
single theoretical approach that can incorporate all different aspects. It therefore seems21
reasonable to develop an eclectic framework. In terms used by Bacharach (1989), the
theory hinted at in the research objective is connective rather than transformational,
where connectivity refers to the ability of a new theory to bridge the gap between two or
more theories and transformation refers to the need to reevaluate the preexisting
theories.
Of course, there is a danger that this will bring about an ‘eclectic smattering of theories’
(Van de Ven, Emmett & Koenig, 1974). In chapters two, three, four and especially five,
however, it will be shown that it is possible to synthesize a framework that consists of
multiple perspectives that nonetheless are grounded in a limited number of theoretical
schools of thought. Moreover, the unitary interorganizational theory sought by Van de
Ven et al either does not exist, is not precise enough or simply has not been able to pass
the empirical test until now.
The eclectic framework is confronted with empirical data and may be adapted using the
fourth research question. This confrontation takes place in a number of stages. Firstly,
the theoretical concepts used are validated by means of studying secondary case
material and initial interviews and document analysis of original case material.
Secondly, the presumed relationship between concepts, operationalized in variables and
indicators, is checked with the empirical data.
The enumeration of research questions sums up what is studied, not how the
investigation takes place. The latter is explained in the following section.
1.5 Research  design
1.5.1 Introduction
To indicate how research questions are answered (with what strategies, using what
methods, etc.), research activities are laid down in a method of research (van der Zwaan,
1990, p. 21) or research design (Yin, 1994). Yin defines a research design as “an action
plan for getting from here to there, where ‘here’ may be defined as the initial set of
questions to be answered and ‘there’ as some set of conclusions (answers) about the
questions” (Yin, 1994, p. 28).
In general, there are many research designs available to organizational scientists. In
general, the content and form of the research design to be used is dependent on the
research goal specified. In this section, firstly, we will present an overview of various
research approaches and of criteria that lead to choosing any of these approaches, and
we will argue which research approach suits our research goal. Then, secondly, we will
give an overview of various research strategies to be chosen after a research approach
has been selected as well as of criteria that can be used to select a research strategy, and
the selection of the specific research strategy for our purposes will be explained.
A first distinction that is possible is the distinction between problem solving as a
research activity and theory developing and testing as a research activity.22
1.5.2  Applied research versus fundamental research
In general, it is possible to distinguish two approaches toward research (van Strien,
1986, p. 19; Swanborn, 1984, p. 127). An applied research approach is primarily aimed
at solving real, existing problems in a well-defined, step-by-step manner using
theoretical frameworks and models to derive a solution for the problem under scrutiny.
The steps to be taken are prescribed by the regulative cycle (or the diagnosis-
intervention-implementation cycle of the applied research approach). Bosman (1977)
has applied the regulative cycle to the design of information systems. He has proposed a
number of refinements to the research approach, although he has left the core of the
regulative cycle intact.
Phase Description Results in…
Problem definition Perceived discrepancy
between an actual and
normative situation
Description of actual and desired
state
Diagnosis Formulation of the
problem in terms of a
theoretical framework
Statements indicating how actual
state can be transformed into
desired state
Plan Design of solutions Proposal for timing and
localization of intervention
Intervention Implementation of the
solution proposed
Description of state arrived at
after intervention has taken place
Evaluation Test if gap between
actual and normative
situation has narrowed
Statements indicating to what
extent desired state has been
reached
Figure 4: Elements of the regulative cycle
The elements (Figure 4) form a cycle because evaluation of the results of the testing can
form the basis of other problem-solving research activities (Figure 5).23
Figure 5: Regulative cycle
However, a fundamentally different cycle is followed when the goal of the research is
explaining phenomena by developing a theory. Here, the approach is called the
fundamental approach, which is characterized by the empirical cycle (Swanborn, 1984,
p. 124). The empirical cycle consists of the following elements (Figure 6).
Phase Description Results in …
Observation Exploration of a phenomenon
(previous studies, literature,
primary observation)
Indication of relevant
concepts, variables
Induction Design of an exploratory model
on the basis of parts of existing
theories
Exploratory framework
Deduction Deduction of testable hypotheses
from the explanatory model
Set of hypotheses which
together constitute a theory
Testing Confrontation of hypotheses with
empirical data
Statements indicating
confirmation / disconfirmation
of theory
Evaluation Rejection, revision or
corroboration of the model
Revised theory
Figure 6: Elements of the empirical cycle
Again, the above phases constitute a cycle because rejecting, revising or corroborating
an explanatory model can generate new observations and, subsequently, new theory
construction and testing (Figure 7). Note that this gradual shaping of theories is very
much inspired by the philosophy of science of critical rationalism, in the sense that
scientific inquiry is an interplay between knowledge (in the form of theories) and
problem
definition
diagnosis
plan intervention
evaluation24
empirical data. This feature is also adhered to in, for example, Peirce’s view on science:
in his view, as well as in the critical rationalist view, knowledge in the form of theories
is formed in a self-corrective inquiry process, in which the knowledge of previous
scholars is inherited and possibly refined. The ultimate source of knowledge, however,
is different. In a critical rationalist’s view, knowledge is eventually based in theories
that explain empirical phenomena. In Peirce’s view, this inquiry is at heart a process of
free association or creative thinking, or at best the utterance of preference for a
hypothesis (out of a set of hypotheses) that explains a phenomenon
28. Kuhn and Lakatos
have proposed other refinements. Kuhn states that there is no gradual cumulation of
knowledge, but that the body of knowledge of science grows by ‘scientific revolutions’
or paradigm shifts, which makes subsequent theories incommensurable.  Lakatos, on the
other hand, assumes a sort of ‘path dependence’ in any scientific community; that is, a
theory is rejected only if it has proved to be really untenable (after several refutations of
hypotheses) and if a better theory is available.
The refinements proposed by Kuhn and Lakatos describe well how science progresses
over large periods of time (decades). As the current study does not address such a period
of time, these refinements are not taken into account here.
The fundamental approach, guided by the phases of the empirical cycle, tries to
contribute to the understanding of phenomena through theory construction. It is the goal
of theory construction that distinguishes the empirical cycle from the regulative cycle.
In the empirical cycle, by means of improved understanding, knowledge in the form of
theories is provided that can be used to analyze problems and to plan actions to improve
a problematic situation, but problem solving is not primary to the fundamental
approach.
In section 1.3, contributing to the theory of information management in
interorganizational relations was stated as the research objective of this study. Theory
building as an objective indicates a fundamental research question and suggests an
empirical cycle to be used in this study.
                                                          
28 Peirce amends the standard empirical cycle as follows. He discerns abduction, which
consists of examining a mass of facts and allowing these facts to suggest a theory;
deduction, to deduce from that ideal theory a variety of consequences, and induction,
the verification of effects by means of experimentation. Other than redefining some
elements of the empirical cycle, however, the addition of an abduction phase does not
transcend the induction-deduction-testing phases identified in Figure 6.25
Figure 7: Empirical cycle
1.5.3  Research strategies
Note that the phases identified in Figure 6 and Figure 7 are phases that can be
analytically separated but that represent a rather stylized representation of many
research endeavors.  In practice, the phases of the empirical cycle do not have the same
weight in all research activities and they do not always constitute the exact sequence
presented in Figure 6 and Figure 7; iterations may frequently occur.
These deviations from the ‘pure’ empirical cycle may be explained because, in various
attempts to explain phenomena by developing theories, researchers are confronted with
existing theories that are more or less developed.  For some phenomena, there are few
theories with testable hypotheses available that explain these phenomena. In these cases,
the induction and deduction phases may be given more attention and iteration between
induction, deduction, testing and evaluation frequently occurs. For example, in such a
situation, considerable effort may be spent on, for example, conceptual analysis, and
possibly formalization of various fragments of existing theories, in order to provide a
basic comprehension of how empirical particulars are related. Gazendam (1993)
proposes the CAST method
29 to explore and formalize existing theories or fragments of
                                                          
29 CAST is an acronym for Conceptual Analysis and Specification of organization
Theories. CAST is a method to conceptually analyze and formalize organization
theories in order to guide the development of knowledge-based decision-support
systems (KB-DSS). Although, in the current study, the focus is on theory development
rather than on the development of KB-DSSs, the CAST method is considered valuable
because it provides guidance in the analysis of (fragments of) theories. The original
CAST method consists of a number of steps: (1) summarizing the theory in terms of key
concepts, key performance indicators, main hypotheses and reasoning processes; (2) the
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theories. In fact, in taking a view on doing research in which theory development is
stressed, the exploration (and possibly formalization) of theories may well take up far
more energy and time than the gathering and analysis of data.
It is possible to explain occurrences of some phenomena through a full-blown theory. In
this case, less energy and time must be devoted to developing testable hypotheses
(because hypotheses are often available and well-described); the gathering and analysis
of data in these cases often is more elaborate and demanding.
It must be noted, though, that in all research activities, whether based on the wish to
develop theory or having theory testing as the research objective, all phases identified in
Figure 6 and Figure 7 require attention. Every research activity has an activity involving
theoretic inferencing and an activity in which hypotheses are confronted with empirical
data.
In the methodological literature, various research strategies to be used within the
framework of the empirical cycle have been described (Yin, 1994; Den Hartog & Van
Sluijs, 1995; Swanborn, 1984). Figure 8 provides a summary of these research
strategies.
                                                                                                                                             
specification of an interpretation frame in an object-oriented grammar notation; (3) rule
specification; and (4) dynamics specification. As we will describe later on, we will
focus on the first phase of the method (see Gazendam [1993] for a more elaborate
description of the CAST method).27
Research strategy Description
Case study Observation of a phenomenon in a natural context,
employing various methods to gather information from
relevant people, groups or organizations.
Survey Measurement of a number of variables in many
individuals, groups or organizations.
Action research Manipulation and observation by participating in a real-life
setting, for example by participating as a consultant in a
project, because of which the researcher is able to access
information which would otherwise have remained
inaccessible. Eventually, the objective is to provide an
explanation (theory) of phenomena.
Ethnographic study Participative observation in a specific, real-life setting.
Here, the emphasis is on the ‘Verstehen’ (grasping) of
phenomena and on doing justice to the context in which a
phenomenon takes place. Theory use or theory
development is not central.
Simulation Manipulation of parameters in a model to observe changes
in endogenous variables in the model.
Experiment Measurement of one or more variables in an experimental
group and in a control group before and after the
experimental group has been exposed to a stimulus.
Figure 8: Fundamental research strategies
Note that in Figure 8, a distinction is made between case study research, action research
and the ethnographic study. In other literature, these different research strategies are
sometimes subsumed under the heading of case study. However, as has been shown in
Figure 8, there are important differences which may influence the selection of these
research strategies and, therefore, the distinction is worth mentioning.
There are criteria that can be used to determine the appropriateness of various research
strategies. For example, Benbasat, Goldstein and Mead (1987) state that the selection of
a research strategy depends on the nature of the research topic and the goal of the
research.
A first criterion for the selection of a research strategy is the possibility of manipulating
the phenomenon under scrutiny. If the phenomenon is a historical event or if
manipulation of a present event is not possible, this leaves out the possibility of
choosing the experiment or action research as a research strategy. Simulation may be an
alternative to experiments, but only if the original setting can be modeled in a computer
model or in a setting in which human actors play the roles of actors in a real-life setting.
A second criterion is the nature of the research, and, related to this point, the state of the
theory development. If the research is aimed at theory testing, experiments, explanative28
case studies or comparative surveys may be used in order to replicate previous empirical
studies. However, if the goal of the research is theory development, explorative cases,
surveys and simulation may be used to found theoretical statements on empirical data
that is more or less coincidental (Breukel, 1996, p. 174).
These two criteria can be used to form a matrix in which research strategies are
positioned (Figure 9)
30. Note that the positioning of research strategies in the matrix is
only a rough indication of the appropriateness of various research strategies. Yin (1994)
stresses that there is no (hierarchical) order in research strategies. He opposes the view
in which case studies are portrayed as appropriate only for research activities that stress
exploration, surveys and ethnographic studies for research activities that emphasize
description and experiments for situations in which providing explanations is important.
In practice, Yin claims, there are also experiments with an exploratory character and
case studies that provide explanations for historical events. So the criteria cannot be
applied in a mechanistic way; although each strategy has its own distinctive
characteristics, there are large areas of overlap between them and the boundaries
between strategies are not always clear and sharp. “No strategy is more appropriate than
all others for all research purposes” (Benbasat, Goldstein & Mead, 1987, p. 369).
Research aim
Theory testing Theory development
Possible Experiment, simulation Action research Manipulation
Impossible Survey (Exploratory) case study
Figure 9: Appropriateness of research strategies
In the present study, it is impossible for the researcher to manipulate real-life
information management approaches or characteristics of interorganizational relations.
It is not realistic for any organization scientist or information system researcher to
propose to an organization to apply multiple information management approaches or to
change interorganizational relations with partner organizations. And even if this was
realistic, it surely is impossible to implement each of these interventions in similar
circumstances. So experimentation is ruled out as a research strategy.
Furthermore, in sections 1.2.1 and 1.2.2, it was concluded that current research on the
relationship between interorganizational information systems and interorganizational
relations results in contradictory conclusions, which necessitates further theory
construction. Therefore, it was stated in section 1.3, that the research objective was to
develop theory. In our tentative matrix, for this combination of circumstances, a case
study is suggested.
In the current study, we emphasize theory development and conceptual analysis of
existing theories and theory fragments, and we use case studies to enrich and possibly
refine the theoretical explanation. For the theory development, conceptual analysis is
                                                          
30 As neither theory use nor theory development is central to ethnographic studies,
ethnographic studies cannot be positioned in the matrix.29
used according to the first phase of the CAST method,
31 which emphasizes
identification of key concepts, key performance indicators, main hypotheses and
reasoning processes.
The choice of the case study in organization science or information system research in
order to illustrate and possibly refine theory is not at all an unprecedented one. Because
of the properties of absence of possibilities to manipulate and enmeshment of
phenomena with contexts, case studies are frequently encountered in the disciplines of
organization studies and information systems. Benbasat, Goldstein and Mead (1987)
remark that a distinguishing property of the scientific discipline of information systems
is that technological change and innovations (termed ‘novelty’ by Eisenhardt [1989])
occur frequently and that researchers often find themselves trailing behind practitioners
in proposing changes or in evaluating methods for developing new systems. Researchers
in this area usually learn from practitioners, rather than providing the initial wisdom for
these novel ideas. Benbasat, Goldstein and Mead recommend the case study for
capturing the knowledge of practitioners and enriching existing theories with this
knowledge.
Johnston and Yetton remark: “Case studies permit rich description, through capturing
multiple data sources and perspectives (…) It is not surprising then, that such research
frequently reveals emergent patterns and trends which inform theory, and thus facilitate
theory development” (1996, p. 193; see also Yin [1994]; Swanborn [1984]).
Summarizing, from the initial scrutiny of the literature on interorganizational
information systems and interorganizational relations, conflicting conclusions are drawn
and therefore, new theory development and sharpening of constructs is required. It is
therefore our aim to develop insights and theory on information management of
interorganizational information systems.  Furthermore, it is impossible for us to
manipulate the variables we are investigating. Using the above arguments, the emphasis
on theory development through conceptual analysis of existing fragments of theory, and
the tentative matrix (Figure 9), an exploratory case study is chosen as a research
strategy in order to enrich and possibly refine theory. Moreover, this strategy provides
opportunities to learn the state of the art, and to enrich theories using experiences from
practice (Benbasat, Goldstein & Mead, 1987), which is especially relevant because of
the rapid change in the field of interorganizational information systems.
1.5.4  Research activities
After having selected the case study as the methodology to be used in this research,
bearing in mind the restrictions and accentuations mentioned in section 1.5.3, the
question remains how this methodology fits the research design (research goal, research
questions).
                                                          
31 See footnote 29.30
Some authors state that the case study lends itself to theory development by inducing
entirely from empirical data (‘inductive logic’). For example, Eisenhardt (1989) states
that the case study “(…) relies on continuous comparison of data and theory beginning
with data collection” (Eisenhardt, 1989, p. 534; italics by VH; see also footnote 28).
However, a researcher adhering to such a view of the case study runs the risk of ‘death
by data asphyxiation’. Therefore, a priori specification of constructs and propositions,
and possibly variables and hypotheses (Bacharach, 1989) is a prerequisite, and this is
only possible through study of existing theory: coherent with the initial order in phases
of the empirical cycle.
In this study, the development of these ‘prerequisites’ is done through conceptual
analysis of theories from the disciplines of information systems, economic organization
theory and political organization theory, and basic mechanisms are formalized in a
mathematical representation. In fact, the larger part of this thesis consists of theory
construction through  conceptual analysis.
The development of theory is facilitated by case-evidence. As the typical case study
progresses, some distance is taken from the original empirical cycle: iterations between
deduction, induction and testing occur. “[R]esearchers constantly compare theory and
data - iterating toward a theory which closely fits the data” (Eisenhardt, 1989, p. 541).
This process of theory building through iteration is “(…) the heart of building theory
from case studies, but it is both the most difficult and the least codified part of the
process” (Eisenhardt, 1989, p. 539). It nevertheless is essential, because “it is the
intimate connection [of theory, VH] with empirical reality that permits the development
of a testable, relevant, and valid theory” (Eisenhardt, 1989, p. 532).
The iteration of induction and deduction takes place using within-case data as well as
cross-case data.  Doing this, hypotheses gradually take shape by (1) sharpening of
constructs and  (2) verifying that the emergent relationships fit with the data
(Eisenhardt, 1989). This type of reasoning (termed ‘replication’ by Yin [1994]
32)
especially facilitates theory development because “(…) it forces investigators to go
beyond initial impressions” (Eisenhardt, 1989, p. 541). In the literature on case study
methodology (Yin, 1994; Patton, 1990; Eisenhardt, 1989; Benbasat, Goldstein & Mead,
1987; van Strien, 1986; Swanborn, 1984), various ways to strengthen the case study
design are presented. Firstly, Eisenhardt comments: “The research team must judge the
strength and consistency of relationships within and across cases and also fully display
the evidence and procedures when the findings are published, so that readers may apply
their own standards” (1989, p. 544). This is, of course, in some ways rather trivial and
applies to all scientific inquiry. Secondly and more importantly, Denzin (1978, in:
                                                          
32 This logic of replication (Yin, 1994) differs from the logic in theory testing research
because in theory testing research, each hypothesis is examined for aggregate cases, not
individual cases as in theory building research. An advantage is that the latter provides
the opportunity to refine and extend the theory. A disadvantage is that theory building
using this kind of logic is more or less judgmental.31
Patton, 1990) mentions that an important way to strengthen a study design is through
triangulation. He has identified four basic types of triangulation.
·  Data triangulation: the utilization of various sources of data, either documents via
document analysis, human informants through interviews, etc.;
·  Investigator triangulation: the utilization of various researchers;
·  Theory triangulation: the utilization of various theoretical perspectives in the
research;
·  Methodology triangulation: the utilization of various methodologies (experiments,
surveys, case studies) in the research.
In general, the investigation of the alignment between information management
approaches and interorganizational characteristics takes place according to two lines of
reasoning.
·  There are multiple cases included in the study, so there are more combinations of
information management approach and types of interorganizational relations to be
analyzed, which enables replication of findings between cases.
·  If possible, individual cases are studied retrospectively for their history, i.e. how
information management approaches and interorganizational characteristics have
evolved over time. This also provides opportunities to replicate findings within
cases (over time).
Unfortunately, it proved not to be possible to employ investigator triangulation or
methodology triangulation. Investigator triangulation was impossible because of the fact
that this research, like many research projects, is a doctoral dissertation research project
for one researcher. It was therefore impossible to safeguard ‘concurrent’ investigator
triangulation. Possibly follow-up research activities may, over time, safeguard
investigator triangulation.
Methodology triangulation proved to be impossible because, in reference to section
1.5.3, it has been argued that the research strategy to be used is dependent on the
possibility of manipulation of the subject under scrutiny and the research objective
(theory development versus theory testing). As was argued in section 1.5.3, in this
research project it turned out to be impossible to create an experimental setting and the
research objective was to develop rather than to test theory. This combination of
characteristics suggests the use of a research strategy out of the bottom right cell of
Figure 9 and this cell contains only one research strategy. Therefore, pursuing
methodology triangulation proved not to be possible in the current study.
However, considerable effort has been spent on stressing theory triangulation and data
triangulation. Employing the eclectic framework has safeguarded theory triangulation
(see section 1.4). Data triangulation has been safeguarded by explicitly interviewing
various stakeholders who had been selected on theoretical grounds, and by studying
existing documents. The latter proved to be especially important in pursuing the second
line of reasoning in the research (the historical analysis of cases).32
Overall, the empirical study can be accused of abiding to a relatively positivist point of
view, as distinct from ethnographic or interpretivist (Eisenhardt, 1989). The latter
typically focuses on describing and interpreting the meaning of behavior within
particular contexts. In our research, the focus is on developing theory, which eventually
can be tested and potentially generalized across organizations that use
interorganizational information systems.
1.6  Thesis outline
In the preceding sections, the variables of interest were indicated and the research goal
and research questions were formulated. Moreover, in section 1.5, a research design was
chosen. The remainder of the dissertation will answer the research questions according
to the strategy that was explained in section 1.4. The structure of the dissertation is
depicted in  Figure 10.
 Figure 10: Structure of the thesis
The thesis has two parts: a theoretical part and an empirical part. In chapters two and
three, elements of the theoretical framework are documented from two different angles:
from the point of view of information management (research question one) and from the
perspective of interorganizational relations (research question two). Chapters two and
three consist of reviews of existing literature on information management and
interorganizational relations, respectively, including development of theory, comments,
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criticism and illustrations that have been mentioned. Combination of insights from these
angles is postponed until chapter four. Here, elements are synthesized into a theoretical
framework and the research objective is reformulated (research question three).
Chapter five provides results that illustrate the proposed mechanisms in an empirical
setting (research question four). In chapter six, the conclusions with regard to the
theoretical framework are summarized and recommendations for practice and further
research are provided.
In addition to the graphical depiction of the structure of the thesis ( Figure 10), the
contributions of the various chapters are summarized below (Figure 11).
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2  Variety in Information Management
2.1 Introduction
In chapter one, we have introduced the subject of the study (information management
and interorganizational relations). In previous research, we have seen that ‘information
technology’, ‘information systems’ and ‘information management’ are often-used
constructs with sometimes ambiguous meaning. In order to define one of the central
concepts of this thesis, information management of interorganizational information
systems, this chapter will elaborate on definitions of information technology,
interorganizational information systems and information management. In section 2.2,
these key concepts of this study are combined and this results in a definition of
information management of interorganizational information systems.
In section 2.3, the connection between information management and general
organization theory is discussed, tending toward the organizational imperative
perspective
33. Section 2.4 discusses information management and the variety that exists
with respect to information management, with its frame of reference inclining to the
technological imperative
34.
In section 2.5, interorganizational information management is discussed, based on the
contributions of the preceding sections, and, consistent with our research objective, the
theory fragments offered by organization theory and information systems theory are
analyzed conceptually for their key concepts, key performance indicators, main
hypotheses and, in general, for their reasoning processes. Section 2.6 describes
interorganizational information management in three cases (Dutch PICA Library
Automation, information systems in the Dutch penal law enforcement value chain, and
the case of information exchange in the British National Health Service). These cases,
which have been described in the literature, illustrate some appealing aspects that have
been identified in the theoretical literature. The chapter is concluded with an overview
of information management approaches and their characteristics.
                                                          
33 See section 1.1.3.
34 See footnote 33.36
2.2 Key  definitions
Until so far, we have been discussing information technology, information systems,
telematics and interorganizational information systems rather loosely. Markus and
Robey (1988) claim that the variety in definitions results in various conflicting measures
for information technology and that this complicates comparison of empirical and
theoretical research and impedes accumulation of knowledge in the field of
(management) information systems. Therefore, attention must be paid to an accurate
definition of the subject under investigation.
2.2.1  Information technology
Leavitt and Whisler first used the term ‘information technology’ in 1958. Since then,
many authors have used the term ‘information technology’ in many different senses.
Many definitions emphasize the parts which make up information technology (i.e.,
analytical definitions). For example, in the introduction to the ‘Management of the
1990’s Research Program’, Scott Morton refers to information technology as a set of
hardware, software, networks workstations, robotics and smart chips. Smart chips refers
to embedded information technology, such as the use of microprocessors in washing
machines, elevators, etc.
The above definition concentrates purely on technical matters and lack attention to
databases, procedures, people, etc. Breukel extends these purely ‘technical’ definitions
by adding what he calls ‘an implicit knowledge aspect’. “If a definition includes the role
of IT for business functions, the gap between the technological and knowledge angles
will be closed slightly” (Breukel, 1996, p. 34). In other words, a functional definition of
IT is also required. De Jong gives an example of such a functional definition of IT: “all
tools that can be used to collect, store, process and spread information” (1994, p. 15).
Other authors combine an analytical with a functional definition. Stegwee (1992) uses
the term information technology as a comprehensive term for hardware, software and
services relating to the processing, storage and communication of information, using
primarily opto-electronic means. Breukel (1996) defines information technology as the
collection of automated tools (hardware, software and telecommunications) that are
used for the support of information services of organizations.
Summarizing the writings on a definition of information technology, it is possible to
rephrase the definition of IT so that it includes elements of the above-mentioned
descriptions.
Information technology
(IT)
Collection of automated computer tools and associated
methods and techniques that can be used to collect,
store, process and spread information.
In the above definition, reference is made to all kinds of optic-electronic, programmable
computer tools. The inclusion of knowledge (‘methods and techniques’) in a definition
of information technology makes it possible to explain an important aspect of37
information technology: its ability to innovate work processes in organizations.
Knowledge can be seen as a resource in organizations. According to the resource-based
view of the firm (Penrose, 1959; van der Zaal, 1997), innovation of processes or
products is the result of the reshuffling of resources in organizations. By using the
definition of information technology that includes knowledge as an integral part of
information technology, it is also possible to emphasize innovation stemming from
information technology: “(…) enlarging the knowledge-base of an organization is an
important measure to extend innovative strength” (de Jong, 1994, p. 56). De Jong
concludes that it is very likely that application of IT has an innovative character (de
Jong, 1994, p. 190).
2.2.2  Information systems
Above, information technology is defined as a collection of technical means and the
knowledge to cope with those means. Some information technology definitions overlap
with definitions of information systems. For example, one of Gazendam’s definitions of
an information system is “a system consisting of a processor, a memory, data structures
and algorithms, in which the processor operates on data structures as specified by the
algorithms, and in which the data structures and the algorithms reside in the memory”
(Gazendam, 1993, p. 15).
But in general, definitions of information systems explicitly include pragmatic aspects:
the fact that information systems are used in organizations and that they in some way
contribute to goal achievement. Some authors state that an information system
constitutes an integral part of the organization itself. Here, an organization is usually
defined as a group of people with goals as well as methods, routines and mutual
expectations for achieving these goals. For example, Gazendam defines an organization
as “(…) an entity consisting of agents, processes of task performance and other
processes, and knowledge” (Gazendam, 1993, p. 14). In this definition, an ‘agent’ refers
to “an entity that can apply and generate knowledge”. Agents, according to Gazendam,
can be humans, organisms or machines.
It is thus possible to define an information system as the community of machine agents
in an organization. The community element in this definition refers to a group with
some sort of common expectations and incorporated goals. Machine agents are unique
in the sense that they are explicitly developed in order to aid human agents,
emphasizing certain values in order to achieve these goals. Essential in the
differentiation of information technology and information systems is thus the
organizational context (in terms of organizational goal achievement) that is present in
the definition of information systems and absent in the definition of information
technology.
In chapter one, it was discussed that communication technology has gained importance.
An important feature of machine agents is their capability to communicate with humans
using human-computer interfaces. But, despite the fact that the technology of telephony
has existed for quite some time, the communication between information systems using38
communication channels based on computers, data carriers and technical networks
(Gazendam, 1993) accounts for the new developments in the telecommunications
industry (chapter one and section 2.2.1). The advances in information technology and
telecommunication give rise to so-called telematics-based systems: information systems
that use telecommunication technology. Scott Morton (1991) and Nohria and Eccles
(1992) have described the trend towards the use of telematics.
An important distinction within telematics-based systems is the distinction between
deconcentrated information systems (or distributed data processing [Cash & Konsynski,
1985]) and interorganizational information systems (Suomi, 1990; Wierda, 1991).
Deconcentrated information systems use telecommunication technology to connect
geographically dispersed information systems that belong to one organization. Van der
Heijden refers to these kinds of information systems as ‘native’ systems. This kind of
telematics-based systems is relatively easy for organizations to handle:
·  An organization can always fully control its information systems at a strategic
level.
·  The costs of the information system can always be assigned to a single
organization, as can the resulting benefits
35 (Suomi, 1990).
Interorganizational information systems use telecommunication technology to couple
machine agents that are usually geographically dispersed but always belong to different
organizations. This boundary-spanning aspect implies a level of cooperation and
coordination well beyond that of the traditional arms length relationship that exists
between organizations in a totally free market (Kumar and van Dissel, 1995, 1996). On
the other hand, the coordination and communication is not as tightly coupled as is usual
between, for example, divisions of one organization.
Wierda (1991) defines interorganizational information systems as information systems
that are jointly developed, operated and/or used by two or more organizations that have
no joint executives. Barrett and Konsynski define an interorganizational information
system as a system “that involves resources shared between two or more organizations”
(Barrett and Konsynski, 1982, p. 94). Cash and Konsynski propose referring to an
interorganizational information system as “an automated information system shared by
two or more companies” (Cash & Konsynski, 1985, p. 134).
This type of information system is characterized by the fact that various machine agents
communicate and perform tasks that span two or more organizations. Therefore,
including the element of various participating organizations in the information system
can transform our definition of an information system into a definition of an
interorganizational information system.
                                                          
35 In an interorganizational setting, benefits may not always be observed and/or verified
by other organizations. See sections 3.3.5 and 4.4 for an elaboration.39
Interorganizational
information system (IIS)
An information system which is embedded in two or
more organizations with no joint executives
36 and
which is used and developed by these organizations
jointly.
An important element in the definition is the fact that two or more organizations
participate in an IIS. In practice, it is possible to think of various ways to analytically
separate organizations. Suomi (1990) distinguishes three criteria on the basis of which
organizations can be separated.
The first one he identifies is the juridical viewpoint in which organizations are described
as having their own assets and liabilities. Schmidt refers to this viewpoint as the formal
organization perspective: “[f]ormal organization is to be defined as in terms of
ownership and liability as opposed to the dynamic pattern of actual cooperative work
reflecting the requirements of the environment and the technical and human resources
available” (1991, p. 102). According to Suomi, the problem with this viewpoint is that a
parent company can tell a subsidiary to use an information system, even though the
organization might be juridically separate.
The second one is the technical viewpoint. An organization can be defined as having its
own structure and agents – both machine agents as well as human agents (‘technical and
human resources’, see Schmidt [1991]). The problem with this criterion is that
organizations can outsource their machine agents (use external service houses to take
the information processing at hand) and even human resources (by means of
externalization of labor using services of staffing agencies). In these cases, these
resources do not belong to the organization according to a technical viewpoint but
strategic decisions regarding the use of interorganizational information systems are still
in the hands of the outsourcing organization.
The third one is the managerial viewpoint. This point of view focuses on the
independence an organization has in making decisions about interorganizational
information systems: with what applications and techniques, but ultimately whether or
not to participate. According to Suomi, the managerial viewpoint should be decisive
and in this study, this viewpoint is accepted
37.
Suomi (1990) distinguishes three main categories of interorganizational information
systems.
                                                          
36 Very strictly speaking, the definition requires at least one executive, possible acting in
two or more roles.
37 In chapter four, it will be argued in a systematic way that the juridical, technical and
managerial viewpoints are hard to separate. At this moment, however, the managerial
viewpoint is adopted.40
·  Electronic Data Interchange systems: structured and standardized exchange of data
between organizations over an electronic transmission medium (van der Heijden,
1995, p. 5)
38. In the most automated form, on the basis of an event in the primary
process, an application generates and sends an electronic message which is received
and reacted upon by another application (machine-to-machine communication). At
this moment, there are several standards for EDI messages, such as EDIFACT and
ANSI X.12 (Ribbers, Ekering and van Zutphen, 1994).
·  Electronic Mail and Videoconferencing: the transfer of human-initiated information
from one computer to another (human-to-human communication). The exchanged
messages can be E-mail messages, but also video signals, sound fragments, etc.
·  Application to external databases: access to external databases with computer
interfaces. This is the most advanced form of interorganizational information
systems but also the least described. Nowadays, using, for example, the Internet, it
is possible to access databases that are geographically dispersed and whose tables
are maintained by various organizations.
Suomi’s categorization is somewhat confusing because, ideally, EDI (in its most
automated form) also involves access to databases without any human intervention.
Some definitions even require the absence of human intervention for an adequate
definition of electronic data interchange. In practice, however, EDI comes in a variety
of manifestations, with various degrees of integration with an organization’s internal
databases (Swatman and Swatman, 1991; Figure 12).
                                                          
38 Strictly speaking, EDI systems are not always interorganizational information
systems because they can also be used for native purposes (intraorganizational EDI as a
communication medium among departments within the same organization).41
Figure 12: Stages of EDI integration
Swatman and Swatman distinguish four stages of integration of EDI systems. In stage
zero, the output of organization X’s information system is printed and manually keyed
into organization Y’s information system. Stage one integrates the information systems
somewhat further and uses separate PCs to enhance communication between two
separate systems. An EDI converter is introduced in the second stage. Swatman and
Swatman’s final stage three is an information system with built-in EDI facilities.
It is especially this ‘stage three’ model of EDI software integration that blurs Suomi’s
distinction. Suomi’s first category sometimes overlaps with his third category,
interorganizational databases. Obviously, integration is a more useful criterion to
distinguish various interorganizational information systems than Suomi’s
categorization. For this reason, Suomi’s classification is rejected.
2.2.3 Information  management
Many authors point to managerial action towards information systems as an essential
area of concern (Earl, 1989; Porter, 1985; Johnston & Vitale, 1988). The number of
applications of information systems has increased over time, and duplication of data and
inefficiency caused by piecemeal implementation of many applications have drawn
attention to the management aspects of an organization’s information system (van
Waes, 1991). “Poorly managed data presents real problems for the management of large
organizations”, comments Shanks (1997, p. 69).
In the literature, it has been noted that many organizations have difficulties with
accessing data from multiple functions. Analyses showed that the lack of logical data
integration across information systems (as a result of so-called ‘island automation’)
I
S
I
S
I
S
I
S
I
S
I
S
I
S
I
S
C
o
n
v
e
r
t
e
r
C
o
n
v
e
r
t
e
r
Document
Document Document
Document
P
C
P
C
Organization X Organization Y
Stage 3: 
Software
integration
Stage 2:
EDI converter
Stage 1:
stand-alone 
PCs
Stage 0: 
no EDI42
made answering cross-functional or cross-divisional questions difficult. “This leads to
duplicated and inconsistent data and difficulty in the consolidation of data for reporting”
(Shanks, 1997, p. 70), because “(…) [i]nformation from several functional areas within
an organization is frequently required for strategic decisions” (1997, p. 69).
From the viewpoint of resource allocation, it has been argued that information systems
require attention from a management point of view, in order to “align the data
management function with the business plans of an organization and develop a data
architecture” (Shanks, 1997, p. 70). Such an architecture enables the development of
integrated information systems, the elimination of duplicated data, the standardization
of definitions of data across all information systems and easier consolidation of data for
reporting (Shanks, 1997).
The aspect of management that tries to accomplish this has been labeled information
management. Gazendam (1993) distinguishes a number of forms of information
management:
·  Information resource management (IRM). IRM is the management of the
informational aspect of an organization. It emphasizes both the contents of
information as well as the processing of information in terms of types of
information to be managed in order to meet information requirements.
·  Information systems management (ISM). ISM is the management of the
information processing system of an organization. It is restricted to systematic (but
not necessarily automated) information processing and formal properties of
information in an organization.
·  Information technology management (ITM). ITM is the management of the
information processing aspect of an organization that is based on information
technology. ITM also includes the management of changes in strategy and structure
accompanying information technology application. ITM is more restricted than
ISM by stressing information processing by information technology, i.e. by
information processing systems realized on computers using software (Gazendam,
1993).
In the remainder of this thesis, we focus on the role of information technology and thus
we will restrict the meaning of ‘information management’ to ‘information technology
management’. The broader concepts of information systems management and
information resource management are excluded from our analysis of information
management, unless explicitly mentioned.
Despite the exclusion of information resource management and information systems
management from the specific meaning of information management used in this thesis,
a definition of information management has still not been presented. Wassenaar (1995)
describes information management as the direction of information systems in and
between organizations. Simons and Verheijen define information management as
“controlling (at all levels) of information and information supply as an object that43
contributes to the realization of an organization’s objectives” (Simons & Verheijen,
1991, p. 216). Breukel (1996) views information management as all kinds of tasks that
can be performed to bring the information technology in an organization in line with the
organization’s structure and strategy via a process of encouraging initiatives and
enforcing top-down strategic and structural changes.
Information management is thus a rather broad task. Van Waes (1991) defines a number
of subtasks. According to van Waes, ‘strategy formulation’ is the subtask of
determining main lines, ‘planning’ as a subtask sets targets, ‘organizing’ creates
relations between people and tools they use and ‘control’ checks whether the activities
carried out are in accordance with the planning and strategic intentions. Gazendam
(1993) explicates the tasks that are to be performed under the heading of information
management (Figure 13).
Information strategy determination / information policy determination
Information architecture development / information planning
Information project planning
Information management review
Information system development tasks
Figure 13: Information management tasks (Gazendam, 1993)
In the information management literature, various authors have tried to analytically
separate information strategy from information planning and information system
development tasks. Boersma (1989) defines information policy as the prescriptive
framework for information planning and implementation of information plans.
Theeuwes (1988) uses a similar definition in which vision is emphasized. According to
van der Poel, information strategy refers to “a complex of implicit or explicit goals,
visions, guidelines and plans with respect to the supply and demand for formal
information in an organization, sanctioned by management, intended in the long run to
support the objectives of the organization and adjust it to the environment” (van der
Poel, 1995, p. 31)
39. Information planning, on the other hand, is defined as “the
articulation of a decision-making process aiming at the specification of an information
plan, which is to be used as the basis for the development of information systems
support as specified by the plan” (van der Poel, 1995, p. 31). Wassenaar describes
information planning as “the establishment of coherent, future-oriented agreements with
respect to information systems” (1995, p. 288). In Wassenaar’s vision an organization is
a set of relatively autonomous modules, which represent a business domain and an
informational domain. In these domains there is, respectively, a demand for and a
supply of information services. Information management as a whole refers to
                                                          
39 From van der Poel’s use of the term ‘formal organization’, it seems he is positioning
himself in the information system management stream of research. His analysis of
information strategy, however, is restricted to information technology.44
governance of transactions between the information supply domain and the business
domain. Information planning refers to a process of engaging in contracts which aim at
alignment of demands to supply of information services. The results of this process,
according to Wassenaar, are laid down in an information plan covering a portfolio of
information system services, an information system and data structure, information
services and databases.
The demarcation of strategy from planning in the above circumscriptions is rather strict.
However, other authors confuse the distinction. For example, Theeuwes uses
information planning as a comprehensive term for information strategy and architecture
development.  Breukel captures information strategy and information planning in the
term SISP (strategic information systems planning). He defines SISP as follows: “[t]he
process of identifying a portfolio of computer-based applications that will assist an
organization in executing its business plans and consequently realizing its business
goals and/or the process of searching for applications with a high impact and the ability
to create an advantage over competitors” (Breukel, 1996, p. 124).
Other authors use terms like Information Systems Planning, Management Information
Systems Planning, and Strategic Planning for Information Systems (Breukel, 1996,
p.123) and most authors define the terms they are using, but a comparison of these
definitions reveals a semantic jungle (Fitzgerald, 1993). In this study, we will use a
comprehensive term for decision making regarding information systems in
organizations and refer to it as information management. We will define information
management as follows.
Information management Task of decision making regarding goals, prioritization,
development and use of information systems in or
between organizations.
Note that in section 1.2.2, it was noted that, in the literature, ‘information management’
is often held synonymous with an explicit, centralized and formalized form of decision
making. Note that the definition of information management stated here allows for other
forms in which the authority over information systems is dispersed. In this way, the
definition of information management is able to meet Kubicek’s criticism (see sections
1.2.2 and 1.4).
The literature reviewed customarily pays attention to information management in an
intraorganizational setting. Combining the definitions of information management and
interorganizational information systems, it is possible to define information
management in an interorganizational setting (or information management of
interorganizational information systems, or interorganizational information
management).45
Interorganizational
information management
(IIM)
Task of decision making regarding goals, prioritization,
development and use of information systems that are
embedded in two or more organizations that have no
joint executives
40.
Note that a decision-making-oriented definition of information management almost
inevitably draws attention to matters of (concentration of) authority, or locus of control
in information systems (see section 1.2.2). Therefore, a decision-making-oriented
definition of information management provides the opportunity to:
·  Highlight the involvement of the organizations that are participating in the
interorganizational information system, which in general complicates the decision-
making process, compared to the situation in which only intraorganizational
information systems are considered (see also section 2.2.2).
·  Respond to the third point of criticism of existing studies in the scientific discipline
of information systems as mentioned by Steinfield, Kraut and Plummer (1996), and
respond to Breukel’s proposal for paying attention to the decision-making process
(see section 1.1.3).
Thus far, a definition of information management of interorganizational information
systems, which is a part of the initial framework of this study, has been given. In section
2.1, it is indicated that in this chapter, the first research question is addressed (‘What
approaches to information management for interorganizational information systems can
be defined?’). However, before we are able to do so, the origins and development of the
concept of information management are first discussed. This discussion takes place
along two perspectives.
(1)  Firstly, in section 2.3, the ‘organizational imperative’
41-perspective of information
management is highlighted by discussing information management in organization
studies.
(2)  Secondly, in section 2.4, ‘the technological imperative’ angle of information
management is emphasized by scrutinizing how the information systems literature
deals with information management.
It is assumed that by discussing information management from these two perspectives,
the working of the interaction between information management and interorganizational
relations is better understood.
2.3  Information management in organization studies
In the preceding section, a definition of interorganizational information management
was synthesized, with decision making regarding information systems as the central
concept. Bearing the analyses of the interplay of information technology and
                                                          
40 See footnote 36.
41 See section 1.1.3.46
organizational parameters in mind (see section 1.1.3), one would probably expect that
information management is a prominent theme in the discipline of organization studies,
at least at the conceptual level.  Gazendam (1993) has, on the contrary, noted that
although the discipline of organization studies provides a rich spectrum of theories
42,
the theme of information management is somewhat underexposed
43.
The introduction of the term ‘information technology’ by Leavitt and Whisler in 1958
has already been mentioned. In 1966, Felix Kaufman made the first reference to
interorganizational information systems within a more or less organizational context
44.
Kaufman’s ideas were not given much attention in the information systems and
organization science researchers community until the late 1980s and 1990s. In the
organization studies literature, authors studying corporate strategy and competitive
advantage probably made the first references to information management. A well-
known reference is that of Porter (1980) who, by the way, did not refer to information
systems or information management as a part of an organization’s resource pool for
competitive analysis. But many other authors have expanded on the original book by
drawing attention to the role of information systems in the competitive advantage
analysis. Porter himself addressed information management (i.e. information planning)
in a more recent article (Porter and Millar, 1985).
Only after competitive analysis and corporate strategy had gained momentum as a topic
in organization studies was attention given to the potential for transformation of
organizations and for innovation by information systems (Earl, 1989; Scott Morton,
1991; Galliers, 1993; de Jong, 1994; Breukel, 1996). It then proved to be a major theme
in research (Galliers, 1993). In the literature, it was stressed that information systems
have the potential to increase the value added to products and services of an
organization and, moreover, may be able to change the position of an organization in the
market in which it is operating (Porter & Millar, 1985). These observations have
inspired many researchers to bridge the gap between organization studies and
information systems research.
Van der Poel quite explicitly positions information management at the crossroads of
information technology and corporate strategy. Boersma (1989) depicts information
management in a dynamic, continually changing force field with other aspects of
management such as corporate strategy, organizational policy and financial policy.
Thus, information management is a form of decision making regarding information
systems, in the context of other management activities and decision-making processes.
                                                          
42 See, for example, Morgan (1986).
43 Exceptions are Davis & Olsen (1985) and Keen & Scott Morton (1978), although
these books are probably more known for their influence on DSS training programs and
DSS research than for their influence on information systems research at large.
44 His claim was that computers can be used to think beyond organizational boundaries.47
The interference between an organization’s decision making regarding information
systems and its strategic management has resulted in a need to manage an
organization’s information system and to bring strategic management into line with an
organization’s use of information systems (and vice versa). The rationale for aligning an
organization’s management of information systems with its strategic management is the
claim that this form of alignment can enhance an organization’s competitive advantage.
Various authors from the academic information systems discipline have reacted in
various ways to this claim; nevertheless, the concept of strategy is important in the
context of information management. Because the literature on strategy and strategic
management is one of the rare fields in organization studies that explicitly pay attention
to information management, we will now elaborate on the concept of strategy in
organization science.
Chandler (1962) established the concept of strategy in the literature on organization
studies. The writings of Ansoff and Ackoff in particular popularized the concept of
corporate strategy. Snellen (1975) described strategy as a kind of all-encompassing,
explicit, systematical, conscious and comprehensive form of decision making
concerning the outlines of a policy. According to Ansoff (1968), it is possible to
summarize the process of strategy making in seven steps (Haselhoff, 1977). Snellen
(1975) adapted Ansoff’s phases and identified six approaches towards strategy
formation. Haselhoff, furthermore, elaborated on three approaches in strategy
formation.
The correspondence between the distinctions these authors make is depicted in Figure
14.48
Haselhoff Snellen Ansoff
A1a Identification of threats and
opportunities
A1 Strategic variable
approach
A1b A strengths and weaknesses
analysis
A2 Personal /
intuitive approach
A2 Clear and definitive
statements of the objectives
A3a ‘Gap analysis’
A3b A ‘search decision’: plan on
the basis of present prospects or
seek additions and/or
replacements to present product
markets
A3 Strategic gap
approach
A3c A search for alternatives and
analysis of consequences
A. Strategy as planning
(‘technological
strategies’)
A4 ‘What business
are we in’-approach
A.4 The action decision: ‘what
kind of business do we want to be
in?’
B. Strategy as exertion
of power
(‘environmental
strategies’)
B. Stakeholder
approach
C. Strategy as
legitimization (‘social
strategies’)
C. ‘Social needs’ –
approach
Figure 14: Strategy formation
The strategic planning approach towards strategy has long been, and, in some respects,
still is, the most documented and well-developed approach in the strategy field. Snellen
mainly elaborated on the development of strategic planning techniques, but also, more
recently, authors like Earl (1991) and Robson (1993) use Ansoff techniques to
characterize organizational strategy formation. In general, the strategic planning
approach presupposes that articulating organizational parameters like goals, objectives,
strengths, weaknesses, etc., and deducing and formalizing action plans to overcome
problems contribute positively to an organization’s well-being. Critics have attacked
this line of reasoning in organization theory (Wildavsky, 1979; Mintzberg, 1994).
Mintzberg in particular has vigorously opposed writings that defended corporate
strategy without empirical justification
45. “A number of biased researchers set out to
                                                          
45 For example, van der Poel comments: “In general we must therefore conclude that
there is a broad consensus that planning and strategy are sensible and valuable. That49
prove that strategic planning paid, and collectively, they paid no such thing”
(Mintzberg, 1994). However, Mintzberg’s sometimes quite cynical comments mainly
pertain to the strategic planning perspective on strategy. In The Rise and Fall of
Strategic Planning, Mintzberg identifies four conceptualizations of strategy in an
organizational context as alternatives to the strategic planning mode of strategy:
·  a series of activities from which over time a pattern emerges,
·  a sense of direction or perspective,
·  a good eye for opportunities in the environment, a position, and
·  a ploy, a trick.
On the basis of this conceptualization, Mintzberg (1994) discerns ten ‘schools’ of
strategy formulation, each having its own emphasis and result of the formation process
(Figure 15).
School Emphasis Result process
Design school Blueprint of concepts and relations Blueprint of strategy
Planning school Procedures Planned internal
alignment
Positioning school Development, identification and
selection of strategic positions
Strategic positions
Entrepreneurial
school
Role of vision in the shaping of an
organization
Vision
Cognitive school Mental processes of strategy
formation
Insights in strategic
style of individuals
Learning school Learning processes, feedback loops Experience
Political school Opportunism and incrementalism Political power
Cultural school Culture of an organization Ideology
Environmental school Alignment to contingent factors Alignment
Configuration school Growth process with ‘crises’ in
which adaptation to changed
circumstances takes place
Balanced evolution of
an organization
Figure 15: Mintzberg’s schools of strategy formation
Note that Mintzberg’s enumeration also comprises the power or stakeholder perspective
(in the political school) and the social needs or legitimization perspective (in the cultural
school).
For the moment, it is important to note that a lot of attention has been paid to the
‘consistency’ (see chapter one; see also Pyburn [1983]) for an analysis of alignment of
information strategy and corporate strategy, especially inspired by Mintzberg’s design,
                                                                                                                                             
consensus appears to be based more on popular wisdom (…) than on scientific proof”
(1995, p. 35).50
planning, environmental and entrepreneurial schools of strategy formation. A well-
documented example of consistency of information strategy with business strategy,
where business strategy is considered to be positioning in product-market combinations
(strategic planning perspective), is provided by the case described by Rackoff, Wilson
and Ullrich (1985)
46.
Webster (1995a, 1995b) presents an example of consistency of information strategy
with business strategy, where business strategy is considered to be exertion of influence
and power. She presents a number of cases in which large companies use electronic data
interchange as part of their information strategies in order to “(…) unilaterally [impose]
their own in-house computer systems or information handling practices upon their
trading partners, [extend] their own hardware systems into their supplier’s premises,
[dictate] product and inventory coding according to their own established in-house
information systems, and  [dictate] the type and frequency of data to be exchanged”
(Webster, 1995a, p. 37). Here, the information strategy that propagated electronic data
interchange has enforced the existing power relation and has crystallized it into
electronic data interchange networks. “They [powerful players, VH] use EDI to
heighten their control over their trading relationships, and (…) they may even enshrine
this control in the EDI system itself, through particular configuration of the network,
hardware and software” (Webster, 1995a, p. 37). Normally, interorganizational
information systems are developed in a cooperative fashion, but Webster describes
cases in which the less powerful parties – the spokes – have little influence over the
development process. “They are forced to adopt the systems and information handling
procedures developed by their major customers, which are geared to the requirements of
the latter, and not to their own procedures or business strategies. (…) Furthermore, the
absence of any collaboration or prior consensus about the structure, function and design
of these networks afford the spokes little opportunities to develop their knowledge and
expertise in EDI use” (Webster, 1995a, p. 37).
The utilization of standards would ideally lock in the less powerful players to a lesser
degree. However, according to Webster, standard setting is an intensely political and
adversarial process, in which the less powerful parties “(…) are obliged to leave the
standard setting to the large companies who can afford to get involved, and to accept the
resultant technological solutions which now embody the latter’s information handling
requirements” (Webster, 1995b, p. 24).
                                                          
46 Rackoff, Wiseman and Ullrich explicitly make a connection between so-called
strategic thrusts and information management activities. Their methodology, however,
hardly accounts for an explicit, systematic and formal methodology. Their seven-step
methodology includes steps like ‘brainstorming for opportunities’ and ‘discuss
opportunities’. These steps resemble the steps ‘Apprehend Inputs’, ‘Add Insights’ in
strategic planning of which Mintzberg comments that they represent: “(…) the worst
example of a problem symptomatic to the entire literature: assuming that a phenomenon
has been captured, that action will take place, simply because it has been labeled in a
box on a piece of paper” (Mintzberg, 1994, p. 66).51
So, what we see here is that large, powerful organizations reinforce their attempts to
control other organizations by issuing very compelling instruments of information
management. These instruments not only constrain the development of the
interorganizational information system, but also indirectly the business strategies of the
organizations. The existing power-dependence of the organization is reinforced by the
choice of instruments of information management and also eventually in the
information technology.
Webster’s analysis reveals that apart from consistency between information
management and strategy-as-positioning-in-markets (planning perspective), it is also
possible to envisage interaction between information management and strategies-as-
exertion-of-influence-and-power (power perspective). However, specific combinations
of instruments of information management and characteristics of power exertion cannot
be derived yet.
2.4  Information management in information systems
research
2.4.1 Introduction
In order to further analyze these interactions between information management and
strategy, and to analyze the consistency of information management approaches and
strategy formation approaches, in the next section we take a look at the differentiation
that is possible in information management.
Information management as a subject at the crossroads of, on the one hand, information
systems (section 2.2.3) and, on the other hand, strategy (section 2.3), has gained a lot of
attention in the academic discipline of information systems. Wassenaar (1995) describes
an evolution in the attention that has been given to various aspects of information
technology in the theories of organization and information systems (Figure 16).
Period Label Emphasis
1950-1965 Information processing technology Capacity
1965-1975 Information storage technology Shared Data
1975-1985 Information input/output technology Integration and Planning
1990s Information transfer technology Interorganizational Topics
47
Figure 16: Evolution in IT emphasis (adapted from Wassenaar, 1995)
Wassenaar’s analysis can be used to indicate a number of issues. For example, the claim
that the role of telecommunication technology has gained importance (see section 1.1.1)
                                                          
47 These topics refer to, for example, the interorganizational coordination debate
initiated by Malone, Yates & Benjamin (1987), but also to security issues regarding the
exchange of information over public infrastructures.52
is supported by Wassenaar’s analysis. Furthermore, the analysis suggests a change of
emphasis from reasoning very much in line with the technological imperative, to
matters usually associated with the organizational imperative. For example, the
‘technologists’ Cash, McFarlan and McKenney note “much of our thinking has been
shaped by literature dealing with general business” (1988, p. 2). Simons and Verheijen
(1991) have also noted this change of emphasis.
As in the strategy field, there are a number of schools in information management
(Wassenaar, 1995).
·  Engineering school (represented by authors like Martin, and, in the Netherlands,
Simons and Verheijen). Within this school of thought, so-called architectures are
seen as the backbone of the decision-making process. Information management is a
rational, centrally-organized process. In general, the engineering school is assumed
to follow the technological imperative. There is a strong relationship to the strategic
planning mode in the strategy field.
·  Strategic school (represented by Porter and Millar, Wiseman, Breukel). Strategic
planning with regard to information systems is emphasized as a means to reach the
goal of competitive advantage. The perspective somewhat leans toward the
organizational imperative. The strategy school resembles the positioning school in
the strategy field.
·  Adaptive-evolutionary school of thought (represented by Nolan, McFarlan and
McKenney). This stream views information management as a process rather than a
one-time effort and stresses processes of growth as subjects for information
management. An important element of this approach is that knowledge about
information systems is gradually built up. The process itself is controlled centrally.
·  Organizational-learning school (represented by Hopstaken and Kranendonk,
Huysman). Here, gradual convergence of goals with respect to information systems
is stressed. It differs from the adaptive-evolutionary school of thought by its
recognition of inherent divergence of interests in organizations. Eventual action is
only possible, however, after goals have converged.
·  Sociotechnical school of thought (represented by Markus and King, Wassenaar, van
Bijsterveld). Information management is viewed as taking place in a setting of
various stakeholders.
·  Organizational school (represented by Tushman and Nadler, Boersma, Gazendam).
This school emphasizes decision-making in a context of contingencies like
technological, economic and social factors. The organizational school in
information management shares many characteristics with the configurational
school in the strategy field.
In fact, these categorizations are related in the following manner (Figure 17).53
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Figure 17: Relationship between information management schools and strategy
schools
In section 2.2.3, information management was defined as a task of decision making
regarding information systems. In the scientific discipline of information systems, there
are indications that make it possible to conclude that the popular view of information
management identified in chapter one – an explicit, formalized, centralized form – is not
the only view of information management
48.
The enumeration of characteristics (or ‘key concepts’) focused on in various
information management schools reveals a variety in information management,
although it is not very clear what makes up this variety. However, previous information
management research has resulted in some indications of ways to proceed (Gazendam,
1993; see Figure 18).
                                                          
48 See sections 1.2 and 1.3.54
Aspect Description Elaborated in
section…
Control /
Involvement of
stakeholders
Refers to the way decision-making processes
take place
49 and who triggers the development
of information systems. Gazendam (1993)
refers to this aspect as ‘control strategy’ or
‘control approach’ and it is strongly related to
the way various actors are involved in the
process. Note that this line of research reflects
Kubicek’s emphasis on the role of various
participants in explaining eventual effects (see
section 1.2.2).
2.4.2
Functionality /
goals
Refers to the goals that are adhered to in the
decision-making process (and which are
explicitly not adhered to). Goals can be
specifications of common systems, but also
less restrictive requirements; for example,
descriptions of what the system is supposed to
do (functionality), or, inversely, what should
explicitly not be done with the system.
2.4.3
Architecture Architecture (or architectural foundation)
refers to a high-level map of the information
requirements of an organization (Brancheau &
Wetherbe, 1987; see also King & Nault,
1998). It can refer to a set of constraints on the
development of an information system that
ensures a desired level of integration (data
definitions, value consistency) in all future
development and maintenance activities
through the use of an elaborate diagram, but it
is also possible to merely enumerate by what
conventions communication takes place.
2.4.4
Figure 18: Overview of information management aspects
Furthermore, in section 2.4.5, it is noted how changes in ‘contingent variables’ (see
Kubicek, 1995) affect information management approaches, and vice versa.
2.4.2  Control and involvement of actors
In the various schools of information management, there is a variance in the degree of
centralization of decision-making authorities and a variance in the attention to the
                                                          
49 Breukel (1996); see also section 1.2.55
degree of participation of various stakeholders in information management. Who the
stakeholders are exactly, and in what they participate, is unclear until this point in our
analysis.
In the engineering school of thought it is not even that important; the strategy making
and planning is done by a ‘unibrain’ (top management, which represents the rest of the
harmonious organization [Haselhoff, 1977]). However, various authors have focused on
actors or stakeholders in information management. Ruohonen (1991) departs from the
‘unibrain’ idea: information management is too complex as a managerial job to be
handled by one person. Wassenaar (1995) also opposes the ‘holistic view of
organizations’ and adheres to a more or less political view of organizations in which
organizations are viewed as relatively autonomous modules with partly conflicting,
partly identical interests. Ruohonen suggests that managerial groups are required and
that the negotiated situations that result from these group processes are characterized by
organizational power and politics, because various interest groups, or stakeholders, view
information management differently (even within single organizations).
Ruohonen identifies three critical stakeholders groups: top management, user
management and IT/IS management. Wassenaar adds external actors: consultants,
advisors, etc. as a fourth category
50.
In the visions of Wassenaar and Ruohonen, top management (general managers,
managing directors, Chief Executive Officers) has a general view of the strategy of the
organization. Ruohonen adds that their experience with information systems is often
limited to management reporting systems and that their primary interest is curtailing the
cost of information systems.
Representatives of the organizational domain (middle management or user management
groups) are typically users of information systems and have often played a role in
information system development projects as business experts. They typically focus on
the contribution of information systems to business performance.
As a third stakeholder group, Ruohonen identifies IT/IS management groups
(Wassenaar refers to this group as representatives of the informational domain). This
group is made up of information technology experts, in the role of supplier of
information technology and information services. They have knowledge of the
opportunities and technological constraints of information systems.
Wassenaar also includes a fourth category, advisors, but Ruohonen claims that their role
is one of the three roles mentioned above. Therefore, we do not pay attention to a
separate stakeholder group consisting of actors who are external to the organization or
the network of organizations.
                                                          
50 Another category is provided by Nielen (1993). He adds system administrators as a
category. According to Nielen, they are often cautious with innovations. In this thesis,
system administrators are not identified as a separate stakeholder group as their role in
information management is often limited.56
Ruohonen merely identifies stakeholders in information management and recommends
“improved communication between different parties” (Ruohonen, 1991, p. 17; see also
Shanks, 1997, p. 85). Wassenaar’s contribution to theory building mainly rests in the
recognition that the organizational and informational domains are relatively autonomous
modules, that transactions occur between these domains and that formal or informal
contracts (planning agreements) are the basis on which transactions take place. The role
of top management varies: in vertically-oriented management styles, top management
ultimately decides upon the planning agreements. In more horizontally-oriented
management styles, this is true to a much lesser extent. Wassenaar indicates that the
degree of centralization is dependent on a number of factors, he emphasizes a role for
vertically-oriented management styles independent of these factors: “In general, we
found that basic problems are caused by inappropriate key conditions. Meta control is
crucial for successful IS strategy planning. It matches the IS strategy planning approach
and its contingency factors by creating key conditions. These key definitions are
involved actors and their expertise, organizational and methodological conditions and
the intended outcome of IS strategy planning” (Wassenaar, 1995, p. 318).
Summarizing, we conclude that information management is not always a set of tasks
typically performed by ‘the organization’ or a representative of it. There are multiple
stakeholders involved: top management, IT management and business managers. They
contribute different pieces of expertise. Eventually, governance of transactions between
organizational and informational domains varies.
2.4.3  Functionality and goals of information management
In sections 1.2.2, 1.4 and 2.2.3 it was argued that in the literature, information
management is often held synonymous with an explicit, formalized and especially
centralized decision-making process.
Key words here are integration of data through standardization and a formalized
strategy initiated by top management. Integration in relation to this approach to
information management can be defined as the standardization of data definitions and
structures through the use of a common conceptual schema across a collection of data
sources (Goodhue, Wybo and Kirsch, 1992).
In general, such efforts ideally produce a set of plans that typically include a list of the
organization’s recommended subject databases and major application databases, a
migration path, targeted applications, resource allocation recommendations for
application development and guidelines concerning standards (hardware, software and
data). “[The] goal is to plan a technology infrastructure that can deliver information to
each individual’s desktop and then to build databases with the correct structure to store
this information without redundancy”, summarize Davenport, Eccles and Prusak (1992,
p. 55). Note that, preferably, an entire information inventory is addressed.57
However, other information management approaches state other types of goals. For
example, in the strategic school, the ultimate goal is to achieve competitive advantage,
rather than specific (technical) characteristics of information systems. And in the
organizational-learning school, no objectives at all are stated.
2.4.4 Architecture
Originally, information management as a field of interest was introduced as a potential
solution to problems of data duplication and inconsistency by eliminating ‘local’ control
over information systems. A classical approach towards information management was,
therefore, to propose, develop and enforce an elaborate architecture for an entire
organization or network of organizations in terms of a common conceptual scheme of
data structures and definitions across a collection of data sources. Such an architecture
aims at improving poor, inconsistent data quality and gaining control of data
redundancy (Martin & Leben, 1989).
The basic steps for developing such an architecture are (Goodhue, Kirsch, Quillard and
Wybo, 1992):
·  build an enterprise model of business functions (typically 10-30), processes,
activities and responsibilities by organizational groups for these elements of the
model;
·  identify data entities used or created by processes or activities;
·  perform ‘affinity analysis’ to identify groups of data entities that are closely
associated (resulting in candidate subject databases); and
·  group the subject databases and the processes that use or create that data so that
major systems areas can be identified
51.
However, empirical research has highlighted a number of problems (Shanks, 1997;
Goodhue, Kirsch, Quillard and Wybo, 1992):
·  the architecture is difficult to understand and communicate,
·  sustaining management support for the architecture is difficult
52, and
·  the architecture is difficult to implement
53.
                                                          
51 Business Systems Planning (BSP), Information Engineering, Business Information
Analysis and Integration Techniques (BIAIT) and Information Quality Analysis are
examples of methods that elaborate on these steps (Finnegan, Galliers & Powell, 1997).
52 Davenport, Eccles and Prusak comment that bureaucratic information management is
often carried out by technologists “supported by many technical journals, consultants
and technology vendors”, (1992, p. 55), while “the senior executives for whom they
work usually ignore, or are ignorant of, their efforts. Because these technical models are
difficult for non-technologists to understand, managers outside the IS function are rarely
active participants” (1992, p. 55).
53 An explanation for the occurrence of these problems is lacking. In this volume,
chapter five, an explanatory scheme is provided.58
Goodhue, Kirsch, Quillard and Wybo claim that such a classical approach “though
conceived as a generally appropriate method, may not be the best planning approach in
all situations” (1992, p. 11). They doubt whether a detailed plan leads to the
implementation of a set of subject databases and applications integrated across the target
domain of the planning effort. They state that such an architecture may actually only
work when data integration is critical to the strategic goals of the organization and when
the architecture can be enforced across the organization, either because of negotiated
consensus or because of centralized control. They say that, in fact, whenever the
organization is too big or too decentralized, the planning process may become bogged
down in detail or splintered by divergent interests. In this situation, such activities “may
be perceived as a threat to decentralized power [because] functional areas resist a loss of
local autonomy and control” (1992, p. 24).
An alternative to such an approach is the retention of several conceptual schemes in
terms of data definitions and schemes. The overarching architecture then is not so much
a unifying conceptual scheme, but a verbal description of how these various conceptual
schemes are related and how communication between various conceptual schemes
should take place (with what communication protocols, what messages are used, what
the syntax of messages is, what agreements are used, etc.).
2.4.5  Dynamics of information management
In general, it has been observed that information management approaches change over
time. Moreover, Gazendam (1987) observed that in a large, divisionalized governmental
organization, existing, locally-oriented information management approaches were
accompanied, over time, by more encompassing information management approaches,
in such a way that these various information management approaches continued to exist
simultaneously
54.
Van der Poel (1995) proposes a model to describe the phenomenon of information
management (or, more specifically, information strategy) in organizations. On the basis
of six case studies and a literature review, van der Poel concluded that information
management typically evolves over time. Van der Poel developed a typology in which
five subsequent information management phases are identified (Figure 19).
Turbulence Orientation Consolidation Exploitation Tension
Figure 19: Van der Poel’s phases of information management
Van der Poel identifies a number of causes as disturbances to information management:
a new senior officer, legislation, a change in the organization’s strategy, a merger or
                                                          
54 Gazendam states that organizations are subject to learning cycles and that, depending
on complexity, autonomy of divisions and the number of interorganizational
relationships, over time information management approaches are added to an
organization’s ‘repertoire’ of information management approaches.59
new IT developments. These kinds of disturbances raise commitment of top
management and current methodologies are abandoned. In the orientation phase, there is
an orientation towards projects, triggered by stakeholders. Methodologies are picked up
and architectures are developed. In the subsequent consolidation phase, the process
becomes even more mechanistic with a focus on architectures. The mechanistic
orientation and nourishment of plans and architectures continues in the exploitation
phase. The exploitation phase ends when stakeholders become aware that the situation
has stabilized and that fixed architectures seem to obstruct new developments.
Architectures become outdated and the process becomes more problem-driven in the
tension phase
55.
Gazendam and Van der Poel draw attention especially to the dynamics of information
management: information management is obviously not either rationalistic or
incremental, but changes over time. According to Gazendam organizations develop a
‘repertoire’ of information management approaches over time, and according to Van der
Poel, organizations abandon information management approaches over time and replace
them with other approaches. And as the information management approach changes, so
do the roles of various stakeholders and the way in which their activities are
coordinated.
2.4.6  Synopsis: information management approaches
Above, we have identified various aspects that are addressed in decision making
regarding the goals, prioritization, development and use of information systems in or
between organizations.
Previously, we have identified various ‘schools’ in information management. In these
various schools, different aspects of information management are stressed in various
ways. This situation is depicted in Figure 20.
                                                          
55 The resulting typology resembles Nolan’s stage model of adoption of IT innovations,
although van der Poel himself claims that it is an elaboration of one of Nolan’s phases,
the maturation phase. Van der Poel’s model shares some of the difficulties of the Nolan
phase model, such as the problems of entanglement of prescription and description. In
fact, Nolan’s model has also been criticized for its technological determinism and its
presumed ‘one best way of computerizing’. These points of criticism apply to a lesser
degree to Van der Poel’s model of phases of information management.60
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Figure 20: Information management schools and aspects addressed
Obviously, various approaches towards information management exist. In general,
various authors have elaborated on how aspects of information management are dealt
with in various schools of information management, thus identifying information
management approaches (Schmidt, 1991; Goodhue, Kirsch, Quillard & Wybo, 1992;
Gazendam, 1993;  de Jong, 1994; Zuurmond, 1994; Johnston and Yetton, 1996). These
various information management approaches, in which various key concepts are dealt
with in different ways, are identified and elaborated below.
Firstly, there is top-down information management. This stems especially from the
Engineering Information Management School. Gazendam (1993) labels this approach
‘bureaucratic information management’ and it corresponds with the ‘top-down strategy’
identified by de Jong.
In terms of control, centralization is emphasized. The approach is aimed at “centralized
databases, integrated information systems, centralized information system development
serving a maximum number of user groups, standardization of work procedures, and
centralized control of work” (Gazendam, 1993, p. 298).
In terms of functionality and goals, it is stressed that actions to build or change
information systems are taken from a strategic planning vision. Consistent with such a
vision is the clear specification of the goals of information management. Eventually,
standardization of data structures is the ultimate goal. Gazendam criticizes the top-down
information management approach because the most important aim, integration of data
models and data definitions, is often incompatible with the political and cultural reality
(Gazendam, 1993, p. 262). Gazendam states that “(…) integration of information
systems can never be an objective in itself. Integration decreases the diversity in an
organization, which can be a threat to adaptivity and flexibility. The striving after
integration has to be assessed from the viewpoint of probable practical results [and] is61
therefore dependent on the characteristics of the organization” (Gazendam, 1993, p.
262)
56.
In the top-down information management approach, a model of the enterprise, its
functions and its underlying data serves as the architecture. Eventually, this model
serves as a basis for identifying and implementing an integrated information system that
will meet the needs of the organization (Goodhue, Kirsch, Quillard and Wybo, 1992).
Zuurmond associates this approach with “a complete, integral, timely and continuous
understanding of the target system”
57 (Zuurmond, 1994, p. 63).
Although top-down information management has intuitive appeal, Schmidt remarks that
“[i]t is the presupposition of this approach that information is something innocent and
neutral. Consequently, it is the ultimate aim of the efforts following this approach to
design a Grand Database containing all the relevant data from different parts of the
organization so as to provide managers with a unified data model of the organization”
(1991, p. 77). Johnston and Yetton illustrate the top-down information management
approach as follows: “(…) oriented towards efficiency, integration and cost control,
with the centralized structure and tight management controls geared towards achieving
this end. This is reinforced by a technological emphasis on standards and a dominant
platform/architecture. Such technological architectures often ‘grow their own expertise’,
socializing IT staff through internal recruitment, training and promotion, and rewarding
loyalty and length of service. This tends to produce a conservative and risk-averse
management style. These IT-configurations are potentially suited to business
environments that are relatively stable, and to organizations seeking to control IT costs.
This typically large, formalized IT organization is often functionally insulated from the
business” (1996, p. 195).
Shanks has described a situation in which top-down information management and
organizational characteristics were not consistent. “The centralizing tendency of the
data administration group in attempting to gain control over data modeling within
project teams was clearly a structural contradiction to the highly decentralized and
autonomous business units [and eventually] no change to the structures of domination
was achieved” (1997, p. 84).
An alternative to the top-down information management approach is the bottom-up
approach. Shanks (1997) refers to this approach as an evolutionary approach which
                                                          
56 Note that Gazendam implicitly assumes that diversity, adaptivity and flexibility are
virtuous characteristics of ‘an organization’. Taking into account that these
characteristics are typically associated with decentralized organizations, it is possible to
reconcile Gazendam’s criticism with the criticism of Goodhue et al; both seem to
emphasize that bureaucratic information management is incompatible with
decentralized organization structures.
57 “(…) een volledig, integraal, actueel en continu inzicht in het te bestuderen
objectsysteem”62
would achieve greater participation from stakeholders. Zuurmond’s (1994)
corresponding archetype is ‘local, contextual informatization’. It derives the actions to
be taken from operational opportunities or necessities. Initiatives are taken by line
managers at all levels in the organization.
This is based, in particular, on the Organizational-Learning Information Management
School. Johnston and Yetton (1996) refer to this as the divisional approach. Schmidt has
remarked that reality has condemned the idea of top-down information management
“(…) to the realm of utopia. In fact, the underlying conventional notion of organizations
as being monolithic entities is quite naïve. Organizations are not perfectly collaborative
systems. Rather, an organization is a mixture of collaboration and conflict. Most
information generated and processed in organizations is subject to misrepresentation,
because it has been generated, gathered and communicated in a context of goal
incongruence and discord of interests and motives.” (1991, p. 77).  Johnston and Yetton
propose the bottom-up approach as an approach that is better able to cope with
circumstances of discord of interests and motives: an approach “supported by
decentralized management structures and flexible, project-based management processes,
this ideal type focuses on how it can add value to the business. Because it is highly
responsive to multiple business divisions, this approach can lead to a relatively high IT
cost structure, high staffing levels and a proliferation of systems and platforms. Its
professional staff is usually externally trained and mobile, and motivated by a reward
system based on performance-driven pay and promotion. Such configurations are
typically associated with diversified, market focused business environments. This
configuration often features a corporate IT unit coordinating the business divisions’
competing demands for IT service, as well as specialized IT staff located within
divisions.” (1996, p. 195).
In terms of control, the bottom-up information management approach emphasizes
decentralized initiatives. Zuurmond claims that, in general, the lack of a control method
and lack of an elaborate information architecture results in ‘enmeshment of program
code and data’, ‘spaghetti program code’, ‘operating system commands in applications’,
‘undifferentiated authorizations’ and ‘ultimate island automation’. Zuurmond states that
because of these characteristics, it is impossible to represent local peculiarities in
information systems (1994, p. 63)
 58.
                                                          
58 Zuurmond adds the property of programming method in order to distinguish between
bottom-up and top-down approaches. He associates bottom-up approaches with messy,
spaghetti-like coded programs and top-down approaches with neat, well-structured
applications. Gazendam and de Jong, on the contrary, argue that bottom-up information
management is typically associated with the use of modern, object-oriented
programming methods and the use of rapid application development tools. In general,
however, the choice of programming techniques is a matter of system development or
even software engineering and choices of software engineering are decided upon
independent of the information management approach adopted. It is perfectly possible
to adopt a top-down approach and eventually use object-oriented tools in order to63
In terms of functionality and goals, the bottom-up information management approach in
a way parts with the original necessity of information management, by relaxing the ideal
of integration: bottom-up information management “(…) is information management
aiming at databases that are decentralized according to the structure of the
organizational units, a network of small person-oriented information systems (decision
support systems), decentral development of information systems, extensive re-use of
program code, and line-management-based control of work” (Gazendam, 1993, p. 299).
So, integration of data models and data definitions are not pursued immediately.
Consistent with the decentralization philosophy, no general common goals are specified.
Sometimes, it is specified for what purposes the information system should not be used;
this is, however, far less restrictive than specification of a goal that should be attained.
In terms of architecture, Zuurmond (1994) explains that this approach does not
prescribe an information architecture in terms of a common conceptual scheme for data
definitions and data structures. Rather, the architecture consists of a set of agreements
on procedures in order to communicate between various conceptual schemes, such as
agreements on referring, limited agreements on numbering, agreements on a set of
communication primitives used to communicate, etc. (see also Heesen, Homburg &
Offereins, 1995, 1997).
Intermediary between top-down and bottom-up information management approaches is
the equilibrium approach. It is termed ‘governance approach’ or ‘network approach’ by
Gazendam (1993) and it is especially rooted in the Organizational - and Adaptive-
Evolutionary Information Management Schools. “The equilibrium policy for
information management attempts to maintain a balance between centralistic and
decentralistic approaches to information management. It is aimed at governing
computerization based on the principle of choosing the adequate approach for each
problem, and for admitting decentral initiatives while maintaining a central overview
and a minimally necessary coordination” (Gazendam, 1993, p. 300). Goodhue, Kirsch,
Quillard and Wybo stress that “to be accepted by key stakeholders, data integration
efforts may need to find the right balance between the value of global data integration
versus local flexibility” (1992, p. 124).
Zuurmond refers to this approach as ‘personal political informatization’, in which actors
very consciously and opportunistically decide whether or not to adopt either bottom-up
or top-down approaches: that is, dependent on personal or political motives. Analogous
to  architecture, which is central to the Bureaucratic Information Management approach,
the equilibrium approach nourishes a zoning plan, a sketchy architecture in verbal
terms. Such an architecture is probably more ambiguous but it has the additional
                                                                                                                                             
implement information systems, or use a bottom-up approach and decide for each
information system to be developed to use either modern object-oriented tools or third
generation languages to build information systems with.64
advantage that non-technical people do not see an architecture merely as a wiring
diagram (Shanks, 1997).
In general, several authors indicate that information management approaches are
contingent upon environmental characteristics and changes in approaches are the result
of external ‘shocks’ (de Jong, 1994; Wassenaar, 1995; van der Poel, 1995). However, a
‘one best way of organizing’ principle has been promoted by Zuurmond (1994) in his
discussion of his global, universal informatization archetype. Zuurmond states,
however, that this archetype of informatization only occurs if certain criteria are met,
such as size of information systems, and a ‘cultural levelling and/or homogenization at a
worldwide scale’
59 has occurred
60. This is such a big ‘if’ that a ‘one best way of
organizing’ principle is rejected in this study.
Gazendam states that “[t]here is no a priori preference for a specific organization
metaphor or a specific planning and control structure” (Gazendam, 1993, pp. 255-256).
However, Gazendam also states that the objective that can be used to differentiate
various information management approaches, integration, is dependent on the
characteristics of the organization (1993, p. 262). De Jong identifies the same variety in
information management and attempts deliberately to link the appropriateness of
information management approaches with specific circumstances. De Jong recommends
a top-down approach (bureaucratic information management) for small organizations
with flexible structures and cultures and considerable financial resources, operating in a
steady environment. In this information management approach, the stability of the
architecture on the basis of which information systems are to be developed, is crucial.
The bottom-up approach is recommended for any organization that can live with the
costs of fragmentation of technology and knowledge and that operates in an
environment in which strategic changes are not likely to be necessary. The equilibrium
information management approach is preferred for any organization that can afford the
cost of fragmentation of technology and knowledge and must operate in an environment
in which strategic changes are likely to be necessary.
The above authors indicate ‘consistent’ combinations of information management
approaches and organizational contingencies, but a true explanation is lacking at the
moment. In terms of a conceptual analysis of theories, key concepts are identified
                                                          
59 “Er moet op mondiaal niveau een ‘culturele nivellering en/of homogenisering’ hebben
plaatsgevonden, wil informatisering door kunnen groeien naar het globale, universele
type” (Zuurmond, 1994, p. 65).
60 Zuurmond assumes a tendency towards cultural levelling and homogenization in
western, capitalist countries (1994, p. 65). The argumentation for this statement,
however, is lacking. Shanks (1997), on the other hand, indicates that a problem with
using a universal informatization (or bureaucratic information management) approach is
the problem of alienation of stakeholders: “[A] big problem was in getting people to
accept that you could use a generic model to achieve specific needs” (p. 81).65
(control model, architecture, goals) and efficiency seems to be an underlying key
performance indicator for all information management approaches, but explicit
hypotheses are often lacking in information management.
2.5  Interorganizational information management
The question is whether the information management approaches arrived at in section
2.4.6 are also applicable to decision making regarding interorganizational information
systems. The essential difference between intraorganizational information systems
(even in a divisional setting) and interorganizational settingsis that the control of an
interorganizational information system is not located in one organization, and neither
are the costs and benefits.
Characteristic of decision making with respect to interorganizational information
systems is “(…) the lack of a formal, unequivocal authority in organizational networks”,
comments Grijpink (1997, p. 5)
61. Rather, participation is based on agreements, which
can be formalized into covenants, contracts, etc. (Wassenaar, 1995).
The literature on interorganizational information systems, like the literature on
information systems in general, stresses integration as a virtue and a goal to be pursued
in these agreements. For example, it is stated that “[t]he greatest benefits from EDI (…)
are obtained when integration of computer applications is achieved over a network of
companies” (Huang, 1998, p. 2; see also Benjamin, de Long & Scott Morton, 1990;
Scott Morton, 1991; Cunningham & Tynan, 1993). Finnegan, Galliers and Powell
(1997) state that top-down information management approaches allow organizations
more control over interorganizational information systems. In these statements, there is
an implicit preference for a top-down or bureaucratic approach towards information
management, based on the design- and planning schools of strategy research (see
section 2.3) and especially on the engineering school of information management (see
section 2.4.1).
However, interorganizational information management in practice is often less detailed
and less formal than intraorganizational information management (Finnegan, Galliers &
Powell, 1997). Furthermore, several disadvantages of such an approach are noted from a
theoretical point of view. For example, integrated interorganizational information
systems can limit the participating organizations’ possible actions (the organizations
may lose some of their freedom to act independently [Wierda, 1991, p. 15]). Especially
when all-encompassing plans are presented, organizations are often confronted with the
danger that tasks will be taken away. This often generates opposition, counter-proposals
in the form of alternative plans, etc. (van der Vlist, 1987, p. 17). Van Bijsterveld adds
that “(…) organizations have to be careful with the copying of integral information
management approaches that have been applied to other organizations or networks. (…)
                                                          
61 “De belangrijkste factor is het ontbreken van formeel en eenduidig gezag in
organisatienetwerken en bedrijfsketens”66
Every organization is different with respect to goals, the position of information
technology is different, information systems are different, the structure differs, the
background of people is different, the history of the organization is different, etc.”
62
(1997, p. 205)
63.
As a result of the identification of these disadvantages, Kubicek (1995) has stated that
“[t]here are good reasons to question the dominant and popular EDI visions and to ask
how EDI gets along with the problems of data modeling and data maintenance and
whether a maximum of integration of computer systems across organizational
boundaries is possible at all, and more importantly, really to be strived for from a
management and workers point of view, or whether there are options for EDI systems
with a lesser degree of integration” (Kubicek, 1995, p. 78). Kubicek implicitly proposes
information management approaches that put less emphasis on integration (less
centralized, ‘tightly coordinated’, bureaucratic information management styles).
Finnegan, Galliers and Powell (1997) state that it could be “an important philosophical
decision to move away from mechanistic approaches when dealing with
interorganizational issues” (1997, p. 7).
Grijpink (1997) elaborates on Kubicek’s argumentation by mentioning that, in general,
organizations cherish their own data, so that the establishment of common, integrated
interorganizational information systems is hampered. The line of reasoning in this
approach starts with the recognition of each organization’s autonomy, based on the
political, cultural and learning schools of strategy research and the adaptive-
evolutionary and organizational learning schools in information management. It is
assumed that in the exchange of information, organizations predominantly safeguard
their autonomy and this can conflict with the wish to develop, plan and use an
information system that exchanges information across organizational boundaries.
In conclusion, in the literature on interorganizational information management,
divergence in control models, architectures and goals/functionality has been observed.
Divergence in integration as a goal especially confirms Gazendam’s observation that
diversity of definitions and data models in general is often a result of deliberate choices
and that integration is not always possible or desirable. Obviously, this is also true for
                                                          
62 “Organisaties zullen echter wel moeten (blijven) oppassen met het klakkeloos
overnemen van integrale automatiseringsmethoden die binnen andere organisaties of
netwerken zijn ontwikkeld en daar succesvol worden toegepast. (…) Elke organisatie is
namelijk anders: de doelen verschillen, informatietechnologie neemt een andere positie
in, de informatievoorziening is anders vormgegeven en ingevuld, de structuur is anders,
de mensen hebben een andere achtergrond, de organisatie heeft een afwijkende historie,
et cetera”
63 Curiously, after analysis of large-scale, integral information management approaches,
van Bijsterveld concludes that integral informatization is a utopian ideal, but as such it
is not senseless.67
organizational settings in which even more autonomy is present, such as in networks of
organizations or organizations participating in interorganizational relationships.
It must be noted, though, that, from the literature, it is not clear in what circumstances
there is a preference for either one of the extreme information management approaches.
Hence, an explanation of the consistency of combinations of ‘contingent factors’ and
information management approaches - that is, the theoretical backing of mechanisms -
is lacking.
2.6  Applications of interorganizational information
management
2.6.1 Introduction
In section 2.2.3, information management was defined and in section 2.5, it was stated
that various information management approaches can be discerned based on the key
concepts of control and degree of commitment of stakeholders, goals and architecture
used. As we have seen in section 1.5.4, it fits the selected research design to identify key
concepts, key performance indicators, hypotheses and, in general, line of reasoning, and
compare it with empirical data, working towards a theory by gradually sharpening
constructs and verifying relationships. Therefore, in this section, three existing cases of
applications of interorganizational information management provide anecdotal evidence
of the mechanisms of interorganizational information management. In each of these
cases, the appropriateness of information management approaches is discussed.
2.6.2  Application one: PICA in Dutch libraries
Wierda (1991) provides an example of such an interorganizational bureaucratic
information management approach with his description of the development of PICA,
Project for Integrated Catalogue Information. PICA is a joint project of the Dutch
libraries, initiated by the Dutch Minister of Education and Sciences, and executed by a
separate organization, the ‘Cooperative Body Royal Library and University Library
PICA’, founded in 1969. The first version of a PICA system did not appear before 1979.
In these 10 years of development, the joint efforts were characterized by lack of
consensus regarding the goals of the interorganizational information system, although
the controversy in this regard was often presented as a dispute over technical
implementation (Wierda, 1991, p. 51). The PICA staff played a very active role in favor
of a more or less centralized group of information systems, with a flexible yet partly
uniform data model;  because of this, two participating university libraries left the
collaboration. This defection was mainly inspired by the fear that they were not capable
of continuing their own cataloguing routines (title descriptions, classification system)
with the new joint system. The two university libraries returned only after the Ministry
compelled them to do so in 1987. But during the development, all participants had
second thoughts. “(…) [A]ll respondents considered fear to lose part of their
independence a major cause for several libraries to be cautious, or even hostile, towards
the effort to develop an IIS (…) [D]ifferences of opinion with respect to communication68
protocols and with respect to description formats were major points in which the mutual
conflicts were expressed” (Wierda, 1991, pp. 54-55). This resulted in lack of
commitment by participants and even manifest opposition against the rather centralized
structure of the new joint system.
In 1989, PICA grew in importance, partly due to coercion from the Minister. However,
the development of the system took almost 20 years.
2.6.3  Application two: VIPS in Dutch penal law enforcement
Grijpink identifies two opposing information management approaches for
interorganizational information systems: value chain computerization and classical
computerization.
Value chain computerization resembles organic, bottom-up, person-oriented
information management in its emphasis on flexibility, local databases and
decentralization and the obvious criticism of messy and inefficient operations.
Classical computerization resembles top-down, bureaucratic information management
in its characteristics of centralization of authority and central, integrated databases, and
subsequently generated opposition by the participating organizations that feared that
their autonomy was threatened. In the latter approach, “[s]ystematic and scientific
development tools are used to design databases, from a holistic point of view; no single
administrative process of the organization is the starting point of the analysis. Rather
analyses are completed from an inter-organizational (network) perspective;
organizations that need the information must agree upon the data-definitions, and use
the newly defined database” (Zuurmond, 1994, p. 327).
Grijpink illustrates the value chain computerization concept with the example of
VIPS
64, an index for use in the (Dutch) value chain for penal law enforcement, in which
hundreds of public and semi-public authorities and private partners cooperate to ensure
security and law enforcement. Examples of organizations that participate in this chain
are the District Attorney (in Dutch: ‘Openbaar Ministerie’), Court (‘rechtbank’), Prison
System (‘gevangeniswezen’), Probation and After-Care Service (‘reclassering’).
An example of information exchange in this value chain is the exchange triggered by
the wish to prevent social security fraud. Grijpink states that a ‘classical
computerization’ solution to the problem of how to exchange information between these
organizations is to set up either a database with characteristics of prison inmates that are
also recipient of a social security benefit, or a temporal comparison of databases of
various organizations. Grijpink rejects the latter alternative because in practice,
temporal comparison of large databases results in many ‘false-positive’ cases of fraud.
This means that such a comparison results in many cases of suspected fraud which,
when inspected further, indicate no fraud in actuality. Setting up a dedicated database,
according to Grijpink, also requires the cooperation and active maintenance of the
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penal law enforcement).69
database by organizations that do not have a direct interest in keeping the database up-
to-date.
Using the alternative of the value chain computerization approach, the participating
organizations’ databases continue to exist, but software components are used that
facilitate the communication (and not so much the registration) of data. In order to
accomplish this, Grijpink proposes the following ‘building blocks’:
·  ‘Referring’, an automated catalogue with reference information;
·  ‘Numbering’, a historically unique numbering system (name, number or
combination of the two) to indicate objects in databases; and
·  ‘Verifying’,  a limited set of queries with the possible results ‘Yes’ or ‘No’.
In this case, it is possible for organizations to control their own database and to ensure
appropriate access rights. In practice, value chain computerization has many
disadvantages. It requires a lot of attention to arrangements and commitment with
respect to accessibility, continuity of data (timely updates) and restrictions of use.
Furthermore, identical verification of identical data is repeated many times in the value
chain, resulting in inefficiency. It is therefore not surprising that from time to time,
attempts are made to enrich the indices system with information concerning content
(‘content enrichment’). Examples of information that has been proposed as content
enrichment are the date of lock-in (‘insluitingsdatum’), expected release date
(‘verwachte invrijheidstelling’) and qualifications such as ‘escape danger’ or ‘firearm
danger’ (‘vluchtgevaar’, ‘vuurwapengevaar’). In this way, the index system would
develop incrementally into an information system. However, Grijpink reports that to
date (1996), this development has not taken place in VIPS.
In short, the concept of value chain computerization is an approach to information
management that stresses:
·  autonomy of participating organizations by emphasizing communication rather than
registration;
·  focusing on local, decentralized databases; and
·  an emphasis on decentral arrangements about access and availability of data in
networks of organizations with a few agreed-upon central communication building
blocks like referring, numbering and verifying functions.
Grijpink claims that “(…) [m]anagers typically employ practical knowledge and
preferential solutions from experiences in the field of internal organization and classical
informatization. Consequently, they are apt to support organization border-crossing
databases and extensive data interchange on a large scale, which mobilizes extensive
opposition when implemented” (Grijpink, 1997, p. 48)
65. Note that this description
                                                          
65 “Managers ontlenen hun impliciete praktijktheorie en hun voorkeursoplossingen aan
ervaringen op het gebied van interne organisatie en de klassieke automatisering (…) Het
gevolg is, dat men zich snel voorstander toont van organisatie-grensoverschrijdende70
resembles the bureaucratic information management approach. It has already been noted
that such a bureaucratic information management approach has intuitive appeal but the
approach suffers from negligence of political aspects within organizations (Schmidt,
1991; Gazendam, 1993; de Jong, 1994). According to Grijpink, value chain
computerization avoids frustration as a result of central direction at the participating
organizations, but is inefficient for some organizations at some times. The counter
tendency to resort to a more efficient, classical computerization approach, emphasizing
centralized databases (content enrichment of databases) is not in the common interest of
the participating organizations.
2.6.4  Application three: MDSM in the British National Health
Service
Beynon-Davies provides an example of interorganizational information management in
the British National Health Service (NHS). The NHS is “a complex network of
autonomous and semi-autonomous groups concerned with health matters. Actual
delivery of health care is in the hands of powerful clinical professionals who are
naturally concerned with preserving their professional autonomy” (Beynon-Davies,
1994, p. 85). As was noted in section 2.2.3, it is possible to speak of an
interorganizational information system when various organizations can make decisions
regarding information systems independently. In the case of the NHS, “(…) no one has
responsibility for IT, IT is exploited and controlled at a number of different levels (…).
The lack of clear organization for IT has meant the absence of a clear strategic vision
for IT” (Beynon-Davies, 1994, p. 91). We therefore conclude that there is no central
authority who has information management authority or to whom information systems
control has been attributed: the NHS information systems constitute an
interorganizational information system.
Ever since its origin in 1948, the NHS has experienced an information problem.
Information systems development occurred in a patchy and piecemeal manner. In order
to try to alleviate this situation, a body known as the Department of Health and Social
Security Steering Group on Health Services Information was initiated to identify a
minimal data set for district health authorities to produce management information. This
initiative occurred against the background of the conservative ideology of the 1980s, in
which there has been a clamor for management information, or managerial
accountability in general.
Eventually, 50 entity-relation diagrams covering 500 entities and 1000 attributes were
drafted. These diagrams represented the data requirements of district health authorities,
regional authorities and the central government. In addition, definitions for the data
were established and detailed formats of each attribute were provided. Later on, this
MDSM architecture was supplemented by a common basic specification (CBS): a
generalized object model of healthcare data (Beynon-Davies, 1994).
                                                                                                                                             
databanken en uitvoerige gegevensuitwisseling op grote schaal, die bij realisatie echter
grote weerstanden oproepen”71
In 1992, an independent report of the MDSM and CBS was commissioned. The
conclusions stated that, although the expenses of the development of the architecture
were justified, the CBS and MDSM should not be made mandatory and no further
money should be spent on enlarging and maintaining the data model. In fact, the District
Health Authorities had not used the MDSM in any real sense (that is, in developing or
acquiring information systems).
Beynon-Davies reported that these conclusions were mainly based on the observations
that doubt had been cast as to the feasibility of large-scale data planning: that is, doubt
over “the model’s utility as a standard set of requirements for internal and external
information systems” (Beynon-Davies, 1994, p. 87). Consequently, the conclusions
seemed to suggest the “condoning [of] the current policy of piecemeal development of
information systems, presumably because of their ability to reflect local requirements”
(Beynon-Davies, 1994, p. 87).
Beynon-Davies quotes Klein and Scriven’s comment on the difficulties of the MDSM:
“[i]nformation of itself is of little value. It is a tool to be used to aid decision-making
and to monitor and perhaps improve performance of tasks. It proves the basis for
accountability in an organization and, as such, is enmeshed in its functioning and
management. Therefore, the Körner exercise (the development of the MDSM
architecture, VH) cannot be viewed simply as neutral and technocratic but as something
which raises fundamental questions about accountability within the NHS” (Beynon-
Davies, 1994, p. 89).
Here, accountability incorporates both managerial and political aspects. Beynon-Davies
notes that the MDSM and CBS concepts can be used to produce “financial data that can
be used as the basis of comparison between NHS bodies”
66 (1994, p. 91). The fact that
this is not in the common interests of the stakeholders (that is, DHAs, who feared that
“computing is another weapon used by region to control DHAs […]. [T]he minimum
data set […] has been portrayed as an attempt to improve centralized control” [1994, p.
90]), probably explains their resistance to implementing the architecture. It must be
noted that the MDSM and CBS as architectures have not been able to meet the original
expectations. A subsequent development is the absorption of some elements of MDSM
and CBS into a NHS data dictionary (including a new format NHS number and coded
clinical terms and groupings).
                                                          
66 This fear has antecedents in theory. Finnegan and Ní Longaigh (1996) report that
computer technology and, in particular, telematics are suited to the control purpose due
to their ability to compute, store, retrieve and communicate data and information very
quickly. They refer to it as pseudo-decentralization: top management creates the
appearance of delegating decision-making authority downward, but at the same time
uses information technology for intensive feedback. However, the analysis of the first
chapter, questioning the unilateral causal inferences relating to IT, also applies here.72
Beynon-Davies (1994) concludes, “the literature tends to under-utilize the enormous
difficulties, particularly of an organizational nature, experienced in large-scale data
planning. (…) It is therefore naïve to assume that data modeling (…) can be undertaken
painlessly and a (…) data model, once derived, can be conveniently used to drive the
process of making strategic decisions” (p. 92). Beynon-Davies recommends giving
attention to the social, political, economic and generally the informal context
surrounding information systems: “data modeling can be considered as a dialectical
process (…) [it] is both shaped by, and shapes, organizational reality” (1994, p. 94).
2.7  Summary and conclusions
In this chapter, we have defined information technology, information systems,
interorganizational information systems and information management. Subsequently, a
definition of one of the central concepts of this dissertation was synthesized:
interorganizational information management. It is the task of decision making regarding
goals, prioritization, development and use of information systems that are embedded in
two or more organizations that have no joint executives
67.
This decision-making process can be viewed from two perspectives. Firstly, it is a
strategic decision-making process in which architectural foundations are created that
guide the development of interorganizational information systems. Secondly, it is a
decision making process that is triggered by or ideally coherent with other aspects of
management, especially organizational strategy formation.
Information management has been explored according to these two tiers: that is, by
using literature on information technology (especially information strategy, section 2.4)
and by using literature on organization studies (especially strategy formation, section
2.3).
In both tiers, it can be concluded that various ‘schools of thought’ exist with respect to
(strategic) decision making. Various authors (Ansoff, Haselhoff, Mintzberg, Snellen)
use various categorizations (see Figure 14, p. 48; Figure 15, p. 49).
In chapter one, section 2.2.3 and section 2.5, it has been noted that many authors in the
scientific discipline of information systems restrict the meaning of ‘information
management’ to an explicit, formalized and centralized form. It is now clear that such a
statement is not very well grounded in theories about information management and
strategy. Using these theoretical insights, it is possible to distinguish various
interorganizational information management approaches. One form, inspired by the
design and planning schools of strategy formation and engineering school of
information management, is the top-down information management approach aiming at
centralized databases, integrated interorganizational information systems and
centralized information systems development. This approach is also referred to as
‘classical informatization’, ‘global, universal informatization’ or ‘bureaucratic
                                                          
67 As was discussed in section 2.2.3, organizations are assumed to be independent if
they can make decisions about information systems independently, at least before the
interorganizational information system is introduced.73
information management’ and it is initiated by the participating organization’s top
management or an umbrella organization.
Top-down
information
management
Decision making regarding goals, prioritization, development and
use of information systems between organizations in which the
authority over the information system is concentrated and
instruments of information management emphasize
standardization of data definitions and structures through the use
of a common conceptual schema across a collection of data
sources.
In top-down information management, there is a centralized control strategy, aimed at
integration as a goal and using an elaborate architecture that serves as a common
conceptual scheme of data structures and definitions in order to achieve standardization
with respect to these data definitions and data structures.
The rationale for a top-down information management approach is that the development
of an interorganizational information system is guided by a clear vision, which is
embodied in an unequivocal architecture, which is enforceable through centralized
control or consensus. The development of the interorganizational information system,
once the architecture has been established, is therefore very predictable.
Another form, inspired by the learning, political and cultural schools of information
management and the adaptive-evolutionary and learning schools of information
management is the bottom-up information management approach. It is also referred to
as  ‘divisional approach’, ‘local, contextual informatization’, ‘value chain
informatization’ or ‘person-oriented information management’.
Bottom-up
information
management
Decision making regarding goals, prioritization, development and
use of information systems between organizations in which the
authority over the information system is dispersed and instruments
of information management emphasize preservation of various
conceptual schemes across a collection of data sources.
In bottom-up information management, control is decentralized (e.g., decentral
information system development and, in general, line-management-based control of
work), and it in general aims at databases that are decentralized according to the
structure of the participating organizations. The architecture used does not serve as a
common conceptual data scheme, but rather as a set of agreements over how
communication takes place in terms of the use of referral indices, messages used,
limited numbering conventions, etc. Obviously, as a result of the general
decentralization philosophy, no universal goals for the various conceptual schemes are
indicated. Sometimes, it is specified to what purposes the information should not be74
used; this however leaves open many options, which is, of course, far less restrictive
than specification of a prescribed goal.
The rationale for a bottom-up information management approach is that the practical
necessities and information requirements of the participating organizations guide the
development of an interorganizational information system, which is supposed to
increase the commitment and involvement of the participating organizations. The
decision-making process regarding the interorganizational information system is much
less predictable and is characterized by sometimes complicated negotiations in which
organizations participate in order to safeguard (1) the fulfillment of their own
idiosyncratic information requirements and (2) their autonomy.
It must be noted that intermediary forms have also been identified. They are referred to
as ‘equilibrium approaches’, ‘governance approaches’, ‘network approaches’ or
‘personal-political approaches’. In fact, in practice, the ideal types, ‘top-down
information management’ and ‘bottom-up information management’, will rarely exist
and, probably, these forms will always develop into equilibrium approaches which
resemble either a true top-down or a true bottom-up approach. However, in this thesis,
the aim is to develop theory and in order to provide an insightful explanation, the
distinction in extreme forms is sustained.
Up to now, existing theories in the field of information management have been analyzed
conceptually in terms of key concepts, key performance indicators, hypotheses, and, in
general, line of reasoning.
Key concepts have been identified (control over development of interorganizational
information systems and involvement of stakeholders, architecture used, and goals
adhered to in the decision-making process), and, based on the identification of key
concepts, information management approaches have been defined. Key performance
indicators are stated very loosely in information management research. In general, the
literature on information management in combination with strategy formation theories
provides a very limited explanation of the appropriateness of various information
management approaches. Based on the strategy and information management literature,
and inducing from the anecdotal evidence from the case studies described in section 2.6,
it is possible to sum up characteristics of distinct information management (efficiency
and flexibility advantages). However, the suspicion that this list of characteristics is
hardly more than a list of symptoms seems justifiable: the question remains why certain
information management approaches are more efficient or flexible than other
approaches
68. In other words, hypotheses relating information management approaches
and key performance indicators, or hypotheses relating ‘Gestalts’ of information
management approaches and other variables such as characteristics of
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interorganizational relations, are lacking, and so is a characterization of the line of
reasoning in information management research.
Therefore, the literature on information management can only partly be used to gain
insight into combinations of information management approaches and various types of
interorganizational relations. In order to contribute to the required insight, the
discussion of information management in this chapter is supplemented with theories of
interorganizational relations in the next chapter.7677
3  Variety in Interorganizational Coordination
3.1 Introduction
In chapter one, it was indicated that the objective of this study - gaining insight through
construction of theory - is sought by exploring theories from the discipline of
information systems and theories on interorganizational coordination relations. The
variety in information management was described in chapter two; this chapter will
describe the variety in interorganizational coordination and offers a review of theories
and frameworks explaining this variety. This is done by following the first step set out
in the CAST method: identification of key concepts, key performance indicators,
hypotheses, and, in general, the line of reasoning of existing theories or fragments of
theories.
This chapter has the following structure: after an introductory exposé on the positioning
of the theme of interorganizational coordination in organization theory (section 3.2),
perspectives on interorganizational relations and interorganizational coordination are
discussed from the angles of economic organization theory (section 3.3) and political
organization theory (section 3.4). Section 3.5 offers a synthesis of these approaches and
in section 3.6, conclusions are drawn.
3.2  Interorganizational relations in organization theory
In section 1.1.2, it was shown that the topic of interorganizational relations has gained a
lot of attention in organization studies’ contemporary publications. The topic of
interorganizational relations, though, has not been part of the discipline of organization
theory from the beginning. In fact, until 1950, most organization theorists in most of
their work assumed that it was possible to understand organizations apart from their
environment, and that their important processes and events were internal to the
organization (Scott, 1987). In the organization theories of Weber, Taylor, Fayol,
Bernard and Mayo, the functioning and design of autonomous organizations is
discussed, unconstrained by the environment in which they operate; organizations were
seen as ‘closed’ entities.
However, over time, organization theorists shifted their attention from
intraorganizational to interorganizational phenomena (Negandhi, 1969). Krupp78
identifies three ways in which the topic of ‘environment’ has entered into organization
theory:
·  environment as externally constraining phenomenon for the functioning of
organizations;
·  environment as network, or ‘organizational set’, consisting of other interacting
organizations; and
·  the environment as a ‘super-organization’, in which the environment constitutes a
whole, a collectivity in which the constituting organizations are not explicitly
discerned (1961, p. 55).
Note that the third way in which environment is given a place in organization theory is
subsumed under the heading of organizational sociology or even macro sociology rather
than organization theory, because the focus is not on explaining the behavior of
individual organizations.
Benson (1975) states that the emphasis on organizational environments as externally
constraining phenomena has been established since the publication of Mill’s book The
Power Elite in 1956.  Since then, it has been increasingly recognized that organizational
boundaries are both permeable and variable (Krupp, 1961; Scott, 1987). Selznick
(1957), March and Simon (1958), Katz and Kahn (1978), Lawrence and Lorsch (1967),
Thompson (1967) and Chandler (1962) have explored this field. As a result of the
recognition of environmental pressure on organizational design and functioning,
interorganizational analysis became popular.
A drawback of much of the research on environments of organizations, either focused
on the environment itself or on the functioning of organizations in their environments, is
the vagueness of the concept of ‘environment’. “The ‘environment’ figures prominently
in almost all contemporary organization theory but is rarely defined in other than a
residual way, as everything outside the boundaries of an organization” (Aldrich &
Marshden, 1988, p. 369; see also Benson, 1975). The vagueness of the concept of
environment has also been described as failure to operationalize hostility, dynamics and
other aspects of the environment. And even if successful operationalizations are used,
the expressiveness of these variables in organization theory is limited. For example,
Aldrich (1979) uses the variables stability, homogeneity, concentration, environmental
capacity (lean-rich), domain consensus, turbulence and mobility of organizations in
order to characterize the environment. However, if organizations decide to change their
relationships with the environment, they do not manipulate ‘stability’, ‘turbulence’,
‘homogeneity’ or ‘environmental capacity’, but they change contracts with partner
organizations, change the technology used, or merge with partner organizations. So,
much of the ‘classic’ interorganizational analysis does not address decision variables
(see also Pfeffer, 1997, pp. 158-163).
Contemporary research has shifted its attention from focusing on ‘environment’ and
‘environmental forces’ to the second concept of ‘environment’: that is, to (less abstract)79
relationships between organizations, interorganizational cooperation, strategic alliances,
partnerships, etc. (Pennings, 1981; Ring & van de Ven, 1992; van der Zaal, 1997).
Benson (1975), Williamson (1975) and Van de Ven (1976) pioneered this renewed
interest in interorganizational relations. Interorganizational relations are customarily
defined as a significant amount of interaction between distinguishable organizations
(Benson, 1975) or a pattern of social relations over a set of organizations (Van Alstyne,
1997). Van de Ven (1976) conceives interaction as exchange of resources. Resources
here refers to money, physical facilities and materials, services or generally property
rights (Van de Ven, 1976; Ring & Van de Ven, 1992; see also section 3.3.5), but it can
also reflect issues of competencies and knowledge (Nooteboom, 1993), or even
customer or client referrals (Van de Ven, 1976; Grossman & Hart, 1986).
Ring and Van de Ven (1992) also recognize the importance of interaction as a necessary
element of a definition of interorganizational relations and they identify two polar
interorganizational interaction types. Firstly, there are relatively short-term, market-
based transactions, based on discrete contracts, which in fact do not represent
interorganizational relations because the resources exchanged tend to be so non-specific
that there is hardly any interaction between organizations. Secondly, there are
(complete) hierarchies, which do not qualify as interorganizational relations because
there are no distinguishable organizations involved.
Interorganizational relations, therefore, seems to refer to all situations between, but not
including, these poles. Koenig and van Wijk (1991) identify some ‘common threads’ in
various definitions. They state that if organizations participate in interorganizational
relations, they keep their formal identity, even if they sacrifice varying degrees of
autonomy. Furthermore, a relation entails the transfer or sharing of (tangible or
intangible) goods or assets, in such a way that some control over the object of the
cooperation is delegated.
Based on the above-mentioned contributions, a definition of interorganizational
relations is presented below.
Interorganizational
relations
The recurrent, non-discrete transaction of resources between
two or more organizations
In the literature, a distinction is often made between horizontal, vertical and symbiotic
relations (van der Zaal, 1997). Horizontal relationships are relations between
organizations that compete with each other in obtaining similar resources and/or
disposing of similar goods and services. In other words: horizontal relations are
relationships between competitors. Horizontal relations are, as far as organizational
research is concerned, the domain of strategic management.
Vertical relations are relationships between organizations located in different stages of
production service: that is, vertical relations are buyer-supplier relationships. Buyer-
supplier relationships have been studied at length within the domain of industrial
organization.80
Symbiotic relationships exist among organizations that complement each other in the
rendering of services. For example, the relationship between Compact Disc producers
and manufacturers of hi-fi equipment is a symbiotic one. Another example is the
relationship between computer software producers and hardware manufacturers
(Alexander, 1995).
The distinction between the various types of interorganizational relations has, among
other things, been proposed in order to clarify the fact that horizontal relations reveal
more strategic or political flavor than other types of relations. In this view, horizontal
relations are seen as a threat to the participating organizations (or, at most, a necessary
evil), whereas vertical relations are considered to be an opportunity. However, van der
Zaal (1997) has provided evidence that, to some organizations, horizontal relations are
considered to be an opportunity, whereas there are also vertical relations that are
perceived by the participating organizations as a threat. Moreover, many of the theories
on interorganizational relations apply to all three kinds of interorganizational relations.
Therefore, the distinction between horizontal, vertical and symbiotic relationships will
not be sustained in this study.
Organization scholars’ focus on relationships between organizations is remarkable,
taking into account the fact that the theme was ignored for a long time. However,
current discussions of interorganizational relations have not relinquished organization
studies’ insistence on an organization’s freedom to act independently;
interorganizational relations are seen as devices that limit an organization because
scarce resources and energy have to be invested in the maintenance of linkages with
other organizations
69. Following this logic, organizations never choose to become
involved in an interorganizational relationship for purely voluntary reasons. Van de Ven
(1976) stresses that every organization strains to maintain its autonomy, that is, it strives
to avoid the situation in which the behavior of other organizations has ramifications for
the focal organization. Autonomy here refers to the capability of organizations to
choose the course of actions they wish to pursue (Van de Ven, 1976). Simon (1976)
defines autonomy as a situation in which the organization’s decisions are not guided by
the decisions of another organization, or in which it at least has the capability of
independently examining the merits of such an imposed decision (Simon, 1976). The
capability of independently examining merits must include the ‘right to the last word’ in
accepting or rejecting a general rule imposed by another organization.
In other words, organizations prefer not to be guided in their decision making by
decision premises that have been set by partner organizations.
Parsons (1960) and Litwak and Hylton (1962) have, on the contrary, described
situations in which organizations heavily interacted with other organizations; due to
                                                          
69 Chisholm (1989) objects that because every organization operates in an environment
constituted by other organizations, no organization is an autonomous entity and thus de-
emphasizes the managerial possibilities to maneuver.81
some of these interactions, instances of exertion of interorganizational authority did
occur. In these cases, that might have occurred for a number of reasons (see Figure 1, p.
6);  organizations accept that “(…) a general plan of operations will govern the activities
(…) of the organization” (Simon, 1976, p. 10)
70. Parsons (1960) and Litwak and Hylton
(1962) described these situations with the term unstructured authority: situations in
which parties voluntarily give up some valued conditions in exchange for similar
concessions on the other side (Benson, 1975).
In general, authority refers to the situation in which one organization sets a general rule
which permits the communicated decision to guide another organization’s choices
without deliberating on its own part on the expediency of these premises (Simon, 1976).
In the case of unstructured authority, modifications of agreements between
organizations occur through (1) waxing and waning of resource allocation mechanisms
and (2) changes in legitimization or shifting domains (Parsons, 1960). The organizations
involved “intervene and extend their influence through association; they alter the
resource landscape for themselves (…) and in the process can change the structure of
[interorganizational relations]” (Van Alstyne, 1997, p. 4). If attempts by one
organization to exert influence on another organization by using authority have
succeeded,  dependence between organizations exists (Pennings, 1981).
Simon states that one of the uses of authority is that it achieves coordination. According
to Alexander (1995), coordination is a property of decisions; a decision is coordinated if
it takes all information into account and makes appropriately spontaneous adjustment.
Note that this description views coordination as an end rather than as a means (as will
be shown in sections 3.3 and 3.4, coordination brings about costs as well as benefits).
This view of coordination sees interorganizational coordination as something to be
achieved, not just a phenomenon to be analyzed.
Coordination is also defined as “the process of creating rules or norms for collective
action” (Mulford & Rogers, 1982), or “informing each as to the planned behavior of
others” (Simon, 1976, p. 72) in such a way that a general plan of operations will govern
the activities of the organizations.
Simon distinguishes two modes of coordination: procedural coordination, which is the
specification of behaviors of and relationships between organizations (it establishes the
lines of authority and outlines the spheres of activity of each organization), and
substantial coordination, which specifies the content of work to be done
71.
Summarizing, in this section a short overview of the position of interorganizational
coordination and interorganizational relations has been presented. Various theories
analyze interorganizational relations in terms of the key concepts ‘autonomy’ (of
organizations involved), some sort of ‘dependence’ and the need to ‘coordinate’
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however, also applies to an interorganizational setting.
71 Note that Simon refers to coordination as the essence of organizing.82
exchanges between organizations. In the various theories, however, obviously
incommensurable definitions are presented. At this moment, it is impossible to define
these concepts or constructs in an uncontested manner. Therefore, in the following
sections, an analysis is made of how the important concepts of autonomy, dependence
and  coordination are elaborated in specific theories. Furthermore, their
interconnectedness in terms of hypotheses is discussed.
The analysis takes place with use of two specific theoretical perspectives that are often
used to elaborate on interorganizational relations (for an overview, refer to Krickx
[1991] and Van der Zaal [1997]). These theoretical perspectives are economic
organization theory (especially transaction cost economics and property rights theory)
and political organization theory (especially resource dependence theory). For every
theory, a general introduction on the origins and content of the theory is first given and
after that it is shown how the key concepts of autonomy and dependence are interpreted
within the framework of the theory and how these key concepts relate to matters of
coordination between organizations.
3.3 Economic  Organization  Theory
3.3.1 Introduction
The sociologist Pennings asserted that “(…) interorganizational behavior has been the
primary concern of economics, while sociology and other social sciences contributed
little” (1981, p. 433). Economics has indeed contributed to the understanding of the way
organizations, in general, function. “Probably therefore, economic models are growing
in prominence in the social sciences generally, particularly in political science,
sociology and organization studies. (…) In fact, one is hard pressed to think of many
substantive areas in which economic models are not cited, even if only as providing an
alternative hypothesis” (Pfeffer, 1997, p. 44). The economist Hirshleifer even predicted
the takeover (‘economic imperialism’) of the whole of social science by economics
(Donaldson, 1995).
Economic organization theory consists of a number of distinct theoretical streams that
have been developed more or less independent of each other
72. Therefore, in the
                                                          
72 Several authors have categorized these streams in various ways. The categorization of
de Vries (1992) is based on the specific contribution to the neoclassical analysis made in
each of the streams, and, more specifically, what variables are made endogenous.
Eggertson (1990), on the other hand, assumes that the agency stream is part of the larger
transaction cost economics stream. Brynjolfsson (1994) states that neo-institutional
economics is synonymous with the property rights stream, with agency theory and
transaction cost economics as descendants of the property rights approach. Künneke
(1991) discerns three categories of property rights theories: property rights theories
applying different categories of property rights, property rights theories paying attention83
following sections, firstly the development of economic organization theory is sketched
(section 3.3.2). After that, in the sections 3.3.3 to 3.3.5, the emphasis and main line of
reasoning within the various theoretical streams are discussed: transaction cost
economics, the property rights stream and the agency stream. In section 3.3.6, the role
of autonomy, dependency and coordination in neo-institutional economics is
summarized.
3.3.2  The economic perspective on organizations
One fundamental starting point in the discipline of economics is the question why
organizations exist
73. Previously, we have defined organizations as communities of
agents. In these communities, agents are subject to authorities or procedures that guide
their tasks. Based on the assumption that markets are very efficient ways of guiding
agents in their tasks, it is possible to question the wisdom of both organizing individuals
in organizations and organizing organizations in (relatively enduring)
interorganizational relations. Whereas to the organization scientist an organization is a
very self-evident subject of study, to an economist using the line of reasoning indicating
that markets are always very efficient, an organization can be characterized as a ‘market
failure’. Relationships between organizations are not part of the standard neoclassical
economic analysis.
According to neoclassical economic analysis, firms exchange bundles of property rights
in order to satisfy their needs. Firms are “(…) feasible production plans, presided over
by a manager who, buying and selling inputs and outputs in a spot market, chooses the
plan that maximizes owners’ welfare” (Hart, 1995, p. 155). In this view, the firm is a
monolithic economic actor. The basic economic argument, as formulated in the ‘theory
of the firm’, is that markets are ideal for guiding firms in their tasks under the following
conditions (Douma & Schreuder, 1992):
·  There are large numbers of buyers and sellers;
·  There is free entry and exit from markets;
·  The industry is characterized by standardized, homogeneous products;
·  Firms are viewed as holistic units;
·  Firms are assumed to have a single objective;
·  There is perfect information: every buyer and seller knows all relevant details;
·  Buyers and sellers are characterized by maximizing behavior.
                                                                                                                                             
to different role patterns of economic actors (principals and agents) and property rights
theories using the transaction as their basic unit of analysis.
73 For example, the question ‘why is there any organization’ is central to Coase’s
critique of the theory of the firm (see, for example, Williamson [1975, 1985, 1995]).84
The  ‘theory of the firm’ lends itself to an elegant and general mathematical
formulation
74 and is very useful for analyzing how a firm’s production choice responds
to exogenous changes in the environment (through a change in the price of goods or
services). Furthermore, it is very useful for analyzing the consequences of strategic
interaction between firms under conditions of imperfect competition (Hart, 1995).
However, the theory – called rigorous but rudimentary by Hart (1995) – can only
explain phenomena when the conditions mentioned above apply. In particular the
condition of perfect information in markets has attracted much attention. In the model of
perfect markets, all the relevant information is available and compressed in the price of
a good or service
75. In this way, the price contains ‘sufficient statistics’. However, often
there is uncertainty with respect to the future quality of the goods or services, especially
if they are non-standardized or heterogeneous. Furthermore, information can be
distributed unevenly among individuals or firms. The ‘theory of the firm’ has difficulties
dealing with such - more realistic- assumptions.
As a reaction to the ‘theory of the firm’, institutionalists
76 like Veblen, Commons and
Myrdal have criticized the theory of the firm because it views human beings as
‘hedonistically calculating individuals’. They emphasized sociological, juridical and
technological aspects in the study of behavior of firms, and forcefully condemned the
ahistorical, asocietal character of neoclassical economic analysis. The proponents of
neoclassical analysis have responded to this critique by mentioning that institutionalists
never developed specific institutional models and never identified key trade-offs; in
fact, according to neoclassical theorists, institutionalists have formulated only very
vague mechanisms (Williamson, 1995, p. 210).
However, the discussions and debates between institutionalists and neoclassical scholars
inspired a group of so-called neo-institutional economists who, on the one hand,
accepted the critique of neoclassical economic analysis but on the other hand explicitly
endeavored for less heroic assumptions (such as those present in the theory of the firm).
In general, they pursued a more realistic economic analysis. “Neo-institutional
economics aims at generalizing neoclassical economics while retaining the ‘hard core’
of the micro economic paradigm, i.e. stable preferences, the rational choice model and
equilibrium structures of interaction” (Neelen, 1993, p. 4).
                                                          
74 One of the more seditious consequences of mathematical elegance is that it “(…)
provides status and makes it less accessible to the untrained, which lends it prestige”
(Pfeffer, 1997, p. 54).
75 In the traditional model, there are no costs of enforcement and administration of rights
(Künneke, 1991, p. 45).
76 Institutions may be defined as the humanly-devised constraints that structure political,
economic and social interactions (Williamson, 1995, p. 211). Institutionalization, then,
is “a process of crystallization of (…) norms, organizations and frameworks which
regulate the process of exchange” (Alexander, 1995, p. 285).85
Neo-institutional economic analysis builds upon the work of two Nobel laureates who
have especially paid attention to the aspects of uncertainty and unavailability (or uneven
distribution) of information.
The first is Herbert Simon. With his ‘behavioral theory of the firm’, Simon asserted that
human beings are rational in a necessarily limited way. Therefore, according to Simon,
it is principally impossible for individuals to optimize their welfare. As a coping
mechanism, individuals seek organizations that enable satisfying outcomes for
individuals (transformation of ‘intractable to tractable’).
The second is Ronald Coase. His works were later popularized in the writings of, among
others, Williamson (1975, 1985). Coase emphasized that information is not costless and
that organizations are alternatives to markets in the sense that organizations, with
authority and procedures, economize on information costs like searching costs, costs of
drafting agreements, enforcement costs and monitoring costs. Thus, markets as devices
to direct activities of actors can be supplemented by or, in case of extreme uncertainty
or information asymmetry, replaced by hierarchy. Clarke and McGuiness describe
markets and hierarchies as follows: “The difference between these systems rests on the
use of conscious authority in the direction of resources. In the market system specialized
and diverse resources are coordinated by ‘impalpable forces’, in ways that make no use
of conscious authority: in other words, as by an ‘invisible hand’. In contrast, the firm
involves, in some way, the use of conscious authority or the ‘visible hand’ of an
entrepreneur” (cited in Künneke, 1991, p. 30).
Summarizing, the ‘theory of the firm’ is a mathematically elegant theory explaining the
behavior of buyers and sellers in free and open markets. The theory, however, holds a
number of seditious assumptions on the prices as ‘sufficient statistics’ and on
characteristics of products, which are supposed to be homogeneous and standardized.
Simon and Coase addressed these flaws. Simon pointed at the impossibility of including
all information in decision making, while Coase tried to express informational problems
in economic quantities of benefits and, especially, costs.
Their comments were, later on, elaborated into a new discipline, which is referred to
here as economic organization theory, which consists of a number of streams. Benefits
and costs of information (and uncertainty) are specified differently in various streams of
economic organization theory. Agency theory studies the role of information and
information asymmetry in economic relations. Transaction cost economics studies costs
of exchange relations between separate organizations and within organizations. Property
rights theory analyzes various kinds of user rights pertaining to scarce goods between
actors in various institutional arrangements
77. These various streams within economic
organization theory differ to such a considerable extent that until this point, it is
                                                          
77 Note that both the ‘theory of the firm’ and neo-institutional economics lack attention
to a role for government: implicitly it is assumed that juridical arrangements do not
affect resource allocation (Künneke, 1991, p. 45). De Vries states: (…) economics can
do without juridical issues, but not the other way around” (1992, p. 43).86
impossible to indicate the role of autonomy, dependence and coordination and the
relations between these constructs. Therefore, firstly, autonomy, dependence and
coordination are discussed within each of these separate economic organization theories
(see Figure 21). The way these three constructs are dealt with in economic organization
theory at large is postponed until section 3.3.6
Economic organization theory Elaborated in section …
Agency theory 3.3.3
Transaction cost economics 3.3.4
Property rights theory 3.3.5
Figure 21: Overview of economic organization theories
3.3.3 Agency  theory
Some of the weaknesses of the ‘theory of the firm’ are addressed in the so-called
principal-agent theory, which introduces conflicts of interests between different
economic actors through the inclusion of asymmetries of information or observability
problems (Hart, 1995). Principal agent theory has therefore an historical antecedent in
the works of Barnard, who described the essence of organizing as the transformation of
conflict systems (in which no jointly consistent objectives are present) into cooperative
systems (with common objectives). But whereas Barnard emphasized the use of devices
such as psychological incentives and identification mechanisms, principal-agent theory
focuses on reward structures.
In general, agency theory has been elaborated in two distinct directions: the principal
agent theory and the positive theory of agency. Principal agent theory
78 is a
mathematically-oriented, normative and, in general, non-empirical approach in which
the emphasis is on the study of reward structures. The positive theory of agency is a far
less mathematical, empirical approach in which the emphasis is on the study of costs of
governance in various relationships. The following discussion of agency theory mainly
pertains to positive (i.e. empirically oriented) agency theory.
The main line of reasoning is as follows. Firstly, it is recognized that “(…) the firm is
not an individual (…) The behavior of the firm is like the behavior of a market, i.e., the
output of a complex equilibrium process” (Jensen & Meckling, 1976, p. 311). In this
process, three roles are identified: “(…) that of having interest in an enterprise, that of
having power over it and that of acting with respect to it” (Berle & Means, 1932, cited
in Künneke, 1991, p. 69). Agency theory assumes that in many organizations, these
roles do not rest with one person, the entrepreneur, but are dispersed over various
persons: the owner, the manager and the employee, respectively. In agency theory, it is
assumed that their motives and interests are not necessarily consistent with each other
                                                          
78 Also referred to as ‘analytical’ agency theory.87
and not necessarily consistent with the profit maximization behavior of the firm as a
whole.
In general, cooperation between parties requires any one of the following conditions
(Baiman, 1982, in: de Vries, 1992, p. 63):
·  all parties honestly share all information;
·  all parties act in the manner agreed upon, that is, each member implements the
action rule he is assigned (see below); and or
·  all parties agree on a set of individual action rules and a method of sharing the
uncertain outcome resulting from their individual actions such that no one can be
made better off without making someone worse off.
Agency theory focuses on the situations in which the above conditions are violated. For
example, in practice, information sharing and trustworthy behavior are not always in the
interest of all the parties involved. Furthermore, it is hard to require compliance with
information sharing and trustworthy behavior. Agency theory in essence being an
economic theory, the divergence of interests is expressed in terms of costs. The money
equivalent of the reduction of welfare as a result of the divergence of interests is termed
residual loss. This residual loss can be decreased by exertion of control in the form of
control by incentive, control by persuasion or control by authority
79. However, by
exertion of control, enforcement costs are incurred. The total agency costs, resulting
from information asymmetry and divergent behavior, consist of enforcement costs and
residual loss, whereas there seems to be a trade-off between these two cost components.
Originally, agency theory focused on the conflict of interest between owners and
managers
80. The basic hypothesis of agency theory is that if one party (e.g., the agent,
manager) acts on behalf of another (the principal, owner), both parties strive to
minimize agency costs. They do so by considering the marginal values of (1)
enforcement costs and (2) residual losses, and structure their relations in such a way that
appropriate compensations can be paid in every conceivable state of the world.
The problem of conflict of interest between owners and managers makes agency theory
an organization theory explaining intraorganizational phenomena, in which no attention
is paid to interorganizational relations. However, the theory can also be applied to
organizations, one acting on behalf of another, for example, a municipal housing
company acting on behalf of a municipality (Neelen, 1993) or a liner agent acting on
behalf of a shipping company (van der Zaal, 1997). In this rendition of agency theory,
interorganizational relations are analyzed in terms of the divergence of interests
between organizations, and it is hypothesized that organizations devise governance
                                                          
79 There are economists who claim that control by authority (imposing rules) and
control by persuasion (recommending a course of action) changes the costs and benefits
of disobedience and thus can be seen as special cases of control by incentive.
80 In fact, the ‘theory of the firm’ also recognizes owners and managers, but assumes
that there is no conflict of interest between these roles (see section 3.3.1).88
mechanisms (bilateral agreements, authority relations) in such a way that agency costs
are minimized.
Agency theory enriches neoclassical theory significantly by relaxing some of the
closed-world assumptions in the theory of the firm and, in general, by pursuing a more
realistic analysis. However, seen from the perspective of organization theory at large,
agency theory fails to answer the question of what constitutes a firm (or what
determines authority relations). The interorganizational rendition of the theory
recommends optimal reward structures between organizations X and Y, but fails to
specify whether such a reward structure is accomplished by retaining separate
organizations X and Y, or whether X and Y should merge with X gaining authority over
Y, or Y gaining authority over X (Hart, 1995). Furthermore, de Vries (1992) has shown
that much of the theoretical expressiveness of the agency theory is diminished when one
organization does not strictly operate on behalf of another. In general, agency theory
“can make no predictions about the nature and extent of the firm” (Hart, 1995, p. 156)
and, therefore, we will now turn to other streams within economic organization theory.
Economic
organization
theory
Autonomy Dependence Coordination
Agency
Theory
[not explicitly
mentioned]
[not explicitly
mentioned]
the mechanism (profit
sharing
agreement/hierarchy) that
minimizes sum of residual
loss and enforcement costs
Figure 22: Autonomy, dependence and coordination in economic organization
theory (1/3)
3.3.4  Transaction cost economics
Transaction cost economics focuses especially on the application of various governance
mechanisms
81 in and between organizations (Reekers & Smithson, 1996). In general,
transaction cost economics is inspired by two questions Coase asked himself. The first
one, assuming that markets are superior to hierarchies, is why even large, vertically
integrated organizations have managed to survive over time, since, reasoning from an
evolutionary perspective, one would assume that hierarchies are, in general, not efficient
and are thus unable to pass the filter (competition) that lets through only efficient
(fitting) organizational forms? Hart asserted that the ‘theory of the firm’ fails to explain
the occurrence of ‘organization’: “[m]ore subtly, neoclassical theory begs the question
of what a firm is” (Hart, 1995, p. 155). The second question is, given the fact that
                                                          
81 Governance mechanism is synonymous with ‘institutional arrangement’ in the
transaction cost approach.89
hierarchies have obviously managed to survive, why isn’t all production carried out by
one big firm?
Transaction cost economics assumes many of the conditions stated in the ‘theory of the
firm’ (see section 3.3.2). Recall that according to the ‘theory of the firm’, the focus is on
firms: profit-optimizing, holistic organizations that buy inputs and sell outputs on spot
(short-term) markets. These transactions (buying and selling) occur because “(…) a
crucial value of transaction relations lies in complementarity of knowledge, competence
and access to other resources” (Nooteboom, 1993, p. 5).
One condition that transaction cost economics does not assume is the condition of
perfect information. Rather, bounded rationality is assumed (see also section 3.3.2).
According to transaction cost economics, firms are therefore incapable of (1) judging
changes ex-ante in supply and demand (novel and perhaps more attractive customers
and suppliers appearing on the scene), (2) foreseeing change in productive
competencies, and (3) monitoring the partner’s actions.
One of the consequences of bounded rationality is that firms participating in transaction
relations are not able to anticipate all kinds of circumstances in contractual
arrangements. In fact, initial contracts are inevitably incomplete. Especially if
transactions do not take place in spot markets, but rather if their completion takes a
period of time, unforeseen circumstances result in the need to renegotiate terms of the
trade, resulting in adjusted formality and/or detail of contracts, or exchanging or
retracting of hostages (Nooteboom, 1993)
82.
It is the assertion of transaction cost economics that in markets, negotiating and
renegotiating the terms of the trade yields costs, so-called transaction costs. Some of
these costs occur before transactions take place (ex ante), and some of them after the
transaction has taken place (ex post). “Specifically, ex ante costs include (1) search and
information costs; (2) drafting, bargaining and decision costs; and (3) costs of
safeguarding an agreement. Ex post costs of contracting include (1) monitoring and
enforcement costs (2) adaptation and haggling costs (3) bonding costs and (4)
maladaptation costs” (Mahoney, 1992, p. 566). Hart (1995) summarizes the concept of
transaction costs as haggling and learning costs. Note that transaction costs ‘by default’
result from private ordering (settling disputes involving two parties, which involves
opportunity costs of devoting time and energy to productive ends). In excess of private
ordering, court ordering may be called for by means of ‘ultimate appeal’. The latter is
an activity that can make haggling and learning especially expensive.
Assuming bounded rationality, transaction costs are an inevitable by-product of
transactions in markets, and result from uncertainty and information asymmetry, or in
                                                          
82 An example of exchanging hostages is to invite specialists from the partner
organization to stay at the focal organization’s facilities. The information gathered by
the specialists, which is of value to the organization possessing it, serves as the hostage
here.90
general from lack of transparency in markets. This lack of transparency, though, is not a
real problem, because ongoing interactions between organizations are expected to
modify parameters like price, quality and quantity even if both timing and impact of
circumstances is unpredictable (according to Williamson, this is due to a process of
‘spontaneous adaptation’).
According to transaction cost economics, it is possible to decrease transaction costs by
giving one party authority over the terms of the trade (Williamson [1995] refers to this
situation as ‘induced adaptation’
83). In this situation, however, other costs are incurred:
costs of errors and costs associated with administrative rigidity (Williamson, 1995;
Hart, 1995), or, in short, bureaucratic costs.
So, markets (‘spontaneous adaptation’) and hierarchies (‘induced adaptation’) are
governance mechanisms that yield various advantages and disadvantages and hence,
result in various benefits and costs. Williamson (1985, 1995)
84 identifies attributes
which describe the advantages and disadvantages:
·  Incentive intensity (elicitation of effort to adapt to changing circumstances); and
·  Ease of adaptation (ease of making uncontested bilateral adaptation
85).
In general, spontaneous and induced adaptation can be described in terms of these
attributes (Figure 23).
Attribute Weight Induced Adaptation
(‘hierarchies’)
Spontaneous Adaptation
(‘markets’)
Incentive intensity a1 0+
86
Ease of adaptation a2 +
87 0
Figure 23: Comparison of governance mechanisms
A strong assumption, according to Williamson, is that ‘incentive intensity’ is a valued
attribute (Williamson, 1995): in the trade-off depicted in Figure 23, a1 >> a2. Therefore,
                                                          
83 It is a peculiar thing that Williamson (1995) refers to markets and hierarchies as
‘spontaneous adaptation’ and ‘induced adaptation’, respectively, while the line of
reasoning in transaction cost economics is static (for an elaboration, refer to the
discussion of ‘Dynamics‘ in section 3.5.3). However, the precise dynamics are not
elaborated in economic organization theory.
84 The characterization of governance mechanisms with these characteristics is open to
discussion. Williamson presents these characteristics “(…) without pretending to be
exhaustive” (1995, p. 198). However, in order to illustrate the line of reasoning of
transaction cost economics, the characteristics are maintained for the moment.
85 Either by administrative fiat or by third-party arbitration or court ordering.
“Hierarchies tend (…) to use administrative fiat while markets resort to the courts for
arbitration” (Van Alstyne, 1997, hypertext quotation).
86 Although there is reliance on (costly) court ordering.
87 Although there is reliance on (costly) bureaucratic controls.91
according to the line of reasoning in transaction cost economics, the market as a
governance mechanism is favored over the hierarchy. The rationale is that the
transaction costs that are yielded in markets are less than the costs that occur in the
alternative of the hierarchy (i.e., bureaucratic costs).
Up to this point in the line of reasoning, neoclassical analysis is somewhat enriched by
taking transaction costs into account, but the analysis’ results remain unchallenged: the
‘survival’ of large, vertically-integrated organizations is not explained. However, apart
from the departure from the ‘perfect information’ assumption, transaction cost
economics introduces the notion of asset specificity
88. The condition of asset specificity
refers to the situation in which organizations make relation-specific investments, that is,
invest in assets that are specific to certain transactions and that cannot easily be re-
deployed to other uses. Examples of asset specificity are site specificity (transactions
have to be completed at a fixed location), physical asset specificity (transaction requires
specialized equipment) or human asset specificity (transaction requires specialized
human knowledge).
Because of the inclusion of bounded rationality and asset specificity, different
conclusions in transaction cost economics are yielded (as opposed to the ‘theory of the
firm’). Transaction cost economics states that in the situation of asset specificity,
organizations are locked into each other (at least to some extent) and relinquish some of
their freedom to act independently. “Transaction cost economics maintains that the
condition of bilateral dependency varies systematically (indeed, is defined by) the
condition of asset specificity” (Williamson, 1995, p. 198). A situation of asset
specificity (Williamson, 1985, p. 95) is also referred to as a ‘lock-in’ (Williamson,
1985, p. 53), a situation characterized by ‘sunk costs’ (van der Zaal, 1997, p. 77), or a
situation that resembles a ‘small numbers exchange relationship’ (Williamson, 1975, p.
26).
In the case of ‘asset specificity’, organizations are increasingly susceptible to
opportunistic behavior of other organizations: the partner organization may choose to
‘defect’, that is, pursue a golden opportunity. The behavior of an organization actually
defecting from a relationship with a partner-organization is referred to as
‘opportunism’
89.
An important consequence of opportunism in the presence of ‘asset specificity’,
according to transaction cost economics, is that the organization considering
                                                          
88 Asset specificity was in fact not introduced by Coase or Williamson, but by Klein,
Crawford and Alchian (1978).
89 Opportunism by the partner organization confronts the focal organization with the
loss of the sum of (1) the sunk costs of the relationship and (2) the costs to search and
bind a new partner.92
opportunism
90 may try to renegotiate terms of the contract with its partner
organizations, thus raising transaction costs.
An important hypothesis in transaction cost economics and a forceful assertion in the
works of Williamson is that in the case of asset specificity, adaptation to changing
circumstances in markets (‘spontaneous adaptation’) - for example by renegotiating
terms of the trade and/or exchanging or retracting of hostages - is prohibitively
expensive. In the trade-off depicted in Figure 23, the transaction costs are hypothesized
to exceed the bureaucratic costs of a hierarchy. Therefore, assuming optimizing
behavior, hierarchies are hypothesized to be better able to deal with asset-specific
investments. “As a condition of bilateral dependency builds up (…), forms of
organization that are better able to effect uncontested adaptability have more to
recommend them – incentive disabilities notwithstanding” (Williamson, 1995, p. 198).
The premise of the transaction cost approach is that by analyzing transaction costs, one
can discover how transactions can be handled efficiently: in an unstructured market-
oriented setting in which independence is stressed, or in a structured hierarchical setting,
or in intermediary settings. Also, it is stated that the relative costs of markets, hybrids
and hierarchies change as the level of asset specificity (dependence) changes (Figure
24). It is the analysis of the concept of ‘asset specificity’ that especially enriches the line
of reasoning in transaction cost economics as opposed to the line of reasoning in the
‘theory of the firm’.
Figure 24: Governance costs (adapted from Williamson [1995, p. 199]).
The line of reasoning of transaction cost economics shows in which cases markets are
relatively superior to hierarchies, and enriches neoclassical economic analysis by
                                                          
90 For the decision whether or not to ‘defect’, the relative value of a partner organization
is taken into account. Relative value of a partner organization to the focal organization
may include matters of efficiency, development capacity, flexibility, adherence to
specifications, value as a source of knowledge, international presence, etc. (Nooteboom,
1993).
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Figure 25: Autonomy, dependence and coordination in economic organization
theory (2/3)
A conceptual flaw of transaction cost economics is the vagueness of the various costs
incurred by having or dispensing with authority. Fischer has asserted that by issuing
suitably specified transaction costs, almost anything can be rationalized (Brynjolfsson,
1994). Or, as Hart has demonstrated, in transaction cost reasoning it is still unclear by
what exact mechanisms opportunism is reduced if transactions are carried out in
hierarchies. “First, even if we accept the strategy of explaining governance structures in
efficiency terms, the literature has not examined the possibility that authority opens up
new avenues for opportunism. Hence, on the transaction costs school’s own criterion for
good organizational design, we still lack a full explication of the efficiency advantages
generated by authority relations” (Dow, 1987, cited in Pfeffer, 1997, p. 51)
93. Boone
and Verbeke (1991) identify various types of bureaucratic costs: costs resulting from
‘complexity’ and costs associated with agency problems (especially in multidivisional
organizations).
                                                          
91 See Williamson (1995), who states that dependence varies systematically and is
indeed defined by the condition of asset specificity (quotation in this section).
92 This is probably most vividly expressed in Figure 24.
93 In the view of Jensen and Meckling, the firm itself is conceived as a nexus of
contracts. However, this theory cannot explain why a nexus disbands (autonomization)
or why a nexus decides to merge with another nexus (merger).94
Concluding, transaction cost economics sheds some light on market failure as a result of
the occurrence of the condition of bounded rationality. However, no convincing,
rigorous explanation is provided for the question of how introducing authority mitigates
this failure (Grossman & Hart, 1986; Boone & Verbeke, 1991). This latter weakness is
addressed in the property rights approach.
3.3.5  Property rights theory
The theory of property rights, although it is often portrayed as a multidisciplinary
theory, is discussed here under the heading of economic organization theory because it
has very clearly visible parallels with agency theory and transaction cost economics. It
is based on maximizing behavior (like the ‘theory of the firm’), emphasizes incentive
issues (like agency theory) and emphasizes costs of contracting (like the transaction cost
approach). Its distinctive characteristic is the focus on the problem of what exactly
differentiates a hierarchy from a market-based contractual agreement, and how
ownership of assets affects organizational behavior.
The property rights line of reasoning resembles the line of reasoning of the transaction
cost approach. The emphasis, however, is different. Transaction cost economics seems
to focus on Coase’s first question of why hierarchies exist (i.e., analyzes market
failures), while property rights theory seems to seek an answer to Coase’s second
question: why not all production is carried out by one firm (i.e., studies non-market
failures)
94. Transaction cost economics therefore has many characteristics of a theory of
markets, whereas property rights theory has many characteristics of a theory of
administration. In the scientific study of public administration, property rights theory
has, among other things, been applied to studies of:
·  efficiency of legislation (that is, exogenous attenuation of property rights);
·  influence of liability on economic behavior;
·  state intervention and economic behavior
95; and
·  activities of individuals in various property right structures (Künneke, 1991).
Property rights may be defined as “(…) the sanctioned behavioral relations among men
that arise from the existence of goods and that pertain to their use. These relations
specify the norms of behavior with respect to goods that each and every person must
                                                          
94 This is partly due to the fact that property rights theory is a multidisciplinary theory,
influenced by disciplines like law and policy science. Transaction cost theory,
moreover, is an extension of economic theory. Killian and Wind (1998) argue that
deviation from the market mechanism provides the starting point of research for
economists, whereas social scientists (specifically, policy scientists) are more interested
in studying withdrawal from hierarchical coordination.
95 A typical property rights claim is provided by Alchian: under public ownership the
costs of any decision or choice are less fully trust upon the selector than under private
property.95
observe in his daily interactions with other persons, or bear the costs of non-observance.
(…) The prevailing system of property rights in the community is, then, the sum of
economic and social relations with respect to scarce resources in which individual
members stand to each other” (Furubotn & Pejovich, 1974, p. 3). Künneke presents
another definition: “the legally allowed alternatives of resource allocation” (1991, p.
54). Hart and Moore (1990) summarize that a property right ultimately is the ability of
an owner to exclude others from the use of his or her asset.  Künneke mentions the
example of ownership of a dwelling and how this involves a number of property rights:
“(a) the right to use the asset (…) (b) the right to appropriate the returns from the asset
and (c) the right to change the asset’s form and substance” (Furubotn & Pejovich, 1974,
p. 4). These rights are also referred to as usus, the right to occupy it, usus fructus, the
right to let it, and abusus, the right to reconstruct or eventually sell the house,
respectively (Künneke, 1991, p. 58).
Property rights theory “(…) views the firm as a set of property rights” (Hart, 1995, p.
160). So, an organization is characterized by the (nonhuman) assets under its control
96.
The owner may adapt the assets with cost-saving or quality-enhancing features and may
appropriate the benefits of these adaptations. This may occur directly, by generating an
income out of it or, indirectly, by allowing others to use the asset embodying these
innovations in exchange for an increased compensation, specified in a contract between
owner and user of the asset.
The parallel with transaction cost economics is clearly visible in property rights theory’s
treatment of bounded rationality. According to property rights theorist Brynjolfsson
(1994), it is impossible to write a comprehensive, long term contract that governs the
terms of the trade in every conceivable state of the world. Initial contracts are
incomplete  (Brynjolfsson, 1994): “(…) the quasi rents from the investment cannot be
divided up appropriately in advance” (Hart & Moore, 1990, p. 1120).
Property rights theory states that the right to choose the aspects not covered by contracts
resides with the owner of the asset: the owner is residual claimant. “Each of the parties
will have certain rights under the contract, but its incompleteness means that there will
remain some ‘residual rights’ that are not specified in the contract. When these rights
pertain to the use of an asset, the institution which allocates these residual rights of
control is property ownership”
97 (Brynjolfsson, 1994, p. 1647).
                                                          
96 Property rights theory even states that if physical capital is important, control over
nonhuman capital can lead to control over human capital (also referred to as
organizational capital), because it is hard for employees to find a substitute for this
capital in the short run.
97 Note that residues of property rights not only refer to monetary gains (residual usus
fructus property rights, profits), but also to residual usus and abusus property rights. For
example, if a contract says nothing about maintenance of a specific piece of machinery,
the ‘owner’ retains the right to decide on maintenance (Brynjolfsson, 1994).96
In fact, property rights theory identifies two categories of property rights, designated
rights and residual rights (Grossman & Hart, 1986). By means of a contractual
relationship, only designated rights are transferred from one party to another, leaving
residual rights unchanged. Now, a situation of assets under shared control arises (Van
Alstyne, 1997). Ownership, on the other hand, gives access to designated and residual
rights. Thus, under the condition of bounded rationality, the owner of an asset always
has an incentive to invest in an asset, or, more generally, in an interorganizational
relationship, because even in the case of a circumstance that has not been specified in
the (incomplete) contract, over which haggling over the terms of the trade occurs, the
owner possesses ex-post bargaining power by means of threatening to withhold the
assets otherwise. Property rights theory concludes that under a condition of bounded
rationality, organizational behavior is not only determined by reward structures as
specified in contracts, but also by asset ownership.
In transaction cost economics, common control
98 is seen as a way of reducing the
consequences of opportunistic behavior (the transaction costs that can arise, Hart &
Moore [1990]).
As property rights theory clearly has visible parallels with transaction cost economics,
the basic line of reasoning of property rights theory resembles the mechanisms of
transaction cost economics, although the terminology is slightly different.
As in transaction cost economics, the focus is on the advantages and disadvantages of
various governance mechanisms, and markets are contrasted with hierarchies. In
markets, production is characterized by a series of transactions between autonomous
organizations, so that residual property rights are dispersed over these organizations. In
hierarchies, property rights are attenuated: one party gains authority over the whole
transaction.
In fact, the basic transaction cost economics trade-off (see Figure 23, p. 90) is
elaborated.  It is hypothesized that advantages incurred by authority will not outweigh
the disadvantages of decreased incentive intensity (see also section 3.3.4).
As in transaction cost economics, there is a condition in which this does not apply; this
situation is referred to as complementarity of assets (caused by asset-specific
investments). In the case of complementary assets, each party can withhold the asset
under its control and the haggling over the terms of the trade that occurs if organizations
decide to do so increases transaction costs significantly. Property rights theory
hypothesizes that in the case of bounded rationality and complementary assets, cost
savings resulting from integration will, in fact, outweigh the costs incurred by decreased
incentive intensity.
                                                          
98 Also referred to as integration. Here, integration refers to the inclusion of
autonomous organizational parts in a common hierarchy or firm, or the degree to which
ownership and property rights vest with a central office (Van Alstyne, 1997). At this
moment, its meaning is different from the meaning of information systems integration
as defined in chapter two. See chapter five for more details.97
In the line of reasoning of transaction cost economics, the mechanism that is responsible
for suppressing transaction costs is simply embodied in the phrase “a boss can tell a
worker what to do” (Hart, 1995, p. 164). It hardly needs argumentation that this phrase
represents a caricature of what actually happens in organizations, especially if
professionals dominate these organizations (as in professional bureaucracies).
Property rights theory provides an explanation of how hierarchy mitigates transaction
costs, and thus, why hierarchies are better able to deal with complementary assets, in a
more sophisticated way than is embodied in the phrase ‘a boss can tell a worker what to
do’. This explanation is based on the incentive intensity for employees and emphasizes
that in the case of asset specificity, it is in the self-interest of the employees to behave in
the way the boss tells them to (their incentives are more intense).
The explanation can be illustrated using an example. In the example below, we will
illustrate that incentive intensity affects the behavior of owners of firms (in other words,
asset owners), but also, more realistically, that it affects the behavior of employees who
do not own assets but (in the absence of complete labor contracts) can bargain for a part
of the surplus generated by their efforts.
Firstly, let us focus on the behavior of owners of two organizations X and Y that are
involved in the production of a good that does not require complementary assets.
Owners of organizations X and Y face intensive incentives to invest in assets because -
being owners - they can appropriate the gains from these investments. This changes,
however, if assets are complementary. Owner X knows that owner Y is able to bargain
for a part of the value generated by X’s investment by means of threatening to withhold
the complementary asset, and owner Y knows that owner X is able to do the same thing
with the value generated by Y’s investments. In the absence of complete contracts, this
situation confronts both X and Y with decreased incentive intensity. By means of
common control over assets, incentives are restored because the possibility of holding
up complementary assets is excluded and in all cases of redistribution of property rights
(X buying Y’s assets, Y buying X’s assets, and X and Y being co-owners) incentives
are restored.
Secondly, it is possible to show that incentive intensity also applies to employees
working with assets. Although employees are not owners, they can bargain for benefits
in any form: higher wages, promotions, or even more leisure time or on-the-job
consumption.
Employees working with the assets face incentives to engage in, for example, an on-the-
job training program because their value will rise and they will be able to bargain with
the asset owner for benefits as described above. In this situation, the marginal value
created because of the on-the-job training program is, in the long run, expected to be
divided among the asset owner and employees.
Now consider a situation in which complementary assets are involved. The same
employees engaging in an on-the-job training program face degraded incentives because
they have to bargain with the asset owner, who, in his turn, has to bargain with the
partner-organization, suggesting a split of the marginal value between employees,98
owner and partner-organization. Consequently, the employees’ share of gains will
typically be lower and so their incentive to acquire new skills decreases.
The incentives for the employees are restored, however, if the complementary assets are
placed under common control. In this situation, the employees bargain directly with the
owner of the asset, suggesting a split of the marginal value between employee and
owner.
Thus, in a case of (1) incomplete contracts and (2) asset specificity, incentives for
employees are more intensive under common control than under separate ownership.
This line of reasoning explains how the occurrence of complementary assets enables the
owner of the complementary asset to bargain for a part of the marginal value created by
employees working with the original asset (by threatening to withhold the
complementary asset otherwise), thereby suppressing the employees’ incentives. This
situation is an example of a market-failure (caused by ‘hold-up’ power, exercised by the
complementary asset’s owner) that suppresses incentive intensity in markets.
Property rights theory hypothesizes that complementary assets in markets suppress
incentives for employees working with these assets, and that this decreased incentive
intensity offsets the traditional superior incentives in markets. Furthermore, it is
hypothesized that bringing complementary assets under a common hierarchy restores
the intensity of their incentives because employees working with the assets have to
negotiate with only one party (the ‘unified’ owner of the complementary assets). The
phrase ‘a boss can tell a worker what to do’ is replaced by the phrase ‘rental cars are
driven less carefully than cars driven by their owners’ (Van Alstyne, Brynjolfsson &
Madnick, 1995).
Note that property rights theory’s answer to the question of by what exact mechanism
hierarchy mitigates contractual failure is still a caricature, but perhaps not such an
unrealistic one (Hart, 1995).99
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3.3.6  Autonomy, coordination and dependence in economic
organization theory
In this section, the contributions of agency theory, transaction costs economics and
property rights theory with respect to the relationship between autonomy, dependence
and coordination are synthesized. Because of the criticism of the use of agency theory
for our current purposes (see section 3.3.3), this synthesis is largely based on the
contribution of transaction cost economics and (for the larger part) property rights
theory.
In section 3.2, it was noted that organization theory in general claims that organizations
strain to maintain autonomy and avoid situations in which the behavior of other
organizations has ramifications for the focal organization.
According to the line of reasoning of economic organization theory, organizations
exerting the usus, usus fructus and abusus property rights in an unbounded manner face
intensive incentives to perform well. That is, autonomous organizations, accessing other
organizations’ assets and allowing other organizations access to their own assets
through short-term (‘spot market’) contracts, are hypothesized to pass the evolutionary100
filter of market competition. However, this only holds under a number of assumptions,
among other things the assumption of perfect information
99. All economic organization
theories discussed in sections 3.3.3 to 3.3.5 are based on the assumption that perfect
information either does not exist or that perfect information is prohibitively expensive to
gather (the bounded rationality assumption). Consequently, organizations are confronted
with uncertainty, circumstances that had not been anticipated in contracts with other
organizations. So, if circumstances occur that have not been foreseen, adaptation of
contracts will have to take place. Consequently, costs are incurred: so-called transaction
costs. Despite the fact that adaptation to changing circumstances may be effortful and
transaction costs are incurred, it is assumed that intensive incentives yield successful
adaptation. Even in the presence of uncertainty and hence transaction costs,
organizations are assumed to be able to renegotiate terms of trade in such a way that, in
the long run, all organizations involved benefit equally well.
The situation changes, however, if investments have been made in capital that can only
generate rents in conjunction with specific (either human or non-human) assets of the
partner organization (‘asset specificity’ or ‘complementary assets’). In these situations,
organizations are confronted with a lock-in effect. In such a case, the threat of
withholding complementary assets by a partner-organization means that a focal
organization’s decision premises are no longer fully determined autonomously. Hence,
dependence occurs as a result of  ‘asset specificity’. Dependence is seen as a threat
because organizations that are ‘locked-in’ are vulnerable to possible opportunistic
behavior by the partner organization (see also van der Zaal, 1997). It is hypothesized
that organizations try to avoid asset- specific investments, or, if this is impossible, only
engage in cooperation with partner organizations using asset-specific investments if the
focal organization “(…) has a more or less well grounded belief, in the form of a
subjective probability, that Y will cooperate in the sense of not misusing such
dependence. This belief may be based on (perceived) available opportunities for misuse
on the part of Y, Y’s incentives towards misuse, and Y’s propensity to employ the
opportunities” (Nooteboom, 1993, p. 11). In the case of asset specificity, autonomy of
organizations also refers to the possibility of opportunism.
Organizations may allow for the possibility of opportunistic behavior by partner
organizations by anticipating such behavior in contracts. In this way, contractual
arrangements limit both organizations’ autonomy. However, assuming bounded
rationality, it is either impossible to anticipate all states of the world (a Simonian
interpretation of bounded rationality) or prohibitively expensive (in a Coasian
interpretation); contracts are necessarily incomplete. The characteristic of bounded
                                                          
99 Note that concepts like ‘sunk costs’ and ‘asset specificity’ are problematic because
imperfect information renders full anticipation of consequences in contractual
arrangements impossible. Assuming perfect information, though, anticipation is
possible and these concepts are not problematic any more.101
rationality and hence incompleteness of contracts is crucial in economic organization
theory. Thus, economic organization theory, especially transaction cost economics and
property rights theory, focuses on the opportunity costs of autonomy: “the cost to the
individual of preserving autonomy” (Douglas, 1995, p. 98). In situations of dependence,
these costs increase.  It is this feature especially that differentiates economic
organization theory from neoclassical economic analysis.
Economic organization theory states that although bringing two separate organizations
under common control by means of hierarchical coordination yields costs of reduced
intensive incentives and increased administrative rigidity, these costs may be
outweighed by the benefits of avoiding ‘haggling costs’ (see Figure 24, p. 92). As
complementary assets held by separate organizations are a cause of haggling, it is
hypothesized that a net improvement can be realized by integrating assets under a
common hierarchy, thereby removing possible hold-up situations (see section 3.3.5).
A key tenet of economic organization theory is that it identifies positive and negative
consequences (in terms of costs) of various governance mechanisms in various
circumstances. Assuming optimizing behavior of organizations, it explains why
organizations accept being limited in the course of action they wish to pursue (e.g.
accepting procedural coordination, either by detailed contracts or by accepting
hierarchical control; in both ways, transaction costs are decreased).
Often, economic organization theory is viewed as having a preoccupation with the
market-versus-hierarchy theme. In section 3.3.4, it was shown that the market versus
hierarchy comparison is more likely to be conceived as a continuum. Negotiations
between organizations result in contracts that consist of elements that are characteristic
of markets as well as elements that are typical of hierarchies (de Vries, 1992). The
alternative of semi-structured interorganizational relations is a novelty in the works of
Williamson (van der Zaal, 1997). “Whereas I was earlier of the view that transactions of
the middle kind were very difficult to organize and hence were unstable, (…) I am now
convinced that transactions of the middle range are much more common” (Williamson,
1985, p. 83).
In Figure 27, the position of autonomy, dependence and coordination in economic
organization theory at large is summarized. This summary is based on previous
summaries on the position of autonomy, dependence and coordination in agency theory,
transaction cost theory and property rights theory (Figure 22, Figure 25 and Figure 26,
respectively). The summary of economic organization theory focuses somewhat more
on transaction cost theory and property rights theory because agency theory lacks a full
explanation of relationships between organizations if one does not strictly operate on
behalf of another organization (see section 3.3.3).102
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3.4  Political Organization Theory
3.4.1 Introduction
As the statement by Pennings indicates (this volume, p. 82), economic theories have
been widely applied to the study of interorganizational relations. However, economics is
not the only perspective used. Developments in political science, policy science and
sociology have resulted in the emergence of what is referred to here as political
organization theory (see also Klijn, 1997). Political organization theory has proven to be
a rival theory to economic organization theories. Political organization theorist Jerry
Pfeffer and economic organization theory proponent Oliver Williamson have fueled a
vigorous  debate between political organization theory and economic organization
theory. Williamson noted that “[e]conomic and sociological approaches to economic
organization have reached a state of healthy tension” (1995, p. 207). Pfeffer has stated
that “there is evidence that both institutionalization and power theories of organizations
occasionally are more successful than some presumption of rationality or efficiency
explaining organizational structure” (1997, p. 52), whereas he stated, with respect to
economic organization theories, that the dominance of economic organization theory in
the larger field of organization theory does not rest on a readily identifiable set of
empirical successes. Williamson, on the other hand, repeatedly quotes March’s
statement that, for organization theory, power is a disappointing concept
100.
                                                          
100 The debate is not only a debate in organization science. Donaldson (1995) explicitly
grounds political organization theory in the New Left ideology, whereas economic
organization theory is assumed to originate in the conservative ideology of the New
Right (Ter Bogt, 1998).103
3.4.2  The political perspective on organizations
Political organization theory originates in the works of Homans, Levine and White,
Emerson, Zald, Benson, and Pfeffer. A key reference for the political organization
theory is Pfeffer and Salancik (1978). They have explicitly positioned their work as
being opposite to prior organizational analysis that focused internally and ignored the
political dimension (Donaldson, 1995): “[m]ore traditional views of organizations
underemphasize the importance of power, conflict, and non-bureaucratic procedures”
(Tushman, 1977, p. 207). According to Parsons, in political organization theory “(…)
the orientation is the maximization of total command of facilities in the social system
held by one actor, individual or collective, relative to the others” (1951, p. 550).
Political organization theory, being the study of legitimate power, was particularly
vigorous in the early 1970s (Pfeffer, 1997). Since then, attention to power and
politicking has diminished. Pfeffer, one of the key theoreticians on political
organization theory, stated a number of reasons for this decline and concluded in 1997
that  “[p]ower as a topic also suffers from the problem of being politically incorrect.
(…) Considerations of domination and force, of getting one’s way against opposition  -
which is, after all, a part of most definitions about power
101 – perhaps are better left out
of sight of discussion.” (1997, p. 155).
However, because of its value for interorganizational analysis (Pfeffer and Salancik’s
theory has many characteristics of an interorganizational theory: six of the ten chapters
of their work are about interorganizational matters like mergers, joint ventures, cartels,
etc.
102) and the ‘rediscovery’ of political organization theory by authors working in the
discipline of information systems (Holland & Lockett, 1994; Bensaou & Venkatraman,
1996; Klein, 1996; Schwarzer, Zerbe & Krcmar, 1997), political organization theory is
discussed here.
3.4.3  The mechanisms of political organization theory
Political organization theory belongs to the so-called interorganizational theories that
claim to explain the development of interorganizational relations and provide
recommendations for their design. In fact, the starting point of political organization
                                                          
101 Emerson (1962), for example, defines the power of X over Y as the amount of
resistance on the part of Y which can potentially be overcome by X.
102 Donaldson (1995) even claims that because of phenomena addressed in political
organization theory, Pfeffer and Salancik’s work is more a theory of (corporate) strategy
than of organizational structure. However, Donaldson does not point out on which
grounds he differentiates structure theory from strategy theory. For this moment,
therefore, we subsume political organization theory, including Pfeffer and Salancik’s
theory, under the heading of organization theory.104
theory
103 is that the behavior of organizations can only be explained in relation to
environing organizations.
In political organization theory, organizations are viewed as “(…) political entities:
coalitions of interests and demands emanating from within and outside organizations.
(…) Boundaries within organizations change, participation in decision domains varies,
and decisions are differentially important. Under these conditions, organizations can be
viewed as loose structures of interests and demands, competing for organizational
attention and resources, and resulting in conflicts that are never completely resolved”
(Narayanan & Liam Fahey, 1982, pp. 26-27). These coalitions attempt to acquire and
maintain resources by interacting with other coalitions, each with its own preferences
and objectives
104. Here, ‘resources’ refers to social legitimacy, information and physical
and monetary resources.
Thus, the focus is not limited to the functioning and design of the ‘internal’
organization, but rather stresses the management of relations. Tushman (1977) assumes
that (1) to understand the behavior of organizations, one must understand the dynamics
and relationships between organizations; (2) organizations may not be equally powerful
over different issue areas (and the distribution of power and status over organizations
may change over time); (3) organizations will act to limit the uncertainty they are
facing; and (4) the greater the differentiation between organizations, the greater the
potential for interorganizational conflict.
A key statement of political organization theory is that “(…) in general, organizations
will tend to be influenced by those who control the resources they require” (Pfeffer &
Salancik, 1978, p. 44). Pfeffer and Salancik state ten conditions that affect the extent to
which an organization will comply with control attempts:
1.  The focal organization is aware of the demands;
2.  The focal organization obtains some resources from the social actor making the
demands;
3.  The resource is a critical or important part of the focal organization’s operation;
4.  The social actor controls the allocation, access, or use of the resource; alternative
sources for the resource are not available to the focal organization;
5.  The focal organization does not control the allocation, access, or use of other
resources critical to the social actor’s operation and survival;
                                                          
103 In the remainder of the discussion, resource dependency theory is assumed to be
synonymous with political organization theory, unless other authors than Pfeffer and
Salancik are explicitly quoted.
104 Here, clearly the assumption of methodological individualism is violated. Instead,
the view on organizations as held by March and Simon (1958) is more or less followed
(‘individuals in organizations engage in transactions and exchange contributions for
inducements’).105
6.  The actions or outputs of the focal organization are visible and can be assessed by
the social actor to judge whether the actions comply with its demands;
7.  The focal organization’s satisfaction of the social actor’s requests are not in conflict
with the satisfaction of demands from other components of the environment with
which it is interdependent;
8.  The focal organization does not control the determination, formulation or
expression of the social actor’s demands;
9.  The focal organization is capable of developing actions or outcomes that will
satisfy the external demands; and.
10.  The organization desires to survive (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978, p. 44).
Furthermore, political organization theory hypothesizes that if the environment, which
consists of other, possibly linked organizations, changes, the focal organization faces
the prospect of either coping with the changed environment (and thus safeguarding the
acquisition and maintenance of resources) or not surviving. Coping with the
environment, according to the line of reasoning of political organization theory,
includes the question how organizations react to their environment (Pfeffer & Salancik,
1978; Donaldson, 1995; Pfeffer, 1997; see also the discussion in Williamson, 1995).
However, reverse causality – how organizations can influence the environment – is also
taken into account. In this way, the basic mechanism of political organization theory
resembles the reasoning of emergent perspective (see section 1.2.1). “If the organization
and the environment must be mutually compatible, then either the organization can
change or the environment can be changed” (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978, p. 107). In fact,
managers are assumed to have three roles. Apart from the symbolic role, in which a
manager is rewarded when things are going well and fired “(…) as a way of altering
appearances, thereby removing external pressure, without losing much discretion”
(Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978, p. 264), there are both the responsive role and the
discretionary role. The responsive role is the role of processing of and responding to the
environment, and of implementing adaptation. The discretionary role is the role of
actively modifying the environment.
Political organization theory does not assume a deterministic line of reasoning as in
Burns and Stalker (1961), but rather hypothesizes that organizations are not slavish
followers of the demands of the environment (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Haselhoff,
1977). The rationale for this position is that environments of organizations consist of a
variety of other organizations, including organizations that are mainly concerned with
legal, political or juridical aspects, including but not limited to governmental
organizations
105, accrediting organizations, regulatory bodies that were established by
agreement of the focal organization itself, etc. Consequently, the demands that an
                                                          
105 The fact that the environment consists of other organizations, including government
agencies, funding organizations, etc. may be seen as a step forward in comparison to the
situation in which a very abstract concept of environment is assumed (see section 3.2).106
organization faces are often in conflict with one another and even if organizations were
able to comply with these conflicting demands
106, the path dependence of individual
responses constrains organizations in its future actions, including responding to other
demands. This suggests that organizations cannot survive by responding completely to
every environmental demand: such a form of ‘compliance’ is “a loss of discretion, a
constraint, and an admission of limited autonomy. To the extent that the focal
organization is subject to successful external influence attempts, it places itself in a
situation in which its long-term survival is threatened” (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978, pp.
94-95). Wamsley and Zald state that organizations typically shield off their
technological cores from the environment: “Since organizations exist to accomplish
work, the organizational polity must protect and insulate the technological core from
external contingencies (…), that would disrupt task accomplishment” (1973, p. 72; see
also Thompson, 1967; Homburg & Gazendam, 1997).
The possibilities for actively managing the environment are more or less captured in the
conditions that affect the extent to which an organization will comply with control
attempts. In general, Pfeffer and Salancik mention two courses of action (1978, p. 97):
·  avoiding resource dependence, and
·  avoiding control.
Avoiding resource dependence implies avoiding the conditions which demand
compliance in the first place, that is, changing “the focal organization’s dependence on
important critical resource exchanges” (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978, p. 108). Benson
identifies the basic action orientations of maintenance and defense of an exclusive,
autonomous domain. “To forestall a loss of autonomy and to remove some of the
contextual constraints on behavior, the focal organization may take action to reduce the
probability of being subject to successful enforcement of external demands” (Pfeffer &
Salancik, 1978, pp. 95-96).
In practice, organizations can choose to buffer inputs and to commit other organizations
to long-term contracts for disposal of output. However, buffering does not remove the
basic source of vulnerability. Another solution is to develop substitute exchanges (‘the
redefinition of an exchange so that it is no longer critical’) or to diversify (‘expansion
into a related geographical area, or market, to the conglomeration of the firm so that it
includes diverse lines of business with practically no resource exchanges in common’).
In general, avoiding resource dependence implies altering “(…) the purposes and
structure of the organization so that it no longer requires only a limited range of inputs
or serves only a few markets” (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978, p. 109).
                                                          
106 For example, by means of sequential attention to environmental demands,
nondisclosure or playing various groups off against one another (Cyert & March, 1963;
Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978).107
Avoiding control is a course of action that is referred to as ‘expanding organizational
jurisdiction and encompassing critical contingencies’ by Wamsley and Zald (1973). In
this course of action, “the control which other organizations might possess over the
exchange of that resource” (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978, p. 108) is manipulated. This
manipulation is inspired by the observation that “if the exchange is important for the
organization, the organization should attempt to manage its interdependence by
extending its own control in those vital areas” (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978, p. 113). An
option is to control the input or output exchange itself, to control the stability and
predictability of the exchange relations by controlling the rules of the trade
107. Pfeffer
and Salancik propose a variety of measures to do this.
Firstly, collective structures of interorganizational action
108 can be established: informal
or semiformal mechanisms in which behavior is coordinated “not by hierarchical
mandate but by agreements to behave in certain ways” (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978, p.
144) in such a way that access to resources is controlled and assets’ use is regulated.
This can be done by co-optation (forming interlocking directorates).  Co-optation is “a
situation in which a person, or a set of persons, is appointed to a board of directors,
advisory committee, policy meeting or influencing group, some organizational body that
has at least the appearance of making or influencing decisions” (Pfeffer & Salancik,
1978, p. 162).
Secondly, one method is to operate under the protection of government or interfirm
regulation. For instance, concentration of control in the environment can be eliminated
through appealing to antitrust legislation. However, this is only possible in a limited
number of circumstances. For example, governmental power cannot be eliminated using
this type of reaction
109. Furthermore, this second category of measures “still leaves the
organization somewhat vulnerable. Cartels can disband, government regulators can
become hostile, and informal arrangements can be broken down” (Pfeffer & Salancik,
1978, pp. 108-109).
Therefore, thirdly, partner organizations can be controlled by means of merger. Here,
“ownership solves the problem directly; compliance comes through the authority
established by owning the other organization” (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978, p. 145).
Merger is viewed as quite a drastic measure (as compared to informal or semiformal
linkages), because “relationships established through communication and consensus can
be established, renegotiated and re-established with more ease than the integration of
organizations by merger can be altered” (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978, p. 144).
                                                          
107 Pfeffer and Salancik state that this can be achieved both by legal as well as by illegal
means.
108 Also referred to as ‘the negotiated environment’ by Cyert & March (1963).
109 Of course, abusive exertion of governmental power is incompatible with General
Rules of Conduct and can be contested using objection and appeal procedures in
administrative law (Heesen, Homburg & Offereins, 1995; Heesen, Homburg &
Offereins, 1997). The result, however, can never be the dismantling of governmental
power.108
Furthermore, formal mechanisms like merger may not always be possible (Heesen,
Homburg & Offereins, 1995; 1997).
Summarizing, whereas in economic organization theory, profit-maximizing behavior of
organizations as atomic agents is assumed, political organization theory makes
assumptions about behavior of organizations as well as behavior within organizations
(extra-organizational and intra-organizational, respectively). In political organization
theory, the behavior of organizations is not guided by cost-benefit considerations
110;
instead, organizations are assumed to be actors that strive to optimize their self-interest
by (1) minimizing their dependence on other organizations and (2) maximizing the
dependence of other organizations on themselves (see also Guetzkow, 1966; Reekers &
Smithson, 1996). Donaldson states that “(…) thus, the thesis of Pfeffer and Salancik
(1978) is at root a model of political struggle, that is, of different parties seeking to
influence each other to their own advantage, both between one organization and
another, and between one organizational member and another” (1995, p. 130).
Donaldson accuses Pfeffer and Salancik’s theory of treating organizations as political
actors, represented by top-management, rather than production systems or systems of
economic activity (Donaldson, 1995).  In fact, Pfeffer and Salancik themselves state that
asymmetrical power and dependence relations play an important role in their theory and
attention has to be paid to aspects of conflict, struggle for power, exploitation and
especially protection of autonomy. “Many of the structural attributes described as
desirable for organizational adaptability and for coping with an environment of
conflicting demands and interests are represented in political organizations (…). We are
not the first to note structural parallels between political organizations and other types
of organizations or the similarities in their governance and adaptation. (…) We suspect
that it is mainly when the problems confronted by formal organizations become
increasingly the management of conflicting demands and adaptation to changing social
contexts that structural similarities to political organizations emerge” (1978, pp. 277-
278).
Donaldson furthermore states that political organization theory is an example of a
theory that overemphasizes politics, has an anti-management quality and has become
assocaited with an outbreak of irrationality. In short, Donaldson seems to suggest that
“politics are an aberrant form of behavior” (Davenport, Eccles & Prusak, 1992, p. 55).
Tushman, on the other hand, states that politicking “arise[s] not because of (…)
perversity, but because of the nature of organizational processes and decision-making
under uncertainty (…) Conflict is inherent in the system whose social structure is seen
as pluralistic, fractured by (…) divergent interests” (Tushman, 1977, p. 212).
Analysis of the political organization theory as depicted in this section shows that
political theory mainly states that organizational survival is achieved by adaptation and
by influencing the environment in order to retain a degree of organizational autonomy.
                                                          
110 Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) assert that subjective and ideological elements play an
important role in the causal chain that eventually explains behavior of organizations.109
The existence of production systems and economic aspects is not denied but rather
viewed is viewed from another perspective
111.
3.4.4  Autonomy, coordination and dependence in political
organization theory
Autonomy, coordination and dependence all are literally used in the discussion of
Pfeffer and Salancik’s version of political organization theory. Dependence is described
as being the obverse of power (Emerson, 1962), “the reason why nothing comes out
quite the way one wants it to” (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978, p. 40) and it is defined as a
situation in which another has discretion to take actions that affect the focal
organization’s interests. Dependence exists when there is an unequal balance between
two organizations with respect to the concentration of resources and the importance of
resources to the organizations. In fact, dependence is portrayed as being the product of
the importance of a given input or output to the organization
112 and the extent to which
it is controlled by a relatively few organizations. Eventually, dependence is very
important in the explanation of interorganizational behavior.
According to Benson, “[a]dministrators undertake or refuse to undertake cooperative
ventures on the basis of reasonably careful calculations of costs and returns at the level
of resource acquisition. Coordination proposals which threaten the program efficiency
of an agency or its established ties to supporting publics are resisted. Proposals which
strengthen the agency’s position in the resource game are more likely to be adopted”
(1975, p. 238).
Coordination is also literally used. It must be noted, however, that a definition of
coordination is lacking. Coordination is described as “a means for managing mutual
interdependence” (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978, p. 143). Coordination may be achieved
through a hierarchical mandate, but also by so-called interfirm linkages, depending on
voluntary behavior in which significant discretion remains with external organizations
who may withdraw from the coordinated interaction. Examples of such forms of
informal or semiformal coordination are: “co-optation, trade associations, cartels,
reciprocal trade agreements, coordinating councils, advisory boards, boards of directors,
joint ventures, and social norms” (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978, p. 144). Pfeffer and
Salancik mention the following advantages of interfirm linkages:
·  They provide information about the activities of that organization which may
impinge on or affects the focal organization;
                                                          
111 In fact, not many of the theories discussed by Donaldson (1995) manage to survive
his critical review. Schrama (1991) has remarked that Donaldson’s analysis is at least a
rear-guard action.
112 Resource importance is often operationalized as the ratio of the amount of a specific
resource and the total amount of resources that are transacted by the focal organization
(van der Zaal, 1997).110
·  They provide a channel for communicating information to another organization on
which the focal organization depends;
·  They constitute a first step in obtaining commitments of support from important
elements of the environment; and
·  They have a certain value for legitimating the focal organization (Pfeffer &
Salancik, 1978, p. 145).
With respect to hierarchical coordination, the following is remarked: “[e]xplicit
coordination among organizations is costly. When the external world is brought into the
organization, through director interlocks, through the pooling of resources in a joint
venture, or by giving authority to some interfirm organization, external influence over
the organization is increased and its own discretion is simultaneously constrained even
as it increases the certainty of its environment.” (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978, p. 183).
Alexander (1995) states that hierarchical coordination may in fact offer few or no
benefits and setting up hierarchical coordination structures may involve costs which,
even if they are low, offer few prospects of offsetting gains (p. 273).
Moreover, Pfeffer and Salancik remark that “[o]rganizations are willing to bear the
costs of restricted discretion for the benefits of predictable and certain exchanges”
(Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978, p. 183). Overall, however, Pfeffer and Salancik describe
interfirm linkages (that is, in the terminology of this thesis, interorganizational relations)
using the term ‘collusion’ and find them undesirable. “One might ask why collusion is
seen as so disturbing. Why are reciprocal trade agreements, cartels, and other forms of
interfirm coordination considered to be undesirable? After all, the firms are just solving
the problems of dependence through establishing a negotiated environment. The
problem is that the negotiated environment established is not one that includes the
interests of all parties. If two organizations collude to reduce competition, they have
created greater dependence for those who purchase their products. The problem with
collusion, or coordination to establish negotiated environments, is that everyone is not
freely and openly participating in the process” (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978, pp. 183-184).
Autonomy is also literally used albeit not defined. Autonomy is a state to be cherished,
and dependence is a state always to be avoided, unless uncertainty can be reduced, for
example by ‘absorbing’ information from partner organizations, gaining support from
the environment, and, in general, legitimizing the organization.  From the fragment
“[o]rganizations seek to avoid dependencies and external control and, at the same time,
to shape their own contexts and retain their autonomy for independent action” (Pfeffer
& Salancik, 1978, p. 261) one might guess that autonomy in political organization
theory is the state of non-dependence; that is, self-containment. However, as has also
been taken into account, no organization is completely self-contained, so autonomy is
more of an ideal state or objective than an existing, observable state.
A peculiar detail of the role of autonomy in political organization theory is that
organizations (especially those operating in industries at intermediate stages of
concentration) tend to use inter-firm linkages in order to avoid uncertainty. Yet each of111
these interfirm linkages in itself involves an element of diminution of autonomy
(Donaldson, 1995). So “in order to protect their autonomy, organizations take steps
which reduce their autonomy” (Davis and Powell, cited in Donaldson, 1995, p. 148).
This ‘irony’ is further discussed in section 3.5.
The positive causal relation between dependence and uncertainty is notable, especially
because a satisfying explanation is lacking (see also van der Zaal, 1997): in some
situations, organizations resist external control (interfirm linkages, integration), because
it reduces their autonomy. However, organizations are also hypothesized to surrender
autonomy actively in order to reduce uncertainty for the benefits of predictable and
certain exchanges. Obviously, it is assumed that interorganizational relations that are
initiated by other organizations reduce autonomy for a focal organization, whereas if a
focal organization initiates interorganizational relations, it enhances the focal
organization’s autonomy.
Autonomy Dependence Coordination
Political
Organization
Theory
the ideal
state of self-
containment
situation in which
another organization
has discretion to affect
focal organization’s
behavior and interests
by controlling
necessary resources
diminishment of freedom
to act independently,
either by hierarchical
mandates, voluntary
behavior or co-optation
Figure 28: Autonomy, dependence and coordination in political organization
theory (synthesis)
3.5  Synthesizing perspectives
3.5.1  Opportunities for reconciliation between theoretical
perspectives
The debate on the appropriateness of economic organization theory and political
organization theory (see section 3.3.1) is a vigorous one. The discussions of economic
organization theory (section 3.3) and political organization theory (section 3.4) have
indeed revealed that there is some tension between authors of the two different streams.
The debate is somewhat polarized by Williamson (1995) and Pfeffer (1997).
Nevertheless, there are enough similarities and overlaps in order to try to synthesize the
two perspectives: “(…) [W]hile important areas of disagreement remain, more
consensus exists than is at first apparent” (Scott, 1987, cited in Williamson, 1995, p.
207). Moreover, many authors have tried to reconcile economic organization theory and
political organization theory (Holland & Lockett, 1994; Bensaou & Venkatraman, 1996;
Klein, 1996; Schwarzer, Zerbe & Krcmar, 1997). Other authors have even tried to112
reconcile strategy formation (see section 2.3), economic organization theory and
political organization theory (Haselhoff, 1977; Krickx, 1991, van der Zaal, 1997).
In this section, the insights from both theoretical perspectives are compared to each
other and combined where possible. The justification for this effort lies in statements
like “[i]n many ways, transaction cost theory can be considered as an extension to the
resource dependence perspective” (Reekers & Smithson, 1996). Pfeffer (1997) asserted
that studying power processes can provide at least a partial test of the economic model
of organizations, and can also increase the explanatory power of economic models of,
for example, not-for-profit organizations (see also 3.4).
3.5.2  Comparison of political organization theory and economic
organization theory
Introduction
The compatibility of both political organization theory and economic organization
theory with frameworks addressing consistency of organizational (and, for instance,
other organizational or technological) variables has been subject to discussion. Political
organization theory’s description of mutually adjusting interorganizational and
environmental parameters is quite compatible with such a framework (e.g. ‘emergent’
adaptation to environment, rejection of unilateral causality; see also Rogier (1998),
Donaldson [1995]). Donaldson’s critique on political organization theory mainly
pertains to the overall tone of the theory: “(…) highly damning of the discipline of
organizational behavior” (1995, p. 132). In section 3.4.3, it has already been stated that
this line of reasoning does not convince from a research point of view.
Economic organization theory can also be regarded as a theory of adaptation of
organizational variables to environmental variables (especially technology). Pfeffer
concluded with respect to economic research on the relationship between organizational
parameters and environment that  “(…) structure seemed to vary quite systematically
with an organization’s strategy, size, technology, and conditions of the organization’s
environment. (…) Common sense suggested that the appropriate organizational
arrangements must surely depend on what is being organized and the environment in
which the organization has to operate” (Pfeffer, 1997, p. 160). Therefore, we conclude
that both political organization theory and economic organization theory are not
incompatible with the overall framework of this study.
In section 3.5.1, opportunities for reconciliation of the often diametrically portrayed
interorganizational theories were identified. After all, economic organization theory and
political organization theory have in common that they explain interorganizational
phenomena like interorganizational relations, integration and mergers and that they, in
general, study various means of adaptation of organizations to their environment.113
Contrasts
Using the elements of the first step of the CAST method (see footnote 29, p. 25), and
using criteria that have been proposed by authors who have addressed both economic
organization theory and political organization theory Haselhoff [1977] and Schwarzer,
Zerbe, Krcmar [1997], it is possible to emphasize the distinct contributions of economic
organization theory and political organization theory (see Figure 29). In Figure 29, the
following criteria are used:
1.  theoretical roots (Schwarzer, Zerbe & Krcmar [1997]);
2.  perspective / actors (Haselhoff, 1977);
3.  model formulation  (after Haselhoff, 1977);
4.  key concepts (CAST method);
5.  key performance indicators (CAST method);
6.  key statements (CAST method, see also Schwarzer, Zerbe & Krcmar [1997]); and
7.  unit of analysis (Schwarzer, Zerbe & Krcmar [1997])
Approach
Criteria
Economic Organization Theory Political Organization
Theory
1.  Theoretical
roots
Neoclassical economy. Policy Science, Sociology.
2.  Perspective
(actors)
Although agency theory
identifies various stakeholders
(owners, managers and
employees) within firms, their
interests are common
(maximization of utility in terms
of efficiency and, eventually,
profits) and the firm is the actor
(methodological
individualism
113). Bounded
rationality is assumed
114.
Organization is the actor.
The organization is a loose
confederation of various
stakeholders with diverse
interests. Bounded
rationality is assumed.
                                                          
113 In general, methodological individualism refers to a philosophy in which all human
activities are purposeful and meaningful, and, moreover, to a philosophy in which all
social phenomena can be explained in terms of individually purposeful and meaningful
activities. In microeconomics, as well as in economic organization theory,
methodological individualism is applied at a different level of analysis, i.e. at the level
of analysis of organizations (Künneke, 1991, pp. 54-56; Hodgson, 1988; see also section
3.3.2).
114 Economists obviously admit to the idea of bounded rationality, but economic models
of organizations “still tend to define ‘bounded rationality’ as an imperfect
approximation of the ‘unbounded’ one” (Dosi, cited in Pfeffer, 1997, p. 44).
Furthermore, institutions are designed to achieve efficiency, and through a process of
natural selection, inefficient ones cease to exist. The time frame involved in this process114
Approach
Criteria
Economic Organization Theory Political Organization
Theory
3.  Model
formulation
Qualitative, expressed in quasi-
quantitative notation
115. The
expression of information
search activities, haggling,
administrative rigor etc. in terms
of costs enables the expression
of these aspects in a general
equilibrium model.
Qualitative, verbally
expressed. Political
organization theory uses
concepts (uncertainty,
autonomy) that are not yet
expressed in comparable
units and are thus harder to
formulate in an
equilibrium model.
4.  Key concepts Autonomy: state in which
property rights are exerted with
respect to assets in an
unbounded manner, which
elicits powerful incentives to
perform well
Dependence: state in which
assets can only be made
productive in association with
other assets
Coordination: the mechanism
that optimizes incentives for
participants involved
Autonomy: the ideal state
of self-containment
Dependence: situation in
which another organization
has discretion to affect
focal organization’s
behavior and interests by
controlling necessary
resources
Coordination:
diminishment of freedom
to act independently, either
by hierarchical mandates,
voluntary behavior or co-
optation
5.  Key
performance
indicators
Efficiency through incentive
intensity
Autonomy
                                                                                                                                             
may be quite long, though. Economist Williamson has admitted that economists are
somewhat far-sighted (Williamson, 1995, p. 226).
115 Neo-institutional economics shares this feature with, for example, Marxian economic
analyses (Gazendam, 1993, p. 281).115
Approach
Criteria
Economic Organization Theory Political Organization
Theory
6.  Key statement
(key problem,
propositions)
Minimal costs determine
optimal (inter)organizational
structure.
PAgency Theory: If one party acts on
behalf of another, parties’
performance is enhanced by
minimizing agency costs;
PTransaction Cost Economics:
Cooperating parties’
performance is enhanced by
choosing the governance
mechanism that minimizes
consequences of uncertainty;
PProperty Rights Theory: Cooperating
parties’ performance is
enhanced by choosing the
governance mechanism that
optimizes incentives of
participants.
Designing
interorganizational
structure helps to manage
interdependencies.
PPolitical organization theory: In
order to perform well,
organizations reduce
uncertainty by minimizing
their dependence on other
organizations and
maximizing the
dependence of other
organizations on
themselves.
7.  Unit of analysis Transaction Interorganizational
behavior
Figure 29: Comparison of economic organization theory and political organization
theory
From the discussion of economic organization theory and political organization theory
in Figure 29, two important differences are elaborated here:
·  the perspective on the subjects being studied, organizations; and
·  the line of reasoning in the theories, as it appears from the key statements.
The differences in perspective are, in a way, coherent with both approaches’ theoretical
roots. Economic organization theory, like neoclassical analysis, assumes
methodological individualism (Hodgson, 1988; Künneke, 1991). In general,
methodological individualism is a philosophical stance in which, eventually, all kinds of
(social) phenomena are explained in terms of individuals. However, many writings on
economic organization theory are not always strict in adhering to methodological
individualism. Although de Vries (1992) upholds that neo-institutional economics
maintains the core of methodological individualism (de Vries, 1992), there are
economic organization theorists who state that, in order to understand organizations, it
is not necessary to observe microprocesses of individuals (Künneke, 1991, p. 110).
Notably property rights theorists experience difficulties in explaining phenomena116
concerning, for example, large administrative agencies that function to a certain degree
independent of the preferences of individual participants. In fact, two solutions are
suggested: (1) property rights are eventually attributed to individuals (customarily
owners, or, for administrative agencies, citizens or taxpayers) or (2) to whole
organizations. In the latter case, the behavior of individuals is not observed, but rather
the behavior of unitary organizations, which in fact is not completely consistent with
methodological individualism in a very strict sense
116, 117.
Political organization theories, on the other hand, pursue a more realistic analysis by
explicitly distancing themselves from economic organization theory’s methodological
individualism
118. Organizations are viewed as coalitions of participants with principally
divergent interests (referred to as methodological interactionism by Nooteboom [1996]).
This viewpoint is a far less elegant, but possibly more realistic, starting point for
analysis.
The rationality of organizational behavior definitely differs in economic organization
theory as compared to political organization theory. The rationality in economic
organization theory assumes that behavior is driven by cost-optimizing considerations
(see section 3.3.1). In every condition, the governance mechanism that renders the least
costs is preferred, even if autonomy of organizations has to be surrendered. Bounded
rationality is assumed in the sense that not all the possible states in the world can be
discerned and anticipated in long-term contracts (see section 3.3.4). Political
organization theories analyze organizational behavior as behavior that attempts to
reduce uncertainty. This can be done by adapting to the environment, but also by
actively influencing environmental forces. In order to reduce uncertainty, organizations
are assumed to be actors that strive to optimize their self-interest by (1) minimizing their
dependence on other organizations and (2) maximizing the dependence of other
organizations on themselves. This rationality of behavior is thus of a different kind than
the rationality in economic organization theories. In economic organization theory,
uncertainty reduction is a means to the end of economizing on costs, whereas in
political organization theory, uncertainty reduction is an end in itself.
3.5.3  Common themes
Apart from the differences between economic organization theory and political
organization theory, there are also a number of common characteristics in both theories.
For example, a striking common characteristic of both theories is that they both lack an
                                                          
116 For a more elaborate discussion on methodological individualism in the social
sciences, refer to Franssen (1997).
117 But even if property rights are attributed to organizations, the example mentioned in
section 3.3.5 illustrates that incentive intensity refers to the individuals working in an
organization.
118 Neo institutional economics has also pursued a more realistic analysis of
organizations by adopting bounded rationality.117
explanation of how (i.e. by what exact mechanisms) a hierarchy mitigates the
consequences of uncertainty (see the ‘irony’ in uncertainty reduction and autonomy,
section 3.4.4). A notable exception as far as economic organization theory is concerned,
is property rights theory
119,120 (which is often portrayed as a multidisciplinary theory).
Other common characteristics are:
·  the assumption of bounded rationality;
·  the fact, in both theories, that ‘management of interdependence’ is stressed; and
·  both theoretical streams’ difficulties with dynamics.
Bounded rationality
The origins of both economic organization theory as well as political organization
theory seems to lie in the observation that organizations are boundedly rational and
hence, uncertainty exists (section 3.3.2; see also Ter Bogt, 1998; van der Zaal, 1997).
Uncertainty plays a major role in both theoretical streams. In fact, in both streams, the
expressiveness of the lines of reasoning diminishes severely if the assumption of
bounded rationality is no longer held.
However, the line of reasoning in political organization theory differs from the line of
reasoning in economic organization theory, though, in terms of the way organizations
are supposed to cope with uncertainty. With reference to economic organization theory,
Williamson (1975, p. 9) explicitly states that uncertainty is not a crucial problem in
itself, but that it begins to play a role when asset-specific investments enter into a
relationship between organizations. Here uncertainty mainly refers to the possibility of
opportunistic behavior by partner organizations, caused by circumstances that are
impossible to foresee at the moment contracts are drawn.
Political organization theory, however, assumes that organizations are always
confronted with bounded rationality. “The current formulation of [economic
organization theory] does not acknowledge that uncertainty may have a separate effect
(…), independent of asset specificity. [Political organization theory] does acknowledge
this independent effect of uncertainty” (Krickx, 1991, p. 147). In fact, uncertainty in
political organization theory also stems from the behavior of governmental
organizations, trade associations, new legislation, etc.
Concluding, in political organization theory, uncertainty stems from a variety of sources
and is always assumed to be problematic, whereas uncertainty in economic organization
theory is only problematic in combination with complementarity of assets.
                                                          
119 In section 3.3.5, we used property rights theory to illustrate that in the case of
complementary assets, a hierarchy can improve incentives for employees working with
assets, thus providing at least some explanation of how a hierarchy mitigates the
consequences of uncertainty in a market.
120 Therefore, property rights theory is the cornerstone of the model of a political
economy framework to be presented in section 4.3.118
Managing interdependence
The core of both economic organization theory and political organization theory is that,
in the presence of bounded rationality, interdependence between organizations is
considered to be problematic by the organizations involved: the interorganizational
relationship is subject to management activities. Although the determinants of
interdependence in economic organization theory and political organization theory are
labeled differently, Krickx (1991) shows that asset specificity in fact implies resource
dependence: “(…) when asset specificity is high, it implies that resource dependence is
high as well” (p. 154). The reverse is not true: resource dependence is broader than asset
specificity because there are sources of resource dependence, such as monopolist
supply, which do not increase asset specificity (Krickx, 1991).
Both theoretical streams emphasize that organizations engaged in interorganizational
relations are able to limit the consequences of uncertainty by restricting the autonomy of
the partner organization, that is, by limiting the number of courses of action an
organization is able to pursue (procedural coordination): the organization attempts to
manage its interdependence by extending its own control in those vital areas, either by
hierarchical mandate or by informal or semiformal agreements to behave in certain
ways.
In economic organization theory, this is done by drafting contracts (transacting
designated property rights) that include compensatory measures for specific
circumstances. In political organization theory, it is assumed that this is accomplished
through co-optation, interfirm regulation or requesting government regulation.
Ultimately, both designated as well as residual property rights are transacted so that
input or output exchange itself is totally controlled: the stability and predictability of the
exchange relationships are  safeguarded by controlling the rules of the trade. Thus,
decision premises are imposed on partner organizations that limit the number of courses
of action an organization is able to pursue. Note that in both theoretical streams, it is
assumed that in order to be able to limit another organization’s autonomy, a focal
organization must accept decision premises from partner organizations, too: a bilateral
dependence develops.
However, such a limitation in the courses of action an organization is capable of
pursuing has positive (effects of uncertainty are reduced) as well as negative
consequences. Economic organization theory emphasizes that attenuation of property
rights yields diminished incentive intensity. Political organization theory states that
when the external world is brought into the organization (through director interlocks,
through the pooling of resources in a joint venture or by giving authority to some
interfirm organization), external influence over the organization is increased and,
consequently, its own discretion is simultaneously constrained.
This constraint on discretion is assumed to be a threat, even as environmental
uncertainty is decreased. In fact, both organization theories state that a limitation of
autonomy may yield benefits (“[o]rganizations are willing to bear the costs of restricted
discretion for the benefits of predictable and certain exchanges” [Pfeffer & Salancik,119
1978, p. 183]), but, overall, negative consequences of restricted discretion are
highlighted more in political organization theory than in economic organization theory:
“(…) it is frequently the least powerful and the least organized whose interests are not
served in the resultant interorganizational structure” (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978, p. 183).
Dynamics
The standard analysis pursued in economic organization theory is static. “It is a peculiar
thing that on the one hand passage of time [in terms of dynamics and adaptation, VH] is
crucial, but on the other hand relevant parameters are seen as timeless. According to
[transaction cost economics], a crucial condition for dependence is that time is required,
with repeated transactions, to recoup transaction specific investments, and allowance is
made for the emergence of unpredictable contingencies that preclude closed contracts to
govern dependence. On the other hand [transaction cost economics] implicitly assumes
continuation of ex ante inability to judge propensities towards opportunism, unchanged
configuration of supply and demand (…) productive competencies, and ability to
monitor partner’s actions. But surely, ongoing interactions will modify those
parameters”, comments Nooteboom (1993, p. 4).
The same comment seems to pertain to political organization theory; here, unforeseen
changes may happen over time, to which an organization has to respond. Concluding,
both economic organization theory and political organization theory seem to assume
dynamics, but both theories use timeless parameters.
3.6  Summary and conclusions
This chapter has elaborated on the variety that exists in interorganizational coordination
mechanisms and has reviewed theories that explain this variety.
Since the 1950s, the popularity of topics like strategic alliances, partnerships or, in
general, interorganizational relations, has increased in organization theory.
Characteristic for interorganizational relations is that organizations transfer or share
control over resources for a certain period of time, but not necessarily for a continuous
period. This entails that autonomy is sacrificed, but at the same time, organizations keep
their formal identify. In general, an interorganizational relationship may be defined as
significant interaction between distinguishable organizations, or, more precisely, the
recurrent, non-discrete transaction of resources between two or more organizations.
In relation to the central concept of this chapter, coordination, the literature provides
often hard-to-follow accounts of why organizations that are supposed to strive to
maintain their autonomy, seemingly voluntarily accept that their decision making is at
least in part guided by decision-making premises set by other organizations. In general,
often incommensurable descriptions are provided between (interorganizational)
coordination on the one hand and autonomy and dependence on the other hand.120
Since the 1970s two distinct theoretical streams have emerged that attempt to explain
how autonomy, dependence and coordination relate to each other. These streams are
economic organization theory and political organization theory. Both theoretical streams
provide explanations of the behavior of organizations in terms of protection and
surrendering of organizational autonomy, management of bilateral dependence between
organizations, and coordination between organizations.
An important driving force in both theoretical streams is the condition of bounded
rationality: organizations are assumed to be partially ignorant because it is prohibitively
expensive or even impossible to gather all information required, and hence
organizations are confronted with uncertainty. In fact, the condition of bounded
rationality is necessary to explain why organizations sometime surrender their
autonomy.
In economic organization theory, the starting point of the line of reasoning is the
situation in which assets are dispersed over a number of asset ‘owners’. Owners can
legally exert usus, usus fructus and abusus property rights with respect to their
(nonhuman) assets. By exerting the abusus property rights, assets may be enhanced with
innovations, and the usus fructus property right entitles the owner to appropriate the
gains of these innovations, for example by having other persons use the modified asset
in return for an increased compensation, specified in the terms of a contract. The ability
to appropriate the gains of assets confronts each ‘owner’ in a community of owners with
proper incentives to invest in assets. If necessary, adaptation of the terms of the trade
occurs ‘spontaneously’, e.g., through a change in price, quantity or quality. A
disadvantage of this form of adaptation is that ‘haggling’ and ‘learning’ between owners
and users of assets yield costs, so-called transaction costs.
Another situation is the situation in which there is one ‘owner’, a centralized authority,
(a ‘unibrain’, see section 2.4.2) who exerts usus, usus fructus and abusus property rights
with respect to a number of assets in a consistent and uncontested manner, without the
need to negotiate and renegotiate the terms of the trade as specified in contracts between
autonomous parties, every time circumstances necessitate adaptation. Hence, in
comparison to the situation in which assets are dispersed over a number of ‘owners’,
concentrated ownership economizes on transaction costs. However, in such a situation,
the owners of assets are faced with less intensive incentives, which results in
bureaucratic costs, or, in general, less intensive incentives.
The above situations of dispersed ownership over assets and concentrated ownership
over assets are also referred to as the coordination mechanisms of the market and
hierarchy. Interorganizational relations represent intermediate situations, in which
contracts are used that have characteristics of market-based relations as well as
characteristics that are typical for hierarchies. Characteristic of economic organization
theory is that it identifies advantages and disadvantages of dispersed ownership and
concentrated ownership in terms of bureaucratic costs and transaction costs and that it121
explains the occurrence of these ownership structures in terms of maximizing behavior
(e.g. cost minimizing behavior) of the organizations involved. An important hypothesis
is that normally, bureaucratic costs outweigh transaction costs, or, inversely, that the
benefits of access to a control apparatus which enables uncontested adjustment is
outweighed by the costs of degraded or suppressed incentive intensity. Hence, dispersed
ownership is preferred over concentrated ownership.
There are, however, specific conditions in which transaction costs are prohibitively
raised, or, equivalently, incentives are suppressed. Such a situation occurs if assets are
only productive in conjunction with assets that are controlled by other organizations;
this is a situation in which dependence between organizations exists. In such a case,
incentives are suppressed because marginal returns on investments incurred by any of
the organizations have to be split between the focal organization and the partner
organization (because of the presence of hold-up power by the partner-organization; see
the example in section 3.3.5). It is assumed that such a situation yields prohibitively
high costs of haggling and learning and that, in such a case, attenuation of usus, usus
fructus and abusus property rights (e.g., concentrated ownership) is preferred.
In political organization theory, the starting point of the line of reasoning is that
organizations try to avoid uncertainty. That is, they are hypothesized to safeguard their
autonomy; they try to avoid being limited in their courses of action. They do so by
attempting to minimize their dependence on other organizations and by trying to
maximize the dependence of other organizations on themselves.
In reality, however, organizations are limited in their possible courses of action because
of unequal balances with respect to the concentration of resources (social legitimacy,
information, and physical and monetary resources) and the importance of these
resources to the organizations involved (which results in so-called resource dependence
between organizations). This form of dependence is a source of uncertainty that can be
effectively fought by informal and semiformal linkages between organizations such as
co-optation, but also by actively influencing governments and lobbying for, for
example, funding, regulation, etc. Merger of the organizations involved also eliminates
this source of uncertainty, albeit at the expense of a lot of disadvantages (see section
3.4).
In section 3.5, economic organization theory and political organization theory were
mutually compared with respect to their similarities and differences. An obvious
difference is the fact that economic organization theory has a more clearly stated trade-
off in the form of a general equilibrium model than political organization theory does.
Political organization theory, on the other hand, offers a richer description of co-
optation, actively forestalling uncertainty, etc. Here, both theoretical streams reflect
their roots: neoclassical analysis for economic organization theory, with an emphasis on
elegantly formulated trade-offs, and political organization theory with an emphasis on
ineffable constructs like power and status and a tendency to stay close to empirical
particulars.122
With reference to the treatment of autonomy, dependence and coordination in
organization theory at large, and the subsequent elaboration of the line of reasoning in
economic organization theory and in political organization theory, it is possible to
formulate an answer to the second research question (‘what types of coordination
between organizations can be defined?’). The answer is based especially on economic
organization theory and political organization theory and the synthesis of these two
distinct theoretical streams.
The way coordination is defined in these streams is tightly associated with the way
‘assets’ (or ‘resources’) are dealt with. In fact, two extreme situations are identified that
define a range of coordination types. One type of coordination is the situation in which
assets are dispersed over a number of owners, and each owner is granted the right to
exert  usus,  usus fructus and abusus property rights. So, should access to other
organizations’ resources or assets be required, then designated (usus) property rights
may be transferred in return for compensation. As ownership of assets yields intensive
incentives, it is assumed that adjustments occur spontaneously, although transaction
costs are incurred.
A situation that defines the opposite pole of the range of coordination types is the
situation in which the exertion of property rights with respect to a number of assets rests
with a centralized authority. This ‘unibrain’ can adapt the terms of the trade and the
assets or resources involved in an uncontested manner, thus economizing on transaction
costs but, in the absence of complementarity of assets, also degrading powerful
incentives.123
4  The Research Framework
4.1 Introduction
In chapters two and three, information management and interorganizational relations
were analyzed using the point of view of the discipline of information systems,
organization theory at large, economic organization theory and political organization
theory. The analysis in the previous chapters focused on the investigation of key
concepts used, key performance indicators identified, hypotheses used in the theories
and, in general, on the line of reasoning in the various theories.
In this chapter, this study’s theoretical investigation is concluded by synthesizing the
insights gathered in the previous chapters. The result is referred to as the ‘Political
Economy of Information Management’
121.
The structure of this chapter is as follows. Section 4.2 offers some introductory
comments on the process of theory building and criteria for good theories, which are
included here to assist in the development of theory (which, after all, is the research
goal; see sections 1.3 and 1.5).
The ‘Political Economy of Information Management’ is a synthesis of theories on
information management and theories on interorganizational relations. In section 4.3,
the relationship of the Political Economy of Information Management to the theoretical
foundations discussed in the previous chapters is discussed.
The synthesis of the insights from chapters two (information management research) and
three (economic organization theory and political organization theory) takes place in
two steps. Firstly, in section 4.4, economic organization theory and information
management will be synthesized and secondly, in section 4.5, the synthesis of political
organization theory with information management will be discussed. Section 4.6
presents the full synthesis in terms of assumptions, propositions and hypotheses.
In section 4.7, the preliminary research goal (section 1.3) is reexamined and restated, in
order to guide the empirical investigations. Furthermore, the selection of cases is
discussed. This section therefore is the link that connects the theoretical investigation
and the actual empirical study of interorganizational information management, which is
                                                          
121 The connotation of this term will be explained in section 4.3.124
documented in the next chapter. The current chapter is completed with conclusions and
a summary in section 4.8.
4.2  Some Comments on Theory Building
In section 1.3, it was stated that the outcome of this research endeavor is a theory
explaining the appropriateness of various interorganizational information management
approaches. In this chapter, a framework is devised in which insights gathered from the
previous chapters are synthesized. This framework, furthermore, structures the
empirical investigations.
However, not all research frameworks are necessarily considered theories. The objective
of stating theories is to organize data on objects and events adequately in order to
explain (and preferably predict) phenomena in a clear and parsimonious way, and in this
way theories are distinguished from metaphors, categorizations and typologies, which
merely organize data.
In the previous chapters, we have analyzed existing theories and fragments of theories
in terms of key concepts and key performance indicators used, hypotheses, and in
general the line of reasoning in various existing (fragments of) theories. In chapter two,
it was concluded that, in information management, various key concepts are used but
that ubiquitous key performance indicators are lacking and that clear hypotheses
relating information management approaches and characteristics of interorganizational
relations are not explicitly stated. In chapter three, key concepts, key performance
indicators and explicit hypotheses in the field of interorganizational coordination were
identified.
In the current study, the goal is to develop theories (see sections 1.3 and 1.5) based on
the analysis of existing (fragments of) theories. In the current chapter, the line of
reasoning of the synthesis is presented, again in terms of key concepts, key performance
indicators, and hypotheses.
In the process of development, it may be helpful to confront progress with criteria that
can be used to assess the quality of theories. In fact, Bacharach (1989) presents a set of
criteria that can be used to assess the ‘quality’ of theories in the terms that have been
used in this thesis to analyze the line of reasoning of existing theories and fragments of
theories, namely: key concepts, key performance indicators, and hypotheses.
Bacharach initially defines a theory as “(…) a statement of relations among constructs
within a set of boundary assumptions and constraints” (1989, p. 496). He argues
furthermore that the better assumptions and constructs (or key concepts) are
circumscribed and defined and the better and more precisely relations between key
concepts are stated, the better the theory is. In fact, in our analysis of existing theories in
chapters two and three, we implicitly assumed that it is possible to define the value of a
theory in terms of its explicitness of key concepts used and its explicit statement of
hypotheses.
Bacharach, however, states additional criteria. In fact, he remarks that every theory
contains two types of relations: propositions and hypotheses, relating constructs and125
variables, respectively. Here, constructs may be defined as “terms, though not
observable either directly or indirectly, [that] may be applied or even defined on the
basis of the observables” (Kaplan, 1964, p. 55, cited in: Bacharach, 1989)
122. A variable
may be defined as an observable attribute of an entity which is capable of assuming two
or more attribute-values (Bacharach, 1989). So, at a minimum level, the abstraction of
variables transcends the level at which the mere existence of attributes is indicated.
Thus, a theory may be defined more precisely as “(…) a system of constructs and
variables in which the constructs are related to each other by propositions and the
variables are related to each other by hypotheses” (Bacharach, 1989, p. 498; see Figure
30 for a graphical depiction)
123.
Figure 30: Components of a theory (based on Bacharach, 1989)
Furthermore, all theories are constrained by their specific critical bounding assumptions,
i.e. the values of the theorists and explicit restrictions regarding space (specific types of
organizations, levels of analysis) and time (i.e., historical applicability) (Bacharach,
1989)
124. The statement of these assumptions is required because “(…) spatial and
                                                          
122 This corresponds to the ‘key concepts’ used in previous chapters.
123 This definition of a theory is rather strict. For example, Boesjes-Hommes (1970)
presents a less strict definition. She proposes a number of theory layers: theory(1) for
the layer of propositions, theory(2) for the layer of hypotheses and theory(3) for the
layer that is used to operationalize constructs into variables. This tripartition, however,
does not necessarily contribute to the clear delineation of explanations as opposed to
metaphors, frameworks and the like, and it is harder to identify clear criteria for good
theories. Therefore, in this thesis, the rather strict (but on the other hand, ubiquitous)
definition of Bacharach is used.
124 This often leads to a paradoxical situation: generalization requires abstraction, which
means that theory sacrifices the level of detail needed to fit a specific situation.
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temporal boundaries restrict the empirical generalizability of the theory” (Bacharach,
1989, p. 500).
From the definition of a theory as stated above, Bacharach states two criteria (Figure
31) to assess the quality of theories in general.
CB1 Falsifiability This criterion refers to the way constructs are stated in
the theory. According to Bacharach, they have to be
stated parsimoniously, they have to be accompanied by
measurable variables and relations between constructs
and variables (i.e., propositions and hypotheses), they
have to be stated explicitly and they have to be logically
adequate. With this criterion, Bacharach implicitly refers
to the process of growth of scientific knowledge
according to the philosophy of critical rationalism (see
section 1.5.2): theories have to be refutable and able to
be corrected by empirical data.
CB2 Utility /
Explanatory
power
This criterion refers to the statement of theories in such a
way that the line of reasoning is uncovered. Hence,
propositions and hypotheses must be made plausible.
Figure 31: Bacharach criteria for theories
In the following sections, the Bacharach criteria will be used to assess various existing
theoretical frameworks and to evaluate progress in the development of theory.
4.3  Introduction to the Political Economy of Information
Management
4.3.1  The Merali & McKiernan framework
In chapter two, we defined interorganizational information management as the task of
decision making regarding goals, prioritization, development and use of information
systems that are embedded in two or more organizations. Various approaches towards
interorganizational information management exist, of which we have defined ‘extreme’
forms (see section 2.7). The approaches stressing standardization of data definitions and
structures through the use of a common conceptual schema across a collection of data
sources are often implicitly preferred in information management theory. Empirical
research, however, has reported unexpected difficulties in communicating its content,
problems with sustaining support by management and users and difficulties in
implementation. Furthermore, fundamental questions about accountability are raised
(because, for example, comparison of performance between organizations is enabled,
see section 2.6).127
In order to account for unexpectedly negative results of such top-down information
management approaches, it has been suggested that the goal of integration is not a
universal goal, and that information management approaches stressing integration to a
lesser degree (e.g. bottom-up information management) might be preferred. The
rationale for this statement is the observation that information is not something innocent
or neutral, and that integration by means of concentrating authority with respect to
control over development and use of information systems is often incompatible with the
political or cultural reality of an organization.
Merali and McKiernan (1993) attempt to reconcile the information management
approaches by proposing a framework in which there is a preference for a specific
information management approach, dependent on specific circumstances or conditions.
They propose a number of ideal types of interorganizational information management
approaches (Figure 32).
Need for strategic dependence
Low High
High Preservation Symbiosis Need for organizational
autonomy Low Holding Absorption
Figure 32: Merali and McKiernan information management approaches
Preservation and holding information management approaches are characterized by the
retention of autonomous and independent systems. They resemble the bottom-up
information management identified in this study. The rationale for adopting such an
approach is that the decision-making processes regarding interorganizational
information systems is driven by the information requirements of the organizations
themselves.
In information management approaches of the absorption type, there are requirements
for a high degree of dependence to create the value expected, but there is a low need for
organizational autonomy to achieve it. This situation, in which separate information
systems are fully consolidated, resembles top-down information management. The
rationale for this approach is that the development of interorganizational information
systems is guided by a clear strategic vision embodied in a detailed, unequivocal
architecture.
Symbiotic approaches represent a combination of both high autonomy and dependence
between organizations. Here, some systems are centralized and combined and some
systems are connected through ‘bridges’. This approach resembles a ‘mixed’ or
‘equilibrium’ approach.
In fact, in relation to the research objective stated in section 1.3, and in relation to the
lack of an explanation of appropriateness of various interorganizational information
management approaches (see section 2.7), the Merali & McKiernan framework provides128
a promising perspective. However, the research objective was also to develop theory (as
defined in section 4.2). If we attempt to assess the quality of the Merali & McKiernan
framework in terms of the Bacharach criteria (which are referred to in this thesis as CB1
and CB2), the following remarks can be stated.
In terms of CB1, parsimonious constructs are indeed stated (‘need for autonomy’, ‘need
for dependence’, ‘information management approach’) and at least the first two are
stated in measurable terms (‘low’, ‘high’). However, precise definitions of autonomy
and dependence are lacking, which impedes disconfirmation.
The major weakness, however, is a lack of explanatory power (CB2). An explanation of
the mechanisms leading to the framework depicted in Figure 32 is lacking.
4.3.2  Frameworks employing information management theory,
political organization theory and economic organization
theory
In section 3.5.1, it was noticed that various authors have reconciled the obvious
differences between economic organization theory and political organization theory. In
this section, some frameworks incorporating information management theory, economic
organization theory and political organization theory are presented.
Holland and Lockett (1994) investigated the relation between interorganizational
information systems and changes in interorganizational relations. Their research
framework consists of four key concepts (Figure 33):
·  Asset specificity,
·  Market complexity,
·  Governance structure, and
·  Coordination strategy.
Figure 33: Configuration of interorganizational relations (adapted from Holland &
Lockett, 1994)129
Characteristic of this approach is that interorganizational information systems are
viewed as information assets
125 (or information resources). The logic of the framework
is that managers make strategic choices to coordinate the development and use of
interorganizational information systems with partner organizations. According to
Holland and Lockett (1994, p. 407), an assumption in the models of Williamson (1985)
and Malone and Rockart (1992) is that the variables asset specificity, market complexity
and governance structure drive an individual organization’s activities. These strategic
choices, however, interact with economic and market forces; these forces limit the
strategic choices but in the long run are also shaped by strategic choices.
Klein builds upon the work of Holland and Lockett and proposes to focus on
coordination strategies, which covers all aspects of the design and maintenance of
interorganizational relations and arrangements. Coordination strategy recognizes
questions of political and efficiency aspects as well as decisions about the design of
interorganizational information systems. Like any strategy, coordination strategy has to
take restrictions and contingencies into account. These contingencies are depicted below
(Figure 34).
Like Holland and Lockett, Klein does not assume unilateral causal inferences between
the elements of the framework, which are:
·  Market and industry structure, which indicates organizations’ strategic management
orientation;
·  Governance structure, which indicates institutional arrangements between firms;
·  Transaction and relation attributes, which highlight interorganizational relations
and their underlying interorganizational transactions; and
·  Resource base, which refers to unique competencies of organizations.
                                                          
125 In general, an information asset refers to an information system (see the definition in
section 2.2). An interorganizational information system consists then of various
information assets. For example, if one considers a group of suppliers, the information
system in which product inventory is stored is considered an information asset, and so is
the information system in which product data are stored. An information asset or
resource is also referred to as a ‘partition’ by Van Alstyne, Brynjolfsson and Madnick
(1995). Bakos and Nault (1997) refer to an electronic network as a portfolio of
information assets.130
Figure 34: Configuration of interorganizational relations (adapted from Klein,
1996)
Klein’s framework also differentiates among various types of interorganizational
information systems, but as in the Holland and Lockett study, the role of decision
making with respect to interorganizational information systems, in coherence with
contingent factors, is unclear.
If we confront both the Holland & Lockett framework and the Klein framework with the
Bacharach criteria CB1 and CB2, we see that (potentially) measurable variables are used
(asset specificity, coordination strategy, etc.) and that, with reference to the Merali and
McKiernan framework, some progress is made with respect to CB1 (i.e., the use of asset
specificity as a variable instead of the variable ‘independence’). However, with respect
to CB2, both the Holland and Lockett framework and the Klein framework fail in
providing an explication in such a way that inferential mechanisms are uncovered.
References are made to the literature on transaction cost economics and resource
dependence theory, but these references by themselves do not provide a robust
explanation.
4.3.3  Towards a synthesis: The Political Economy of Information
Management
At this moment, it is possible to conclude that:
(1)  Information management theory until now has provided a relatively poor
explanation of the appropriateness of interorganizational information management
approaches (see section 2.7)
(2)  In order to improve this situation, various authors have attempted to synthesize
information management theory with theories on interorganizational relations,
taking into account that interorganizational information systems can be considered
to be  information assets and information resources. As economic organization
theory and political organization theory explain in what circumstances having or
dispensing with authority with respect to assets is preferred, a synthesis of these131
theories with information management theory offers at least the prospect of
progress (Brynjolfsson [1994]; Holland & Lockett [1994]; Van Alstyne,
Brynjolfsson & Madnick [1995]; Klein [1996] and Elg and Johansson [1997]).
(3)  So far, attempts to synthesize various theories have not yielded completely
satisfactory results (in terms of the Bacharach criteria) either.
Consequently, existing frameworks or theories are hardly susceptible to
disconfirmation, (which is, after all, necessary for true scientific inquiry described as the
interplay between knowledge (in the form of theories) and empirical data (see section
1.5.2).
Consistent with our research objective (see section 1.3) and our third research question,
we would like to elaborate on the attempts to synthesize economic organization theory,
political organization theory and information management theory by providing an
explanation of the appropriateness of various interorganizational information
management approaches in various types of interorganizational relations. Such an
explanation is presented here as the Political Economy of Information Management
126.
The term Political Economy of Information Management refers to the interrelation
between a structure of rule and a system for producing and exchanging of information,
in which political aspects and economic aspects play a role. ‘Political’ refers to “(…)
matters of legitimacy and distribution of power as they affect the property of an
[organization]’s existence; its functional niche (…), its collective institutional goals, the
goals of the dominant elite faction, major parameters of economy, and in some instances
its means of task accomplishment” (Wamsley & Zald, 1973, p. 18). ‘Economic’ refers
to “(…) the combination of factors of production, the arrangement of the division of
labor, allocation of resources for task accomplishment, and maximization of efficiency”
(Wamsley & Zald, 1973, p. 19).
This connotation of political economy refers to an arena where money and autonomy
are exchanged. Organizations are assumed to pursue an adequate supply of money and
autonomy (Benson, 1975; see also the discussion of economic organization theory and
political organization theory, section 3.5.2).
                                                          
126 There are various connotations of the concept of political economy. In the nineteenth
century, it was mentioned by economists like John Stuart Mill, Vareto Pareto and
William Stanley Jevons as a fundament of the discipline of economics. Furthermore, in
the second half of the twentieth century, authors like Arrows, Niskanen and Buchanan
referred to political economy as the economics of decision making (Public Choice
Theories). However, with the current use of Political Economy, we refer to the use of
the concept by Wamsley and Zald (1973) and Benson (1975), who define Political
Economy as a field of study at the cornerstone of political science, political analysis,
and organization theory.132
In order to synthesize the Political Economy of Information Management from (1)
information management theory, (2) economic organization theory and (3) political
organization theory, economic organization theory will be applied to information
management (section 4.4) and secondly, political organization theory will first be
applied to information management (section 4.5). The eventual synthesis, the Political
Economy of Information Management, in terms of assumptions, propositions and
hypotheses (see Bacharach, 1989; section 4.2), is presented in section 4.6.
4.4  Application of economic organization theory to
information management
4.4.1 Introduction
Van Alstyne, Brynjolfsson and Madnick (1995) and Bakos and Nault (1997)
127 have
provided an application of property rights theory (see section 3.3.5) to issues of
information management. Their applications focus on managerial and incentive issues
of information management, especially matters of centralization and integration of
information systems. In the syntheses of Van Alstyne, Brynjolfsson and Madnick
(1995) and Bakos and Nault (1997), a relationship is sought between characteristics of
interorganizational relations
128 and (interorganizational) information management
approaches. This relationship is important because the ownership structure
fundamentally determines the social and economic value of interorganizational
information systems: “(…) the ownership structure determines the level of (…)
investments [in interorganizational information systems, VH], which in turn determine
the functionality, the profitability, and, in some cases, the viability [of these
interorganizational information systems]” (Bakos & Nault, 1997, pp. 321-322).
According to Van Alstyne, Brynjolfsson and Madnick, this diminished viability
eventually results in “subtle intangible costs of low effort [which] will appear as
distorted, missing, or unusable data” (1995, p. 282). In short: ownership affects
incentive intensity (see also section 3.3.5), and incentive intensity affects the viability of
interorganizational information systems through levels of investments in
interorganizational information systems.
The rationale for applying property rights theory, in which bounded rationality is
assumed, is sought in properties of interorganizational information systems. These
systems require at least some investments in specific information assets such as “(…)
information, expertise, training and human capital, investments that typically are
noncontractible” (Bakos & Nault, 1997, p. 324). Hence, not all costs that are incurred
by information assets are fully verifiable, and these costs cannot be compensated
directly, so the condition of bounded rationality in decision-making processes
                                                          
127 In fact, these authors build upon the work of Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and
Moore (1990).
128 In terms of indispensability and complementarity of assets.133
concerning information assets is highly relevant (Bakos & Nault, 1997). In fact, the
property rights application of information management assumes that all actions (that is,
investments) are uncontractable.
In our discussion of economic organization theory of information management, we will
assume that information assets either:
·  Are dispersed over organizations, which means that organizations ‘own’ their
information systems and may, at any time, exercise their usus, usus fructus and
abusus (residual) property rights. For instance, in this situation, organizations may
re-model data structures, employ different standards, etc. Inversely, organizations
may exclude any other party from the use of its assets (Brynjolfsson, 1994). This
control situation is referred to as bottom-up information management (see section
2.7).
·  Are concentrated, which means that ownership resides explicitly with one of the
organizations involved and that other organizations are allowed to use the
information system. However, usus fructus and abusus property rights reside with
the one organization that ‘owns’ the system. This control situation is referred to as
‘strategic data planning’ by Van Alstyne, Brynjolfsson and Madnick (1995). Here,
it is referred to as top-down information management (see section 2.7).
In the following sections 4.4.2, 4.4.3 and 4.4.4, we model the impact of alternative
information management approaches (and hence, ownership structures) on the
investments of various organizations that participate in an interorganizational
information system, and their corresponding implications. The insights gathered here
are used to provide a backing for the propositions and hypotheses of the Political
Economy of Information Management (section 4.6).
4.4.2 Notation
The model proposed here consists of the following elements
129:
·  A set S of I organizations, where each organization is indexed by i. Subsets of S are
denoted by s: sÍ S.
·  A set A of N assets: {a1, …, an, …, aN}. Subsets of A are denoted by a: aÍ A. In the
current context, assets are components of an interorganizational information
systems.
·  An ownership map a describes control over assets by organizations: a(s) = {a1, a2,
… , an}. The subset s controls assets a1, …, an and makes investments x = (xi1,
xi2,…,xin) that are at least to some extent specific to the interorganizational
information system. Investments may include investments in on-the-job training
programs for employees in order to instruct them in using the system (see section
3.3.5), or in general in hardware, software and expertise to operate the
                                                          
129 Here, we follow the notation in the existing models by Van Alstyne, Brynjolfsson
and Madnick and Bakos and Nault (as well as the original Goodman-Hart-Moore
model, also referred to as the GHM model) as much as possible.134
interorganizational information system. The investments in all assets by individual
organizations are denoted by x = (x1, x2,…, xi).
·  Each organization i takes investment action xi at cost Ci(xi)
 130. The costs of
investments for the subset s are denoted by C(x).
·  There are consecutive periods: a period (date0) in which organizations choose their
investment levels, and a period (date1) in which they realize the benefits from the
investments. Investment decisions are assumed to be too complicated to be
specified in a date0 contract, hence these variables are chosen non-cooperatively by
the organizations at date0. The gains then have to be split due to a multi-party
bargaining game. The benefits accruing to an organization i are denoted by p(s).V(s,
a|x), where p(s) denotes the organization’s bargaining power.
·  The value generated by coalition s controlling a is denoted by V(s, a| x). The value
generated by i is Vi(s, a| x).
4.4.3 Assumptions
Before the core of the analysis is presented, a number of assumptions have to be stated.
A1 and A2 are standard assumptions in economics
131 stating that marginal value
decreases while marginal costs increase as a function of investment. Together, these
assumptions permit the use of first order conditions to locate a unique solution.
For the sake of brevity, the following notation is used for the marginal return on
investment and marginal costs for organization i:
                                                          
130 Note that xi is a scalar lying in [0, x] with x³0. (Hence, there is a maximum feasible
level of investment x).
131 Hart and Moore (1990) provide a detailed discussion of all six assumptions stated
here.
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It is then assumed that an organization i’s marginal investment only affects coalitions of
which it is a member and no other
132.
Furthermore an organization i’s marginal investments are complementary with those of
another organization j.
This assumption provides for investment externalities. As a result of these externalities,
marginal network return on investment by any individual participant increases as
investments by other participants increase.
The fifth assumption is the assumption of superadditivity or network externalities.
Loosely stated, it says that groups working together create at least as much value as
working apart.
The sixth and last assumption states that marginal return on investment increases with
the number of organizations and new assets in the coalition. This assumption provides
for marginal network externalities: the marginal network return from investment by any
individual participant increases with the number of participants and assets.
Note that assumptions five and six imply that marginal and total value correlate.
From the combination of assumptions one, two, three and four, it is possible to conclude
that, given bounded rationality, any control structure leads to underinvestment. That is,
the level of investment in all assets by organizations participating in an
interorganizational information system is less than the level of investment in all assets
                                                          
132 Investments by a nonparticipant i may, of course, enhance its own productivity.
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in a situation in which an omnisciently rational social planner dictates individual
investments of organizations in a grand coalition (i.e., the socially efficient level)
133.
This underinvestment stems from the fact that an individual organization i:
(1)  is not capable of fully capturing the returns from investments in the ex-post
bargaining process, so direct returns from investment to each organization do not
fully reflect the impact of marginal network and investment externalities; when an
organization i “(…) invests more, some of [its] increased productivity will be
dissipated in bargaining at date 1. (…) [S]ome of the benefits will flow to other
[organizations]” (Hart & Moore, 1990, p. 1130).
(2)  understates the investments compared to the total returns to the grand coalition.
Given bounded rationality, the situation of underinvestment is unavoidable (Bakos &
Nault, 1997). That is, there is no control structure that neutralizes the consequences of
bounded rationality.
In the line of reasoning of property rights theory (as in economic theory in general), it is
assumed that an organization will, over time, adopt an ownership structure that
maximizes value, given bounded rationality. In other words, in this line of reasoning, a
‘second-best outcome’ is arrived at because if a control structure exists that is not
optimal given bounded rationality, someone will propose a new control structure and a
set of side payments such that everyone is better off (Hart & Moore, 1990).
In the remainder of this section, specific situations proposed by property rights theory
(see section 3.3.5) are analyzed. This analysis is aimed at discovering whether, in
specific situations, a bottom-up information management approach or a top-down
information management approach yields more value to the interorganizational
information system, and hence, which information management approach best advances
the viability of the interorganizational information system
134.
Situation I: value independence
The first situation analyzed here is the ‘standard’ situation in property rights theory.
There are a number of organizations (I ³ 2) participating in an interorganizational
information systems but to organization i, its own functioning is not critically affected
by participation or non-participation of any other organization j ( j ¹ i ). In other words,
                                                          
133 For the sake of brevity, the proof for this proposition is not stated here, but the
mechanism is described verbally. The complete proof is stated in Hart and Moore
(1990, p. 1130 and pp. 1153-1154). A stylized proof is provided by Van Alstyne,
Brynjolfsson and Madnick (1995, pp. 272-273) and by Bakos and Nault (1997, p. 327).
134 It must be stressed that the line of reasoning presented here takes the ‘extreme’
information management forms ‘bottom-up’ and ‘top-down’ into account. In section
2.4.6, intermediate approaches were also identified. However, in order to illustrate as
clearly as possible the mechanisms underlying the property rights approach applied to
information management, here only the ‘extreme’ forms are taken into account.137
negligible value is provided to organization i; marginal value is the same regardless of
participation or non-participation of other organizations j ( j ¹ i ):
Now assume top-down information management, an approach that is intuitively
appealing. In a top-down information management approach, ownership of an
interorganizational information system is in the hands of one of the organizations
involved, the ‘owner’. By definition, the ‘owner’ can exert residual property rights in
order to direct other organizations to submit data to the interorganizational information
system according to a given set of standards.
The non-owning organizations k choose their investment levels as follows:
Which reduces to (given A1, A2, A3 and given value independence):
In the current top-down information management approach, the left-hand side is at most
Vk({k}, {ak}| X).
Now, by applying a bottom-up information management approach (and hence, by
attributing property rights to organizations k),  k’s investments have no effect on the
investment of any other organization j, ( j ¹ k ) so j’s incentives are no worse. For
organization k, however, there is no underinvestment anymore because its investments
are no longer subject to possible hold-up.
Formally, in the case of bottom-up information management, because for every k, s =
{k}, I4 applies and underinvestment is mitigated.
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Above, an example is provided of how a different information management approach
(or,  ownership structure) can improve incentives for participating organizations,
irrespective of the technology used, and hence, how the viability of an
interorganizational information system is enhanced (see also Van Alstyne, Brynjolfsson,
Madnick, 1995, p. 274).
However, the above result only applies if marginal value to k is the same regardless of
participation or non-participation of other organizations. According to property rights
theory, there are specific situations in which this is not true: either because
organizations are indispensable (e.g., information assets are idiosyncratic) or because
information assets are complementary.
Situation II: indispensability of organizations
Another situation taken into account is when organizations are indispensable. An
organization  i  is said to be indispensable if, without organization i in a coalition, some
asset ai has no effect on the marginal product of investment for the members of the
coalition. Inversely, that asset is idiosyncratic to organization i.
Consider medical specialists (from various disciplines).  The information systems to
which they submit patient records can be regarded as idiosyncratic assets because the
medical specialists can be assumed to be the only ones who are able to create (social)
value with the asset.
Formally, indispensability is defined as follows:
Assume a control structure with organization i that is indispensable to asset an, not
owning an. Then changing the control structure so that organization i does own an
implies that organization i’s incentives are at least as great as before. For any other
organization j, the change in incentives is the difference in control structure between the
new and old situation. This difference is expressed as follows:
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As an is useless to j without i, the second summation is zero. The first summation is
nonnegative according to A6. Thus, by giving i ownership of asset an to which it is
indispensable, j’s marginal incentive is not reduced and i’s own marginal incentive to
invest cannot fall as a result of now owning asset an (see A6; Hart & Moore, 1990, p.
1134)
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As a result of this proof, it can by hypothesized that organizations which are
indispensable to the functioning of an information asset should control that partition
(Van Alstyne, Brynjolfsson, Madnick, 1998, p. 275). In fact, if a subset of organizations
has investment decisions, one cannot conclude that property rights of assets should be
concentrated only on this subset. In fact, if some organization outside the subset is
indispensable, the above implies that it is better to give all property rights to that
organization (Hart & Moore, 1990, p. 1134; Bakos & Nault, 1997, p. 329).
Situation III: Complementarity of assets
Another situation is that of complementarity of information assets. Complementary
information assets are assets that have great value together but have negligible value
apart: for example, two pharmaceutical information systems, one for inventories of
medicines and one for treatment methods. In this case, there is little sense in prescribing
treatments which are unavailable or in stocking drugs which are outdated treatments
(Van Alstyne, Brynjofsson & Madnick, 1995, p. 276).
Formally, complementarity is defined as follows:
Compared to a situation of bottom-up information management (e.g., an and am are
owned by different organizations i and j), the transfer of an to a group that already owns
complementary asset am yields an increase in value, which is given by:
                                                          
135 Note that if an were owned by a third party k, this lowers incentives for j because an
additional hold-up is introduced.
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Considering A3, the second summation is zero; there is no loss of incentives to the
former owner of an, whereas the new owner has strictly higher incentives
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As a result, it is possible to state that information system partitions which are
complementary should be controlled together and hence subject to a top-down
information management approach (see also Van Alstyne, Brynjolfsson, Madnick,
1995, p. 275).
So, the characteristics of complementarity of assets an and am yield the conclusion that
top-down information management with respect to these complementary assets provides
better incentives to the organizations participating in an interorganizational information
system than bottom-up information management does.
4.4.4 Remarks
A number of remarks have to be stated. Firstly, the above analysis aims at structuring
ownership in interorganizational information systems in order to optimize incentive
intensity. The feasibility of the interorganizational information systems principles,
however, is not taken into account. Wealth constraints and credit constraints may limit
the feasibility of an allocation that optimizes incentive intensity (see also Hart & Moore,
1990, p. 1152; Brynjolfsson, 1994, p. 1650).
Secondly, it must be noted that it is not always possible to ensure compliance with all
principles of interorganizational information management. “Occasions arise when
design constraints interact or even contradict one another” (Van Alstyne, Brynjolfsson
& Madnick, 1995, p. 279)
137. For example, Van Alstyne, Brynjolfsson and Madnick
state that if interorganizational information systems’ databases are strictly
complementary, and more than one organization is indispensable, no optimal
distribution of property rights exists.
Thirdly, the current formalization is heavily stylized as compared to the general
formalization of property rights theory by Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and
Moore (1990). For example, it uses rather informal notions of ‘indispensability’. It is,
however, possible to add a parameter that represents this notion. For instance, Bakos
                                                          
136 Van Alstyne, Brynjolfsson and Madnick remark that “[e]quivalently, am could have
been transferred in the other direction thereby increasing the other party’s incentives”
(1995, p. 276).
137 In accordance with the nature of the model (i.e. economic in nature), it is possible to
state that disregarding principles carries a cost.
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and Nault (1997) use the parameter lin to scale the impact on i of assets A. An
organization  i is then indispensable to aT if and only if ljT = 0 for j ¹  i. The elaboration
of the consequences of this model adaptation go beyond the purpose of the
formalization in this thesis.
4.4.5 Model  testing
Concluding, Van Alstyne, Brynjolfsson and Madnick (1995) have provided an
explanation of why, at an interorganizational level, “most top-down strategic data
planning efforts never meet expectations” (1995, p. 268). The focus is on the
impossibility of drawing explicit, complete contracts, in order to compensate
organizations for being a source of data
138. The authors propose ‘ownership’ as a
substitute for eliciting each party’s responsibilities and compensation. From their
ownership principles, it is possible to derive the appropriateness of bottom-up and top-
down information management approaches. According to Van Alstyne, Brynjolfsson
and Madnick, an inept information management approach renders subtle, intangible cost
of low effort appearing as distorted, missing, or unusable data.
The theoretically-devised hypotheses were partially tested empirically by Wybo and
Goodhue (1995), albeit not in an interorganizational setting, but in divisional settings.
Their initial observation was that many organizations face problems of not being able to
compare divisions in terms of return on investment, or not being able to coordinate
inventories across divisions due to ‘semantic inconsistencies in data’ (“differences in
the definitions, names, identifiers, domains, and constraints imposed on data elements
across systems and subunits”, Wybo & Goodhue, 1995, p. 317). Their basic hypothesis
was that if organizational subunits are interdependent, there is a greater need for and
benefit from integration (see section 2.4.3): “(…) it is most likely that [standardization]
will be employed in situations where the benefits of being able to exchange data
unambiguously and efficiently between subunits are high. (…) [S]uch benefits will exist
among interdependent subunits” (Wybo & Goodhue, 1995, p. 318).
Their hypothesis is based on:
(1)  the observation that, in general, standardization of data definitions and structures
through the use of a common conceptual schema across a collection of data sources
can reduce the flexibility of an individual subunit to redesign its system to best
meet its unique information requirements; hence a high level of standardization
could have negative performance impacts, and
(2)  the observation that in the case of interdependence, common conceptual schemes
could have significant positive effects because communication and coordination are
facilitated.
                                                          
138 “The intangible nature of information (…) renders measurement of results infeasible
and a common theme from information systems literature is that technology
assessments alone are insufficient to guarantee system functionality” (Van Alstyne,
Brynjolfsson & Madnick, 1995, p. 283).142
Semantic standardization is defined as “(…) the percentage of that data required by a
subunit to successfully perform its function that is subject to common systems, data
sources or record structures used or adhered to by a specified other unit in the firm”
(Wybo & Goodhue, 1995, p. 320). Subunit interdependence is defined as “(…) the
degree to which the actions and outcomes of one unit are controlled by or contingent
upon the actions of another unit” (Wybo and Goodhue, 1995, p. 320). It is measured in
terms of the pattern of work flows (pooled, sequential, reciprocal interdependence) and
the characteristics of resource exchange between units (perceived importance and
frequency). In order to test the hypothesis, the research strategy of a cross-sectional
survey was adopted. After having measured the variables, the authors stated that “(…)
none of the interdependence measures showed a significant statistical relationship with
the level of use of semantic standards” (Wybo & Goodhue, 1995, p. 324). They
conclude that “either the hypothesized relationship does not exist, (…) it is smaller than
‘small’ and not managerially significant, or (…) the findings are the result of some other
factor we have not heretofore considered” (1995, p. 324).
As the empirical results disconfirm the presumed relationship, “[s]ome re-theorizing is
in order” (1995, p. 326). We will therefore, in the section below, turn to the political
organization theory as applied to information management.
4.5  Application of political organization theory to
information management
Contributions at the crossroads of political organization theory and information
management (‘information politics studies’) are provided by, among others, Markus
(1983), Grover, Lederer & Sabherwal (1988), Davenport, Eccles and Prusak (1992),
Knights and Murray (1992) and Webster (1995a, 1995b, discussed in section 2.3).
Central in these contributions is the notion that, in information management, “(…) more
than information is at stake” (Davenport, Eccles & Prusak, 1992, p. 54). In fact, it is
assumed that “(…) in the information-based organization, information becomes the
primary medium of value and exchange, and who would give it away for free?”
(Davenport, Eccles & Prusak, 1992, p. 62). The exchange of information is assumed to
take place in a context of divergent interests
139.
In general, applications of political organization theory to information management are
far less elegantly formulated than the line of reasoning in section 4.4. Here again, the
                                                          
139 Although many ‘information politics’ case studies seem to be inspired by a class
politics perspective (e.g., where management is trying to delimit workers’ autonomy, or
where small businesses are exploited by large, multinational companies [see section
2.3]), less obvious situations have also been described. For example, Davenport, Eccles
and Prusak state that in some organizations “(…) hoarding of information was common
(…) because a team that shares its information fully may lose its reason to exist” (1992,
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controversy between economic organization theory and political organization theory can
be used to explain that organization theorists inclining to the economic perspective use a
somewhat farsighted point of view, in which mathematical elegance is a valued
attribute. Political organization theory in general, and, specifically, political
organization theory applied to information management, has a preference for rather
descriptive accounts, e.g.  when property rights theory applied to information
management implicitly assumes that when inefficiencies exist and underinvestment
occurs, there will be someone who suggests another ownership structure and a set of
side payments to make every participating organization better off. Political organization
theory applied to information management in this case would customarily emphasize
(and merely describe) the way in which such a proposal emerges and how subsequent
negotiations take place. In general, it highlights short-term dynamics instead of
farsighted, long-term equilibria.
Below, a classical description of short-term dynamics is presented.
Characteristic of many ‘information politics’ studies is the assumption that “[t]here is
reason to believe that, at least in some organizations at certain times, there are situations
that do not conform to the Rational Perspective” (Markus, 1983, p. 432). However, on
the other hand, it is also noted that “[p]olitical behavior regarding information should be
viewed not as irrational or inappropriate but as a normal response to certain
organizational situations. Valid differences in interpretation of information, for
example, may lead to intransigent behavior” (Davenport, Eccles and Prusak, 1992, p.
54).
In short, uncertainty (or information asymmetry) plays an important role in ‘information
politics’. Markus states that uncertainty arises if organizations disagree about the nature
of the problem an interorganizational information system is supposed to solve, if there is
doubt whether an (interorganizational) information system will solve a specific
problem, or if power bases are highly valued and in short supply (Markus, 1983).
The specific information politics’ dynamics and conflicts (which, according to Markus,
are “endemic” [1983, p. 433]) arise from intended and unintended changes in the
balance of power in and between organizations as a result of new information
exchanges or the introduction of new (interorganizational) information systems.
According to Markus, the introduction of information systems into networks of
organizations may be resisted by those who lose autonomy and kindheartedly welcomed
by those who gain autonomy. “If control over data (…) has prevented certain groups
from obtaining needed or desired access to it, distribution of data, even unaccompanied
by control over it, will provide those receiving it significant power gains. Their
dependence on the controlling group will be reduced, since they will have an alternative
source of data. (…) On the other hand, those whose data monopoly is threatened in the
process are likely to resist. Distribution of data that makes the performance of a subunit
more visible, hence subject to control attempts by other units, is likely to be resisted by
the group whose performance is exposed and accepted by those who would like to
influence the other’s performance” (Markus, 1983, p. 442). Resistance, in this case,144
occurs through organizations encouraging its members to sabotage the system, through
providing inaccurate data, through not using the system at all, through keeping
alternative databases, etc. (Markus, 1983).
Markus illustrates the line of reasoning of Political Organization Theory applied to
Information Management with an example of a large chemical company, consisting of
several divisions, each having a substantial amount of autonomy. Divisional accountants
collected and stored transaction data and reported to corporate accountants according to
a standardized format. In this situation, “(…) divisional accountants summarized raw
data on the transactions in their divisions and sent the summaries to the corporate
accountants for consolidation. Divisions retained control of their own data and exercised
substantial control in summarizing it” (Markus, 1983, p. 438).
In this situation, there was suspicion of withholding of data by divisions: “[c]orporate
accountants felt the divisions were lying to them. And maybe there was some
withholding of data on [the divisional] side” (1983, p. 437). The corporate accountants
initiated the introduction of FIS, an information system in which initially the original
procedure was mirrored in the design; later on, however, the divisional databases were
replaced by a single corporate database. Divisional accountants entered their raw data
into the system and the system automatically summarized these data into reports for
divisional and corporate use: “(…) all financial transactions were collected into a single
database under control of corporate accountants” (Markus, 1983, p. 438).
Although information management theory might argue that such an information
management approach is efficient, possibly eliminating duplicated data and increasing
consistency, Markus states that “FIS was definitely established for political reasons”
(1983, p. 438), motivated by corporate level’s need for “ferreting out how the knaves
were doing in the trenches” (1983, p. 437). The way in which FIS was designed implied
a major gain of power for corporate accountants relative to their prior position vis-à-vis
the divisional accountants (Markus, 1983).
The new situation, however, raised substantive opposition from the divisional
accountants. The corporate accountants reacted by uttering “[we] can’t understand why
the divisions don’t like FIS. There are so many benefits” (cited by Markus, 1983, p.
435).
The divisional accountants, at the same time, noticed that “(…) except for providing
more detailed information, the FIS system has not been beneficial for us” (cited by
Markus, 1983, p. 434). They “(…) had to enter data, but they no longer ‘owned’ it. (…)
At any time, corporate accountants had the ability to ‘look into’ the database and
analyze divisional performance” (Markus, 1983, p. 438).
The divisional accountants elaborated on the lack of benefit to them by mentioning
downtime, delayed reports and data definitions that did not match their own
requirements. In fact, besides writing angry memos, the divisional accountants
maintained parallel systems, engaged in behavior that jeopardized the integrity of the145
database, and participated in a task force with the public objective of eliminating FIS
and replacing it with another system.
The FIS example as described by Markus illustrates how ownership of (and thus control
over) information resources is very valuable and is in fact subject to political struggle.
Given the history of FIS, Markus states it is likely that divisions resisted the system,
whereas corporate management supported it, because the latter gained power in dealing
with the divisions. However, the divisional accountants quite forcefully sabotaged the
system in order to safeguard the divisions’ autonomy.
4.6  Assumptions, Propositions and Hypotheses of the
Political Economy of Information Management
4.6.1 Introduction
Given the synthesis of economic organization theory and political organization theory
derived in section 3.5, and the application of this synthesis to information management
in sections 4.4 and 4.5, it is now possible to state some assumptions and propositions
and derive hypotheses on the Political Economy of Information Management.
4.6.2 Assumptions
For the process of theory construction, Bacharach recommends explicitly delineating
the theoretical boundaries and assumptions (in terms of values, scope and time) in order
to restrict the empirical generalizability of the theory (see section 4.2).
For the Political Economy of Information Management, a number of assumptions are
stated.
·  Firstly, bounded rationality is assumed. Thus, organizations’ decision-making
processes are assumed to be guided by reasonably careful calculations of costs and
returns (see section 3.4.4), albeit not all possible states of the world are included in
these calculations. This aspect was discussed in section 3.3.2. In the discussion of
the departure from the ‘orthodox’ theory of the firm, it is stated that full rationality
is not a realistic assumption for many theories of organization. In assuming
bounded rationality, the contributions of Simon and Coase are acknowledged.
·  Secondly, the analysis is restricted to organizations that have a certain amount of
discretion (that is, their behavior is not totally determined by their environment, a
condition which would condemn any consideration of ‘strategy’ or ‘strategic
behavior’ to the realm of utopia). That is, they are operating in markets that share at
least some characteristics with monopolies. This assumption is not uncommon in
research on strategy formation (see also Haselhoff, 1977, pp. 5-6).
·  Thirdly, we analyze organizations that participate in interorganizational relations as
defined in section 3.2 in the sense that, for some reason, they are exchanging, have
exchanged or are going to exchange information by means of information and
communication technology. The Political Economy of Information Management146
does not, for example, address antecedents of information exchange (see, for
example, Sabherwal & Vijayasarathy [1994], Nidumolu [1995]).
·  Fourthly, although the Political Economy of Information Management originates in
the discipline of information systems and organization theory at large, the
evaluation of the theory by means of case studies took place in the public or quasi-
public sectors. Therefore, preliminarily, the theory is restricted to cooperating
organizations within the public sector. This assumption is further discussed in the
epilogue on the Political Economy of Information Management (section 6.5).
4.6.3  Propositions and Hypotheses
Elaborating on the contributions as described in sections 4.4 and 4.5, it is possible to
formulate an explanation in terms of propositions (see section 4.2).
At the heart of the Political Economy of Information Management are the consequences
of having or dispensing with authority with respect to information assets.
Information assets or information resources here refers to components of an electronic
network (Bakos & Nault, 1997), various databases (Van Alstyne, Brynjolfsson &
Madnick, 1995) or parts of an interorganizational information system (see footnote 125,
p. 129).
In section 4.3.1, it was already mentioned that the treatment of authority and,
consequently, (the potential of) unequivocal adaptation and standardization of data
models and structures, differs in (1) information management theory on the one hand
and (2) economic organization theory and political organization theory on the other
hand.
Information management theory identifies advantages of common conceptual schemes
(e.g., alleviation of problems of accessing data from multiple sources in multiple
organizations). However, it does not provide an explanation for observed difficulties in
communicating and understanding common conceptual schemes, difficulties in
sustaining management support and difficulties in implementation of interorganizational
information systems (section 2.4.3). Nevertheless, top-down information management
approaches are often labeled as ‘efficient’ or ‘efficiency-driven’ (section 2.4.6; see
footnote 68) and therefore preferable.
The symptoms mentioned above, however, are explained in contributions at the
intersection of economic organization theory and information management (section
4.4), and political organization theory and information management (section 4.5), albeit
in slightly different ways. The line of reasoning of the synthesis of these theoretical
approaches is as follows:
Both in economic organization theory and in political organization theory, organizations
are hypothesized to cherish their autonomy with respect to assets, including information
assets.
The rationale for this statement from the point of view of economic organization theory
is that unbounded ‘ownership’ of information assets (and hence, exertion of residual147
usus,  usus fructus and abusus property rights) elicits intensive incentives for
management and users to optimize data quality and prevent abuse. The alternative of
attenuation property rights for reasons of unequivocal adaptability of various
information assets (e.g., top-down information management) in this situation, is
hypothesized to degrade incentives, with, consequently, underinvestment.
Underinvestment here results in distorted or missing data, or, in general, in an
interorganizational information system that does not match the organization’s own
information requirements.
The rationale from the point of view of political organization theory is that autonomy
protects an organization from possible capricious behavior by partner organizations and
that, inversely, mitigated property rights with respect to information assets enables
‘interorganizational surveillance’
140, which customarily results in politicking by
sabotaging interorganizational information systems.
In the Political Economy of Information Management line of reasoning (as mentioned
above), cost components are identified (costs of ‘distorted, missing, or unusable data’
that occur as a result of underinvestment and costs as a result of ‘interorganizational
surveillance’) that are not included in the concept of ‘efficiency’ that is used in
information management theory’s claim that top-down information management
approaches are efficient. In fact, using this extended view of efficiency derived from the
Political Economy of Information Management, it is even possible to state that the
efficiency advantages of a top-down interorganizational information management
approach (see sections section 2.4.6 and footnote 68) are outweighed by its
disadvantages
141.
The above line of reasoning is changed, however, if organizations cannot, in practice,
freely exert property rights with respect to their information assets because of any one
of the following conditions:
·  indispensability (economic organization theory) or resource dependence (political
organization theory); or
·  complementarity of information assets (economic organization theory); if
information assets which are complementary when considered together have great
value for their owners but negligible value apart (for a formal definition, refer to
section 4.4).
In both cases, dependence between organizations exists.
                                                          
140 Also referred to as close monitoring by partner organizations, which might
eventually result in organizations losing their reason to exist (see sections 1.2.1 and
4.5).
141 Section 4.4 provides a formal representation of this statement.148
The Political Economy of Information Management, which has been summarized
above, can be stated in terms of a proposition as follows:
PPolitical Economy of Information Management
The level of dependence of information assets that are used by organizations determines
which interorganizational information management approach is preferred by the
participating organizations.
In this proposition, the following concepts are used:
·  Dependence of information assets (see chapters 3 and 4, especially sections 3.5 and
4.3). This concept can be operationalized into the variables ‘complementarity of
information assets’ and ‘indispensability of information assets’ (or ‘information
resource dependence’) (see sections 3.5 and 4.3).
·  Interorganizational information management approach (see chapter 2, especially
section 2.4.6). The concept of interorganizational information management
approach can be operationalized into the control model used, the architecture used
and the goals adhered to in the decision-making process (see section 2.4.6 and
section 2.7). A top-down interorganizational information management approach
refers to a situation in which the goal of standardization of various conceptual
schemes across a collection of data sources is striven for through the use of a
centralized control approach and the use of a detailed architecture. A bottom-up
interorganizational information management approach refers to a situation in which
preservation of various conceptual schemes is striven for through the use of a
decentralized control model and an architecture in terms of a limited set of
agreements on how communication should take place
142.
Basic to the Political Economy of Information Management is that dispersed ownership
of information assets is preferred because it yields intensive incentives to the
participating organizations and thereby increases the viability of the interorganizational
information systems. This is, however, only true when specific circumstances, such as
complementarity of information assets and indispensability of participating
organizations, do not apply. If these specific circumstances do not apply, participating
organizations are hypothesized to apply a bottom-up information management
approach.
In terms of a hypothesis (where variables are used instead of constructs or concepts),
this can be stated as follows:
                                                          
142 These connections between the variables ‘goal of standardization/preservation’,
‘control model’ and ‘architecture’ are elaborated in chapter 2.149
HPolitical Economy of Information Management, 1
If none of the information assets initially owned by organizations participating in an
interorganizational information system is indispensable, and none of the information
assets initially owned by organizations participating in an interorganizational
information system is complementary, organizations will choose not to standardize
various conceptual schemes for information assets.
This hypothesis mainly stems from the analysis of property rights theory in section 3.3.5
and the analysis of political organization theory in section 3.4, but is also quite
consistent with the literature mentioned in section 3.2 which states that organizations
strive to preserve their autonomy. The hypothesis, however, is not consistent with the
classical information management hypothesis that centralized control is always better
control.
If the conditions mentioned above (indispensability and complementarity of assets)
apply, this gives rise to different hypotheses, as was discussed in sections 3.3.5, 3.4, 4.4
and 4.5. Indispensability of information assets and complementarity of assets give rise
to the possibility of hold-ups by partner organizations, which degrades incentives.
Bringing various assets or resources under common control by applying a top-down
information management approach, in which a detailed architecture is enforced and
well-defined goals are adhered to through a centralized control approach, mitigates this
effect.
HPolitical Economy of Information Management, 2
If at least one of the information assets initially owned by organizations participating in
an interorganizational information system is indispensable, organizations will choose to
standardize various conceptual schemes for information assets.
HPolitical Economy of Information Management, 3
If information assets initially owned by organizations participating in an
interorganizational information system are complementary, organizations will choose
to standardize various conceptual schemes for information assets.
In both cases, potential hold-up situations are avoided, which are assumed to optimize
incentives eventually for all participants and thereby promote the viability of the
interorganizational information system.
In this section, hypotheses were constructed that relate interorganizational information
management approaches and characteristics of interorganizational relations (in terms of
value independence, complementarity of assets and indispensability of participating
organizations), and thus research question three has been answered.150
4.6.4  Confrontation with the Bacharach criteria
In section 4.2, two criteria (CB1 and CB2) were proposed to indicate progress in the field
of theory development. As we have explicitly built upon the Merali and McKiernan
frameworks and the frameworks presented by Holland and Lockett and by Klein (see
section 4.3), and as we concluded in section 4.3 that these contributions do not yield
completely satisfactory results in terms of the criteria CB1 and CB2, it might be a good
idea to confront the Political Economy of Information Management as a theory with
these  criteria in order to assess whether progress has been achieved.
CB1: Falsifiability
In terms of falsifiability, constructs were identified in chapters 2 and 3 (information
management approach and interorganizational relations). Moreover, variables have been
proposed: control approach, elaborateness of architecture and specification of goals, and
autonomy, complementarity of assets and indispensability of organizations,
respectively. In general, in a strict sense, these variables are not very well developed,
but with respect to existing frameworks some progress has been achieved.
CB2: Explanatory power
In sections 4.4 and 4.5, we summarized the insights from sections 2 and 3 and proposed
hypotheses that are explicitly based on the theories that were discussed in these
chapters. Moreover, a formalization of economic organization theory and a reflection on
this theory from the point of view of political organization theory was discussed.
Moreover, in terms of explanatory power, at least some progress has been achieved.
4.7  The Revised Research Design
4.7.1  Research goal
Now that the Political Economy of Information Management has been derived and
synthesized from Information Management Theory, Economic Organization Theory and
Political Organization Theory it is to be evaluated next by confronting it with empirical
data, that is, case data (see section 1.5.3). The objective is to check whether the mainly
theoretically-devised Political Economy of Information Management holds in practice -
that is, whether the hypotheses are confirmed – and, possibly, to refine the Political
Economy of Information Management. Since the research objective is not to test the
theory, the possibility of fundamentally rejecting the Political Economy of Information
Management is excluded in this study.
4.7.2  Selection of cases
In the empirical part of this study, three case studies were carried out. In these cases,
interorganizational information management approaches between organizations in the
public sector, that is, semi-governmental or quasi-governmental organizations, were
analyzed.151
This seems to be an awkward choice at first glance. However, as was explained in
section 1.1.2, the depiction of ‘government’ as a unitary actor in which no truly
interorganizational relations can be discerned, is a radical one. In reality, government
consists of a network of organizations (for example, core ministries and independent
administrative bodies) in which economic and political aspects play a very important
role. Furthermore, the surprising variety of (shifts in) interorganizational coordination
forms and information management approaches lends the domain perfectly to an initial
evaluation of the Political Economy of Information Management.
4.8  Summary and conclusions
In this chapter, the Political Economy of Information Management was presented, based
on the contributions of sections 2 and 3. The theory itself may be regarded as a
synthesis of information management theory, economic organization theory and
political organization theory.
This synthesis was partly based on a formalization of the property rights theory applied
to information management as proposed by Van Alstyne, Brynjolfsson and Madnick
(1995) and Bakos and Nault (1997). Furthermore, the theory was elaborated by applying
political organization theory to the domain of information management.
The proposition and hypotheses derived in this chapter are used to provide an
explanation for the appropriateness of various interorganizational information
management approaches in various types of interorganizational relations, and therefore
are an answer to the third research question.
In section 4.6, the theory was assessed using Bacharach’s (1989) guidelines. The
resulting hypotheses are to be evaluated with empirical data in the next chapter.152153
5  Cases of Interorganizational Information Systems
5.1 Introduction
In the previous chapters, concepts were identified from information management theory
and from economic organization theory and political organization theory. In chapter
four, especially in sections 4.6 and 4.7, the Political Economy of Information
Management was developed.
In section 1.5, the research strategy of the case study was chosen in order to facilitate
the process of theory construction. This research strategy provides the opportunity of
continuously iterating theory and empirical data in order to further build and reconstruct
theory. This iteration has already taken place by building the Political Economy of
Information Management on the insights of the cases of EDI information management
(section 2.3), library automation (section 2.6.2), informatization in the British National
Health Service (section 2.6.3) and informatization in Dutch penal law enforcement
(section 2.6.4).
In this chapter, a new iteration of theory (that is, the Political Economy of Information
Management) and empirical data is presented. There are two differences with the
iterations mentioned before. Firstly, the Political Economy of Information Management
has been elaborated and propositions and hypotheses have been explored, which allows
a more structured case study description. Secondly, the empirical data presented here is
not secondary data but data collected for the purpose of evaluating the Political
Economy of Information Management.
The iteration of theory and empirical data presented in this chapter provides an answer
to the fourth and last research question of whether there is empirical validation of the
theory
143.
In this chapter, three case descriptions and subsequent analyses are presented. In section
5.2, the first case is presented. This case describes the information management
approaches and changing interorganizational relations in the field of Dutch Higher
Education and Research.
                                                          
143 It must be noted that the iterations described in this chapter do not serve as a strict
‘empirical test’ as was explained in sections 1.3 and 1.5.154
Section 5.3 provides a case description of information exchange between the Dutch
Ministry of Finance (specifically the Tax and Customs Administration) and Statistics
Netherlands. The third case is described in section 5.4 and is a case description of
changing interorganizational relations and information management approaches adopted
in the field of Social Security in the Netherlands.
The findings of the case studies are summarized in section 5.5.
5.2  Case 1: Research information
5.2.1  The Context: Organizations in Dutch Higher Education and
Research
The Dutch Higher Education and Research institutions provide an interesting example
of information management in an interorganizational context (Noordegraaf & Kickert,
1993). The field consists of a number of organizations. Traditionally, the Ministry of
Education, or, more specifically, the Directorate of Higher Education and Scientific
Research
144, is an important player in the field. Besides the Ministry, there are the
universities and the institutes for higher vocational education, with their respective
interest associations – VSNU and HBO-Raad
145. Furthermore, there is the Royal Dutch
Academy of Sciences– KNAW
146 – which represents research institutes. Recent policy
developments (since the beginning of the 1980s) have resulted in the breaking apart of
the Ministry into the core Ministry itself along with a number of semi-autonomous
agencies
147 and independent administrative bodies (ZBOs)
148. Expectation of efficiency
gains motivated these hiving-off operations (see also section 1.1.2). The newly
developed relationships between the Ministry and these semi-autonomous agencies and
independent administrative bodies are analyzed elsewhere (e.g., Ter Bogt, 1998). These
developments are mentioned here in order to illustrate that nowadays, the field of Dutch
Higher Education and Research is characterized by network-like structures rather than
by a hierarchical structure, in which the whole field of organizations is presided over by
the Ministry of Education (Kickert, 1993; Noordegraaf & Kickert, 1993; Homburg &
Gazendam, 1996).
                                                          
144 In Dutch: Directoraat Generaal voor Hoger Onderwijs en Wetenschappelijk
Onderzoek, DGHW.
145 VSNU stands for Vereniging van Samenwerkende Nederlandse Universiteiten
(Association of Cooperating Dutch Universities). HBO-Raad is the Council of Institutes
for Higher Vocational Education.
146 KNAW stands for the Koninklijke Nederlandse Academie van Wetenschappen
(Royal Dutch Academy of Sciences).
147 In Dutch: agentschap. An example is the CfI (Centrale Financiën Instellingen, central
financial institutions).
148 In Dutch: zelfstandige bestuursorganen. A ZBO is confronted with some freedom in
the outputs that are realized (Ter Bogt, 1998). An example is the Informatiebeheer-
Groep (IB-Groep). For a discussion on the legal status of ZBOs, refer to Boxum (1997).155
However, this was not always the case. “In the period up to 1945, university education
is regulated by the Higher Education Act of 1876 in which the state universities had
virtually no autonomy” (Gazendam & Homburg, 1996, p. 327; see also Hermans, 1986).
The institutes for higher vocational education, falling under the Secondary Education
Act, did not have any autonomy either. The funding of institutions (both universities
and institutes for higher vocational education) in this period was based on the
universities’ and higher vocational institutes’ statement of expenses (Binsbergen et al,
1991; Noordegraaf & Kickert, 1993).
This rather hierarchical institutional system, with the Minister of Education as the top
manager, assisted by his Ministry and responsible to Parliament, was discussed for the
first time in a report by a State Committee for the Reorganization of Higher Education
(the Reinink Committee) in 1949. In the report, the committee recommended increasing
the autonomy of the universities. The situation, however, did not really change until the
emergence of the Scientific Education Act in 1960 (Binsbergen et al, 1991;
Noordegraaf & Kickert, 1993; Gazendam & Homburg, 1996). “In 1960, the universities
received a certain degree of autonomy by the Scientific Education Act. (…). According
to this act, university funding was based on the budget proposals they submitted.
Universities received liberty of spending within legal constraints, became corporate
bodies and had responsibility for their own personnel management” (Gazendam &
Homburg, 1996, p. 328; see also Binsbergen et al, 1991). It must be noted, though, that
the manner of consultation, however, remained highly hierarchical. In bilateral
consultations with the minister or with high government officials, each institution tried
to obtain approval of their expansion proposals.
In the period 1960-1969, student numbers rose by 10% per year and minister Veringa
asked  McKinsey Consultants to issue a proposal for comprehensive planning, a rather
centralistic long-term planning system for higher education (Broekhuizen, 1988). This
system proposed a matrix system of planning via institutions and via disciplines. The
planning via disciplines, however, was not accepted by the institutions. As a result of
that, this system of planning was never implemented (Binsbergen et al, 1991).
A more pragmatic attempt to realize a planning system proved to be successful in 1975
with the publication of a report by Deputy Minister Klein
149. Instead of long-term
planning, medium-term planning was stressed. Instead of a top-down method of
planning, planning was seen as a cooperative effort between Ministry and universities,
in which ‘learning by doing’ was stressed. A consultation structure was set up,
supported by technical preparation groups in which government officials and university
administrators cooperated
150. The funding of universities was based on a funding model
                                                          
149 ‘Planning van het Hoger Onderwijs: Nota inzake de voortgang van de opbouw van
het planningssysteem voor het hoger onderwijs en wetenschappelijk onderzoek in
Nederland’, Document of the Dutch Parliament TK 13401, 1974-1975.
150 The POO, Planning Overleg Orgaan (Planning Consultation Body) and the AGP,
Adviesgroep Planning (Advisory Committee Planning).156
that was based on the tasks to be performed by an institution. Important parameters in
this model were the student number forecasts that therefore became an object of
negotiation (Gazendam & Homburg, 1996).
This system lasted until 1980, when it was severely criticized in Parliament
151.  In fact,
this criticism marked the end of the interorganizational relations which had developed
since the introduction of the Scientific Education Act of 1960.
In the mid-1980s, university administrators and especially the minister found their
managerial and political discretion to be too restricted by the preparation of proposals in
the system of technical cooperation groups. Especially for a minister who must realize
budget cuts, the cooperative planning system was no longer suitable, and a system based
on consultation and dialogue was proposed in the so-called HOAK report
152
(Binsbergen  et al, 1991; Noordegraaf & Kickert, 1993; Gazendam & Homburg, 1996;
see also Bekkers, 1998a). “In 1985, the Ministry of Education presented a new view
concerning the steering of the higher education policy sector in the Netherlands. In this
view central government retreats and steers only globally. The Ministry recognizes that
universities have self-regulating capacities which should be used and mobilized. (…)
One of [the] instruments is a dialogue between the Ministry of Education and the
universities” (Bekkers, 1998a, p. 351). Noordegraaf and Kickert (1993) and Bekkers
(1998a) interpret this dialogue as an acknowledgement of the self-steering capabilities
of the universities.
Plans of universities and of the minister would be seen as proposals to be discussed in a
dialogue. “This dialogue has the following character. The discussion is opened by the
Minister of Education with the publication of the so-called ‘Concept Higher Education
and Research Plan’. This plan gives an overview of the wishes of the Ministry regarding
the desired development of academic education and research. The Plan can be seen as
an agenda with issues for the dialogue. The universities respond to these issues through
the publication of their so-called ‘development plans’. The exchange of the central Plan
and the decentral development plans will lead to bilateral – between the individual
universities and the Ministry – and multilateral discussions – between the interest
associations of organizations of higher education and the Ministry in the Chamber of
Higher Education” (Bekkers, 1998a, p.351). The ‘steering philosophy’ was
implemented in the Higher Education and Scientific Research Act of 1989. Noordegraaf
and Kickert reconstruct the rationale of this new policy as a quest for innovation,
flexibility and variety for which autonomy is necessary: “[f]ormal legislation has to be
minimized and the institutional autonomy has to be maximized. Primary are the self-
steering capabilities of the system of Higher Education and Research”
153 (1993, p. 80).
                                                          
151 Document of the Dutch Parliament TK 19222, 1985-1986.
152 Hoger Onderwijs: Autonomie en Kwaliteit (Higher Education: Autonomy and
Quality).
153 “Formele wetgeving en regulering moet worden teruggebracht tot een minimum en
de institutionele autonomie op onderwijsgebied moet zo groot  mogelijk worden”.157
In 1993, a new funding model for the universities as well as the polytechnics is
implemented. In this model, the funding of the universities is partially based on the real
student numbers (instead of student number forecasts) and on numbers of certificates
obtained. Furthermore, there is a more or less fixed budget for research. In 1994, the
universities and the polytechnics are brought under a new Higher Education Act. The
funding of higher education institutions  takes a course in the direction of a market-
oriented system. The universities and polytechnics have the freedom to start new
curricula. The polytechnics have been particularly creative in establishing new
curricula. Administrators of higher education institutions concern themselves with their
market share instead of lobbying government officials or predisposing the Minister in
favor of their plans (Gazendam & Homburg, 1996).
Summarizing this historical exposé, it must be noted that the relationship between the
Ministry of Education on the one hand and the universities (and polytechnics) on the
other hand has gradually changed over time. The situation of 1945-1985 shows a
relationship, in which universities had little autonomy. The relationship is characterized
by the fact that initiatives had to be approved by the Minister.
Since 1985, the situation has changed. “The changed relation between government and
institutes is marked by more global control and increased autonomy of institutes”
154
(Binsbergen et al, 1991, p. 12). Noordegraaf and Kickert (1993) characterize this
situation as the replacement of top-down steering on inputs with autonomy and steering
on output.
In fact, the situation of the 1990s reveals more market-oriented interorganizational
relations (or network structures), in which universities and polytechnics are less
restricted in the courses of action they wish to pursue (in terms of acknowledgement of
their potential for autonomous adjustment).
5.2.2 Analysis
Introduction
In terms of the Political Economy of Information Management (section 4.3), it is
interesting to focus on the information management approach in the period of time from
1945 to the 1990s. As Bekkers notes, “[t]he formulation of an information policy has
always been a critical issue in the relations between the Ministry of Education and the
universities” (1998a, p. 352). The information management approaches adopted over
time will be described and analyzed as follows. Firstly, some general developments
155 in
                                                          
154 “De veranderende verhouding tussen overheid en instellingen komen ander ondere
tot uiting in de ‘globalisering van de overheidssturing’ en in een toegenomen autonomie
van de instellingen”.
155 In the Higher Education and Research field, four information management ‘domains’
are identified: finance, personnel, education and students, and research (VSNU, 1996).158
the information management approach
156 will be discussed, based on Gazendam and
Homburg (1996) and Bekkers (1998a). Secondly, the description and analysis will be
restricted to the exchange of research information between universities mutually and
between universities and other organizations, such as the Ministry. The latter case
description is based on literature review, interviews and document analysis.
General developments in information management approaches
Overseeing the period of time between 1945 and the 1990s, it must be noted that the
Ministry of Education has, on a number of occasions, stressed the importance of central
registration. Such a central registration, initially in paper form and later on in the form
of information systems, implied that the Ministry requested information from the
universities and the universities supplied the Ministry with the requested information. In
fact, these information relations were, during the last few decades, stated in an
information policy. In information management terms, such a model of information
gathering resembles a top-down information management approach, because there is a
standardized, even central database owned by the Ministry. This information
management approach continued to exist until 1985.
In 1985, university administrators quite explicitly opposed the top-down information
management approach, probably inspired by the changes that were announced in that
year (see section 5.2.1). In the years before 1985, the information supplied by the
universities was used against them in cutback operations and the universities feared that
these cutback operations would continue, inspired by their information. During a
discussion on information management organized by the interest association of the
universities, an anonymous participant said:
“(…) [A] couple of years ago, association measures were identified between
input and output. Should we have the fox guard the chicken coup by means of
automating our registrations?”
157
Therefore, new rules and procedures for the exchange of information were discussed. In
1985 the Ministry of Education and the universities reached an agreement, formalized in
an Information Statute, regarding the exchange of information. In the Information
                                                          
156 Bekkers uses ‘information policy’ to indicate the management of information
systems and interorganizational information systems. Therefore sometimes ‘information
policy’ is used in Bekkers’ citations. It must be noted at this point in the line of
reasoning that information policy is synonymous with ‘information management’ as
defined in section 2.2.3. In fact, we are facing the consequences of the ‘semantic jungle’
regarding information planning, information policy and information strategy (section
2.2.3) here.
157 “Jaren geleden zijn relaties gelegd tussen input en output. Moet je de kat op het spek
binden door middel van het automatiseren van onze bestanden?”159
Statute, universities are held responsible for (1) the maintenance of data in information
systems and (2) reporting to the Ministry (VSNU, 1996). However, this responsibility
was largely a mandated (i.e. transfer of designated property rights rather than a transfer
of designated and residual property rights; ownership issues were not addressed)
responsibility. In the following period of time, the Ministry launched a new initiative,
according to Bekkers (1998a), to increase the transparency of the ‘dialogue’ that had
been agreed upon. In this new initiative, “(…) [t]he necessity of information to be
delivered by the universities for the functioning of the department of Education is
stressed. Special attention is given to the document formats of the information to be
exchanged and the development of central registrations. The plan also suggests that a
central information agency could be established which develops and maintains central
registration systems. This agency, it is proposed, should be a joint venture between the
Ministry of Education and the universities, with mutual responsibilities” (Bekkers,
1998a, p. 352). The interest association of the universities noted in 1990 that the
proposal for a central register at a distance from government, and induced by law,
seemed to imply an internal inconsistency.
“Furthermore, [i]n one of the appendices of the Higher Education and Research Plan of
1988 a set of indicators was formulated to enhance the transparency of the universities.
The idea behind the presentation of these indicators is that a dialogue between the
Ministry of Education and the universities can only be rationalized if objectivity exists
about the information to be exchanged in the dialogue. If objective information about
the state of the university system is not available to every participant, an open and
power-free communication cannot be established. Therefore information, which is
mutual and which is mutually maintained, is a necessary condition for a successful
dialogue. The indicators presented in the Higher Education and Research Plan can be
seen as an objective language which the participants can use as a mutual point of
reference for underlining their arguments and perceptions (…)” (Bekkers, 1998a, p.
352). However, “[t]he introduction of the indicators has led to severe criticism of the
universities” (Bekkers, 1998a, p. 352); Bekkers explains this resistance by emphasizing
that “[f]or the Ministry the transparency created by sharing the same data is seen as a
way of neutralizing the role of information as a powerful and strategic resource in an
open planning process. A powerless dialogue (…) supposes the absence of strategic
information behavior of the parties involved. Here, transparency is seen as a way of
fostering the self-regulating capacity of the university system itself. If the Ministry and
the universities share the same data and knowledge, it must be easier for them to reach a
common definition about relevant trends, developments, problems and solutions.
However, the universities feared the degree of transparency which the Ministry wanted
to accomplish. It was the transparency of the Ministry. Moreover, they doubted the
intentions of the Ministry. Although transparency could foster a more powerless
dialogue, the opposite could also happen: transparency could open the door for more
sophisticated ways of control. This was seen as a threat for the proclaimed autonomy of
the universities” (Bekkers, 1998a, p. 354). “The system was seen as illegitimate because160
it affected the autonomy of the institutions” comment Homburg and Gazendam (1996,
p. 329).
By now, a mechanism of proposals and counter-proposals comes into play (see also Van
der Vlist’s comment in section 2.5). In this case, the interest association of the Dutch
universities presented its own information policy proposals. In 1990, it stated a number
of information management principles, including (VSNU, 1996, p. 5; see also Bekkers
1998a, p. 352) that:
“the information exchanged should match the information requirements of the
universities themselves”
158.
Furthermore, the importance of exchange through formal reports is stressed and it is
argued that the number of reports should be minimized. Finally, it is stated that “(…)
controllability has to be sought in simplification rather than in integration of overly
complex information flows”
159 (VSNU, 1996, p. 5) and it is stated that “(…) there is no
need for new, government-owned, centralized registrations”
160 (VSNU, 1996, p. 5; see
also Bekkers, 1998a).
“In the discussions regarding the formulation of a new information policy, the
recommendations of the Association were mostly accepted in the Chamber of Higher
Education. They were also input for a new set of agreements regarding the exchange of
information, which were formulated at the ‘Information Conference’ in 1992” (Bekkers,
1998a, p. 352-353).
The ‘Information Conference’ of 1992 marked a change in the information management
approach adopted for the exchange of information between universities and the Ministry
of Education. The set of indicators used by the Ministry raised a lot of criticism. During
the conference, the universities agreed that they would be held accountable for their
results based on a set of indicators, but they also managed to agree with the Ministry
that the initiative for the formulation of these indicators would be primarily in the hands
of the universities and their association (see also Bekkers, 1998a). At the same time the
universities acknowledged that the Ministry needs this information. However, there is a
problem about the desired level of aggregation of the information to be exchanged.
Agreement was reached on an approach in which the information needs of the Ministry
will more and more be satisfied by the use of indicators.
                                                          
158 “(…) de informatielevering moet aansluiten bij de eigen informatiebeheofte van de
universiteiten en bij de bestaande besluitvormingsprocessen”
159 “(…) beheersbaarheid moet meer gezocht worden in vereenvoudiging dan in
integratie van te complexe gegevensstromen”
160 “(…) aan nieuwe centrale bestanden onder beheer van de overheid bestaat geen
behoefte”161
Another very important result of the conference was that “the Ministry of Education
acknowledges that the information to be exchanged is owned by the universities”
(Bekkers, 1998a, p. 353). It is notable that special, dedicated information systems that
support the new situation did not exist. “A variety of information systems are being
applied for the preparation of the ‘Facts and Figures’ document and for the trends
presented in the Higher Education and Research Plan” (Bekkers, 1998a, p. 353).
Attempts were made to develop an expert system to support the communicative
planning cycle. Therefore it was necessary that universities and other institutions of
higher education should employ categories in which the status of the dialogue was
represented. Using the system, all kinds of associations could be made. “For instance, if
a civil servant would like to know something about the number of student registrations,
he would not only have these figures at his disposal, but he would also know which
other departmental unit and/or civil servants were engaged with this issue. He would
also know which letters between universities and the Ministry of Education had been
exchanged regarding the issue. However, the system raised such criticism that it was
abandoned” (Bekkers, 1998a, p. 353).
Information Management approach regarding research information
A special case within the context of Higher Education and Research Information
Management is the case of exchange of information on research activities. The case
description will, from now on, focus on the exchange of information on research
projects. The information assets involved are information systems embodying
information on research projects carried out by universities and research institutes.
Exchanging information on research activities is asked for in order to ‘expose’ current
research activities to the academic community
161 and to social organizations
(Wetenschappelijk Technische Raad, 1990).
Since 1970, several organizations within the field of Higher Education and Research
have been gathering information on research activities
162 in which various organizations
focused on distinct scientific disciplines. In 1988, the NBOI
163 was founded, among
                                                          
161 For example for peer reviews, quality assessments, but also to expose research
activities to the scientific community at large, or the business community (R&D firms).
162 Initially, postal questionnaires were used to gather data on current research,
researchers and research institutes. However, these questionnaires have, over time, been
replaced by electronic data interchange facilities.
163 The Dutch Bureau for Research Information, or in Dutch: Nederlands Bureau voor
Onderzoek Informatie (NBOI). On September 1, 1997, the NBOI merged with the
Library of the Dutch Royal Academy of Sciences (Dutch abbreviation: BKNAW), the
Social Sciences Information Services (SWIDOC), the Dutch Historical Data Archives
(NHDA) and the Bureau for Bibliography of Dutch Literature (BBN). The newly
created organization, NIWI, is the new owner of the NOD, the Dutch Research
Database.162
other things in order to design and develop a National Research Database
164 (NOD).  It
must be noted that there is no formal obligation for the universities to account for their
research activities. In 1995, the following intention was drawn up in an information
agreement:
“Research institutions have in principle agreed that they will submit research
information to the NBOI database (the NOD)”
165.
As a result of this agreement, the Ministry assumed that the universities were obliged to
submit research information to the NOD. The interest organization of the universities,
on the other hand, assumed that an obligation existed only if there was not a single trace
of doubt as to (1) the method of submission of information and (2) what organization
should receive the information i.e. NBOI. In practice, the association wanted to
postpone its commitment to the agreement until the results of the expected evaluation of
the NOD were available and until its own investigation of the possibility of an
alternative information management approach had been completed.
“The research institutes’ efforts to collect, store and distribute information on
research activities are only partially justifiable due to the tasks and
responsibilities of the institutions; in particular efforts to increase the efficiency
of exchange of information among institutions, efforts to increase national and
international ‘exposure’ and efforts to increase comparability, go beyond the
level of institutes. If the government merely formulates demands, the institutes
will have to be offered complete freedom with respect to technical and
organizational aspects, so that it is possible for them to align completely with
their own information and management policies.  If, on the contrary, government
assumes detailed technical and organizational arrangements, that the
institutions are not able to influence but that do influence an institution’s
management, the institutes are not able to comply with this approach”
166
(internal report VSNU).
                                                          
164 In Dutch: Nederlandse Onderzoeks Databank (NOD).
165 “De instellingen hebben in principle afgesproken dat zij deze informatie zullen
onderbregen in de NBOI database (de NOD)”
166 “De inspanningen die de instellingen zich moeten getroosten om de
onderzoeksgegevens te verzamelen, op te slaan en ter beschikking te stellen zijn slechts
voor een deel te rechtvaardigen op grond van de eigen taken en verantwoordelijkhefen
van de instelling zelf; met name de inspanningen om onderlinge gegevensuitwisseling
efficiënt te organiseren en om landelijke (of zelfs internationale) vindbaarheid en
vergelijkbaarheid te realiseren, hebben een instellingsoverschrijdend karakter. Waneer
op dat vlak door de overheid slechts wordt volstaan met het formuleren van eisen, zal
het WO volstrekte vrijheid hebben inzake de technische/organisatorische opzet moeten
worden gelaten, zodat geheel bij het eigen informatie- en managementbeleid kan163
The NOD raised criticism by universities and its interest association over who should
provide the research information and who should contribute to the costs of the NOD. In
fact, it was felt by the NBOI that the commitment of universities to the importance of
‘exposure’ of research activities by the NOD diminished because they did not
experience any benefits from the NOD. In Ambtelijk Overleg Onderzoek (1990) of the
interest association of the universities, it is stated as follows (Ambtelijk Overleg
Onderzoek, 1990, p. 3):
“The universities are not fully convinced of the usefulness of the [NOD] (…).
The (potential) users of the research are not yet sufficiently identified and
specific partitions of the database, to be used by the universities for their own
‘strategic’ research policies, are not yet available”.
The rationale behind the resistance to the NOD is expressed later on in the same
publication (p. 3):
“The academic institutes are apprehensive of putting research information,
which is to be classified as ‘strategic’ and which consists of input and output
data at specific aggregation levels, at the disposal of (potential) users without
explicit permission. If it is not clear to what use the information is to be put, [the
institutions] refuse to supply this information”
167.
During a conference meeting in 1990, an anonymous participant remarked:
“(…) a system that aims to harmonize local universities’ information system,
should allow universities a certain amount of diversity”
168.
Another participant stated that
                                                                                                                                             
worden aangesloten. Wander echter de door de overheid geformuleerde eisen gepaard
gaan met gedetaileerde technische en organisatorische voorronderstellingen waarop het
WO geen invloed heeft, maar die wel ingrijpen in de eigen bedrijfsvoering per
instelling, zou het WO daarmee niet kunnen instemmen. (…) Concreet betekent dit (…)
dat ook mogelijke alternatieven voor informatielevering via de huidige NOD in de
beschouwingen moeten worden betrokken.”
167 “De instellingen van W.O. zijn er daarnaast voor beducht dat de
onderzoeksinformatie die als ‘strategisch’ kan worden betiteld, en die input- en output-
data op specifiek aggregatie-niveau bevat, zonder expliciete toestemming ter
beschikking wordt gesteld aan (potentiële) gebruikers”.
168 “Een systeem dat landelijke harmonisatie van local voorzieningen bj de
universiteiten beoogt dient o.a. aan de voorwaarde te voldoen dat het de universiteiten
een zekere mate van diversiteit toestaat wat betreft de lokale voorziening”.164
“(…) if the NOD is accessible unconditionally, government is, through the back
door, allowed access to information that, given the position of government, has
to be characterized as ‘management information’. Seen from the point of view of
the universities, the supply of such an amount of management information is not
acceptable”
169.
In the proceedings of a discussion meeting, the following is noted:
“(…) from the reports, consults and interviews, it is clear that stakeholders
prefer a coordinating and referring function with respect to research information
systems.  Therefore, no need exists for a complete, central and uniform register
with detailed information with respect to output of research activities”
170.
In the 1990s, two concurrent initiatives for the collection of information on research
activities emerged: the centralized NOD initiative, owned by the NBOI (from 1997, the
NIWI), and the decentralized initiatives by universities, represented by the VSNU. The
latter initiative is inspired by the fact that, for the universities, the current organizational
and technical aspects of the information exchange (i.e., the NOD) are by no means
given; the position of the interest association is that, as long as there is no optimal
cost/benefit ratio or synthesis of interests, the institutes are not obliged to submit
information on research activities to the NOD. Furthermore, a problem faced in the
NOD initiative is (Wetenschappelijk Technische Raad, 1997, p. 7) that:
  “[t]here is a problem concerning the filling of the NOD. Of fourteen
universities, eight have a contract with NBOI/NIWI for electronic data
interchange. By far not all research activities have been entered into the system
(…). Users have to experience the utility of such a research system, and
                                                          
169 “Als een NOD ongeclausuleerd toegankelijk is voor de overheid krijgt de overheid
via een achterdeur de bschikking over een hoeveelheid informatie die gezien de positie
van de overheid als bestuurlijke informatie moet worden beschouwd. Vanuit de
universiteiten bezien is een dergelijke verruiming van de hoeveelheid bestuurlijke
informatie ‘langs een sluiproute’, in het licht van de discussie over de bestuurlijke
verhouding tussen overheid en universiteiten en de operationalisering daarvan, niet
acceptabel”.
170 “Uit de rapportages, adviezen en interviews komt naar voren dat de betrokkenen
voor het NBOI/NOD in principe een coordinerende en verwijzende functie zien t.a.v.
documantaire informatiesystemen. Daardoor bestaat geen noodzaak tot een centrale
faciliteit met een volledig en uniform bestand dat tot op detailniveau informatie m.b.t.
output van onderzoek bevat”.165
researchers (suppliers) have to benefit from using it, otherwise the filling of the
database will drop behind and, with that, its use”
171.
On the other hand, the interest association of the universities developed a data model,
CombiFormat  (VSNU, 1996). In 1997, the CombiFormat was accepted and
implemented
172 by ten of the fourteen universities (Advantage, 1997), which have either
developed a research information system (in Dutch: OZIS or OIS) themselves, or have
bought an existing system which was developed by another university.
Subsequently, the Board of the Royal Dutch Academy of Sciences, under whose
heading the NBOI/NIWI operates, stated that it is of the opinion that it is wise to
scrutinize the relationship between centralized and decentralized information gathering.
The Board states that it:
“(…) does not exclude the possibility that, over a certain period of time (five
years), the alternative of decentralized data storage will predominate”
173.
As neither the NBOI/NIWI nor the interest association of the universities had an interest
in further fueling the debate between the competing top-down and bottom-up
information management approaches of gathering research information, an independent
third opinion was requested by the Royal Academy of Sciences and the interest
organization of the universities.
In the subsequent report (see Wetenschappelijk Technische Raad, 1997), it is noted that,
in general, “researchers do not have a primary interest in supplying information on
research activities. (…) In searching for expertise in one’s own discipline, a research
database does not outperform traditional sources: journals, conference proceedings and
professional contacts”
174 (Wetenschappelijk Technische Raad, 1997, p. 6).
                                                          
171 “Er is een knelpunt rond de vullingsgraad van de NOD. Van de 14 universiteiten
hebben er acht een contract met NBOI/NIWI voor electronische gegevensleverantie.
Lang niet alle onderzoeksprojecten zijn ingevuld, of moeten moeizaam handmatig
worden ingevoerd. (…) Gebruikers moeten het nut zien van een dergelijk systeem en
toeleveranciers moeten voordeel hebben van deelname, amders zal de vulling ervan
achter blijven en daarmee het gebruik”.
172 It is noted that several universities adjusted the data model to local peculiarities
(Advantage, 1997).
173 “Het bestuur sluit niet uit, dat op termijn (vijf jaar) de tendens naar meer decentrale
gegevensopslag de overhand zal krijgen. Voor het NBOI zou dan een meer faciliterende
en bemiddelende rol zijn weggelegd, eerder dan een gegevensverzamelende” (Quotation
in letter from Board of Royal Dutch Academy of Sciences to curators of NBOI, 1996).
174 “De wetenschappelijke onderzoekers zien hun naam graag vermeld in de
onderzoekwereld, maar hebben geen primair belang bij het aanleveren van de gegevens166
In the report, a new-style, more decentralized NOD is recommended. Therefore, “(…)
[t]he research data have to be gathered and entered at the source as much as
possible”
175, advises the Wetenschappelijk Technische Raad (1997, p. 7). For the NIWI,
the Wetenschappelijk Technische Raad proposes the following tasks: firstly, an
(inter)national referring function to local information systems, including the marketing
of the research activities; secondly, the building, maintenance and distribution among
local research information systems of a thesaurus of research data; thirdly, quality
assessment of locally-entered information on research projects.
The Wetenschappelijk Technische Raad proposes the following situation (see the report
of the Wetenschappelijk Technische Raad, 1997, pp. 11-12). At the level of universities,
researchers or project managers enter information on research projects and publications
into a local information system at the level of the research group. The information of all
research groups within a research institute or university is collected in the university’s
OIS or OZIS system
176. For the small research institutes which do not have an OIS or
OZIS, it is proposed that the NBOI/NIWI negotiate for them with one of the universities
which does own such an information system so that the small institutes’ information
may be entered in the latter system.
For the NOD, two options are mentioned. Firstly, a database is set up with copies of the
OIS/OZIS databases in the CombiFormat data model. Secondly, the NOD consists of
(1) a list of projects and (2) references (in the form of hyperlinks) to the local databases.
According to the Wetenschappelijk Technische Raad, a transition of the (current) first to
the second option is a natural one, taking into account the rapid change in telematics (in
this case, TCP/IP telecommunication technology). “(…) Rapid developments in the
field of the Internet and the World Wide Web beg the question of whether a central
database is required. Possibly, over time, WWW searches on decentral databases could
be a satisfying solution” (Wetenschappelijk Technische Raad, 1997, p. 8)
177.
                                                                                                                                             
over lopende onderzoekprojecten. (…) Voor het zoeken van expertise op het eigen
vakgebied levert een onderzoekinformatiesysteem niet meer op dan de traditionele
bronnen: het raadplegen van vakliteratuur, het bezoeken van congressen en collegiale
contacten”.
175 “De WTR adviseert een NOD nieuwe stijl met en meer decentrale opzet dan nu. De
onderzoeksgegevens worden zoveel mogelijk aan de bron ingevoerd”.
176 It is supposed that an IOS or OZIS serves primarily the own interests of the
university: firstly, generating internal reports and secondly, giving account to the
Ministry.
177 “De ontwikkelingen op Internet en het World Wide Web gaan zo snel dat men zich
de vraag moet stellen of een centrale database nog nodig/wenselijk is. De mogelijkheid
moet niet uitgesloten worden dat op termijn volstaan kan worden met WWW-searches
op decentrale databases”.167
The (new) NOD then, would enable access from comparable information systems
abroad (the report mentions the European CORDIS information system, the English
CRIB database and the Belgian IWETO system). The report states that “NBOI will have
to realize international activities in order to realize an intelligent system of mutual
references” (Wetenschappelijk Technische Raad, 1997, p. 12).
The Wetenschappelijk Technische Raad advises standardizing the local (university)
systems according to an extended
178 CombiFormat (a development that was, at the time
of the report, already taking place), and developing a thesaurus of search terms and
indices (to be developed by the NIWI).
The Wetenschappelijk Technische Raad warns furthermore that “if the parties involved
do not succeed in increasing drastically the timeliness and coverage [of the NOD], it is
not likely that a NOD-like structure will survive. And the former is a prerequisite for
justifying the costs the NOD incurs”
179 (Wetenschappelijk Technische Raad, 1997, p.
8).
In general, the report of the Wetenschappelijk Technische Raad is supported by the
parties involved: the Royal Academy of Sciences, the NIWI and the interest association
of the universities (Advantage, 1997). This implies that both the interest association and
the Royal Academy of Sciences accept that the NIWI has a new role to play and that the
ownership issues with respect to information on research activities have changed.
However, both parties continue to elaborate on the report separately.
Developments at NIWI
In a reaction to the proposals by the Wetenschappelijk Technische Raad, the Royal
Academy of Sciences notes the following:
“The core of the report implies a changed role of the NOD, with a more
important role for the decentralized input of data by the institutions who are
responsible for the research activities. The role of NBOI/NIWI will change
towards quality assurance and the active (international) marketing of the
research information”
180.
                                                          
178 Extended with Uniform Resource Locators (URLs) for project, person and university
information, and a standard classification code system.
179  “Indien de samenwerkende partijen er niet in slagen [dekkingsgraad en actualiteit]
drastisch op te voeren, is het niet waarschijnlijk dat een NOD-achtige structuur
langdurig in stand kan blijven. En alleen in het geval dat dit wel lukt zijn de kosten die
de NOD jaarlijks met zich meebrengt te rechtvaardigen”.
180 “De kern van het advies behelst een gewijzigde opzet van de NOD (…) met een
grotere rol voor de decentrale invoer van gegevens door de instellingen onder wiens
verantwoordelijkheid de onderzoeksprojecten worden uitgevoerd. De rol van het NIWI
zal meer verschuiven naar kwaliteitsbewaking en het verzorgen van de ontsluiting door168
As a reaction to the report, the Academy has formulated a pilot project proposal for new
forms of cooperation between NIWI and three universities. It is acknowledged that the
NOD has a new ‘referring’ function, besides the recording of information on experts,
profiles of universities and information on projects.
The pilot project aims at elaborating on and testing the decentralized data input,
decentralized access to information, decentralized quality assessment and interfaces
between NOD and OZIS systems (among other things through the use of URLs), in
order to draw up standard procedures for the other universities and large research
institutes. The NIWI focuses on the first task in the report of the Wetenschappelijke
Technische Raad, in which databases are transferred from OZIS systems to the NOD
database:
“In the long run – whenever the technical means are available -, the NBOI/NIWI
database will consist of URL hyperlinks to the university OZIS information”
181.
Developments at the interest association of universities
The interest association of the universities requested an additional independent opinion
on the practical elaboration of the report of the Wetenschappelijk Technische Raad (see
Advantage, 1997).
In this subsequent report, a number of remarks are made. Firstly, it is noted that various
universities and research institutes should discuss whether information from university
or faculty level should be exchanged. Secondly, it is noted that the choice for a specific
research information system is the responsibility of institutes and that a proposal of the
de facto standard OZIS system or any obligation from any party involved is not
acceptable. Thirdly,  access to secondary databases or WWW servers is preferred over
access to the primary databases (aspects of security are more important than aspects of
timeliness).
It is recommended that institutes should move incrementally towards the situation as
proposed in the report from the Wetenschappelijk Technische Raad. Standardization of
the de facto standard OZIS system is not presumed to be possible, and the development
of so-called universal applications is not recommended. In the Advantage report, the
alignment between interorganizational characteristics and an information management
approach is acknowledged (Advantage, 1997, pp. 9-10).
“An important point of reference is that the organizations involved are highly
autonomous. (…) The choice of a specific (project) approach therefore has to
take these relationships and mutual interdependencies into account. Here, the
                                                                                                                                             
het verzorgen van een venster op de onderzoeksinformatie en door middel van aktieve
marketing, ook internationaal” (NIWI, internal project proposal).
181 “Op de langere termijn – indien de technische mogelijkheden hiervoor ontwikkeld
zijn – zal de NBOI/NIWI database URL verwijzingen naar de universitaire OZIS
gegevens bevatten” (internal project proposal, Royal Academy of Sciences).169
relationships between institutes and between institutes and NIWI are at stake. A
combined bottom-up/top-down approach, in which all participants are taken into
account, is preferred. (…) An incremental approach is to be preferred over a
waterfall-like approach. (…) It is furthermore important to notice that the
relationship between NIWI and the institutes is not self-evident. This relationship
will have to be nourished on the basis of mutual value-added”.
182
5.2.3 Review
From the description of the context of the field of Higher Education and Research, it
becomes clear that the relationships between the Ministry of Education and the institutes
have changed from purely hierarchically-coordinated relationships, in which
universities have virtually no autonomy, to relationships that have characteristics of
market-like coordination and in which universities are confronted with freedom to act
independently of the Ministry (resulting in network structures [Kickert, 1993] or a
multi-actor system [Gazendam & Schaap, 1994]).
In section 5.2.2, observations are stated with regard to the information management
approach adopted in the exchange of information between universities and Ministry. In
this section, these observations are confronted with the hypotheses of the Political
Economy of Information Management that were developed in section 4.6.
The first hypothesis stated that if none of the information assets initially owned by
organizations participating in an interorganizational information system is
indispensable, and none of the information assets initially owned by organizations
participating in an interorganizational information system is complementary,
organizations will choose not to standardize various conceptual schemes for information
assets.
In analyzing the complete period the case study has taken into account, it is interesting
to note that up to the 1990s, the hypothesis does not receive support. At that time, the
information regarding research activities was gathered by the NBOI (from 1997: NIWI)
operating under the heading of the Royal Academy of Sciences. The NBOI/NIWI
                                                          
182 “Belangrijk aandachtspunt hierbij is de constatering dat hierbij sprake is van
(nagenoeg) zelfstandige organisatie. (…) Bij het kiezen van een (project) aanpak dient
met deze relaties en de onderlinge afhankelijkheden rekening te worden gehouden. Het
gaat daarbij met name om de relatie tussen de instellingen enerzijds en tussen de
instellingen en het NIWI anderzijds. Een gecombineerde bottom-up/top-down
benadering waarbij recht wordt gedaan aan alle betrokkenen (…) heeft de voorkeur.
(…) Een incrementele aanpak verdient daarbij de voorkeur boven een waterval-achtige
aanpak. (…) Belangrijk is te constateren dat de relatie tussen het NIWI en de
instellingen geen vanzelfsprekende is. Deze relatie zal op basis van onderling
toegevoegde waarde moeten worden ingevuld”.170
gathered information from universities and research institutes and they owned and used
a central database with research information, while none of the information assets were
strictly indispensable in the sense that the NOD would be worthless without any one of
the assets involved.
With respect to this period of time, Bekkers (1998a) concludes:
“A cybernetic view on the use of information dominates the information policies
(…) The universities feared that this information would also be used for cutback
operations. Moreover, they did not recognize themselves in the information
needs of the Ministry
183. The result was that information policies became the
object of struggle, lasting many years. Questions, such as the degree and nature
of the desired transparency and the ownership of information which was
gathered by the universities, dominated the agenda” (Bekkers, 1998a, p. 355).
In the top-down information management traditionally adopted,
“(…) ICTs are very tempting instruments. There is always a latent tendency to
use them for developing new and sophisticated ways of monitoring and control”
(Bekkers, 1998a, p. 355).
In the years following 1990, this top-down information management approach met
gradually increasing resistance from the universities, because the information
management approach:
“(…) is seen as a threat for the self-regulating capacities of functionally and
territorially decentralized organizations. (…) Information gathered about the
individual functioning and output of these organizations could be used to get a
better – aggregated – insight in the functioning of sectors, but it can also be used
to control the organizations at an individual level” (Bekkers, 1998a, p. 355).
In general, as the universities were allowed more autonomy, they resisted exchanging
information with the Ministry. It is clear that the hypothesized effects, as the line of
reasoning of the Political Economy of Information Management states, do occur:
theoretically, it is expected that in the absence of dependence between information
assets, a top-down information management approach yields underinvestment and hence
poor data quality. In reality, the NOD did experience poor data quality in terms of
inaccuracies and lack of timeliness, which is consistent with an economic organization
theory explanation: the universities felt that they were not benefiting from the
information they submitted to the NBOI/NIWI and, in fact, they had no incentives to
submit the requested information. Furthermore, institutes feared that giving away
information on research activities to the NBOI/NIWI without exactly knowing what the
                                                          
183 This is a clear illustration of concept of ‘value independence’, see section 4.4.171
NOD would do with it, would allow the Ministry to monitor their activities and to use
that information for cut-back operations. This is consistent with a political organization
theory explanation. The consequent resistance was expressed by protesting against the
costs that were imposed by the NBOI/NIWI on the universities.
The emergence and adoption of the CombiFormat/CombiSearch initiative, which
provides a more or less standardized data model for a decentralized research
information system consisting of OIS or OZIS information systems, does provide strong
support for the first hypothesis. In fact, the initiative does propose a standardized data
model, but at the same time it is stated that ownership of data (and hence residual
abusus property rights with respect to the data model) resides with the institutes. The
universities are therefore allowed to adjust the model to local needs. The bottom-up
interorganizational information management approach embodied in the emergence of
the CombiFormat/CombiSearch initiative is hypothesized to match the situation of the
field of Higher Education and Research, and in practice, it was adopted both by the
VSNU and NIWI, preferred by most universities and eventually accepted by the
Ministry. Note that the crucial difference, from the point of view of the Political
Economy of Information Management, lies in the residual property rights to the
information assets involved: in case of incomplete or vague contracts, such as in the
statement that ‘research institutes have in principle agreed that they will submit research
information to the NOD database’, residual property rights enable the owners - that is,
the research institutes - to exclude third parties from using the information assets. It is
stated by the universities as follows:
“Cooperating does not mean to say: do everything together. It does mean to say:
striving for or cooperating with organizations with comparable needs,
development phases and/or a shared vision on information management”
184
(Ambtelijk Overleg Onderzoek, 1990, p. 7).
The second hypothesis stated that if at least one of the information assets initially owned
by organizations participating in an interorganizational information system is
indispensable, organizations will choose to standardize various conceptual schemes for
information assets.
This hypothesis could not be investigated in this case study as strict indispensability did
not occur at any moment in time of the period investigated.
It might be concluded that from the point of view in which the Ministry is trying to
collect complete management information, any information asset can be regarded as
indispensable, but such indispensability does not apply to the point of view of the
institutes, which, moreover, had alternative sources of the information that the NBOI
                                                          
184 “Gezamenlijk wil niet zeggen: alles met zijn allen doen. Wel: streven naar of
aanhaken bij instellingen die eenzelfde behoefte, ontwikkelingsstadium en/of een zelfde
visie omtrent informatiebeleid hebben”172
was attempting to gather: e.g. personal contacts, the World Wide Web, conferences, etc.
However, Political Economy of Information Management explains why the Ministry
supported the NOD initiative and tried to compel the institutes to submit research
information to the NOD, while at the same time it explains why the research institutes
rejected it (i.e. because they did not experience that any of the assets involved was
indispensable).
The third hypothesis stated that if information assets initially owned by organizations
participating in an interorganizational information system are complementary,
organizations will choose to standardize various conceptual schemes for information
assets. This hypothesis is not applicable either.173
Case: Higher Education and Research
Control/ Involvement of
stakeholders
The NBOI/NIWI initiatives embodied a
centralized control model, with a centralized
database and centralized development of the
interorganizational information system.
Universities were only indirectly involved
with the development of these centralized
systems.
The CombiFormat initiative embodied a
decentralized philosophy with decentral
system development, possibly tailored to local
needs. In fact, universities built research
information systems themselves.
Functionality/ Goals Integration is deliberately pursued in the NOD
initiative. Note that the VSNU resisted the
NOD because they wanted it to be specified
for what purposes the submitted information
was going to be used. Being the owner, the
NBOI/NIWI was able to decide on that.
The CombiFormat initiative offers
considerable space for deviations in
implementation in OIS/OZIS systems.
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Architecture The NOD architecture features a common
conceptual scheme to be used by all
universities, including data models.  Although
the official goal was to take stock of ongoing
research in the Netherlands, the universities
feared that an unofficial goal was to assess
their performance.
The CombiFormat features a proposal for a
data model, although it is explicitly stated that
universities were the owners of the systems
that were to be built and that they were
entitled to adapt the architecture to their own,
local needs.174
General characterization Sense of autonomy was very important for
universities. Ministry gradually adopted policy
of ‘steering at a distance’.
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HPEIM,1 No support for period up to 1985. Strong
support for period from 1985 – 1990s.
HPEIM,2 No conclusion on support. There is no
indispensability involved.
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HPEIM,3 No conclusion on support. There is no
complementarity involved.
Figure 35: Characterization of the Higher Education and Research Case
5.3  Case 2: Fiscal Policy
5.3.1  The Context: Organizations in Fiscal Policy
Overview of Organizations
In the Netherlands, the task of levying taxes and premiums for national insurances
185 is
carried out by the Ministry of Finance or, more specifically, the Tax and Customs
Administration
186. Other tasks of the Tax and Customs Administration include fighting
tax fraud and monitoring international goods and passenger traffic. For the execution of
its tasks, the Tax and Customs Administration depends heavily on information systems.
In the use of information systems, improvement of service to taxpayers is prioritized by
the Tax and Customs Administration, but intensification of control and combating fraud
are considered important too.
In order to execute the task of levying taxes and premiums, the Tax and Customs
Administration registers a lot of information in order to support the primary process.
                                                          
185 For a more elaborate description of national insurances and social security, refer to
section 5.4.1.
186 In Dutch: Belastingdienst.175
The gathering of information in itself is not a primary task for the Tax and Customs
Administration; however, in the process of levying taxes and premiums, information on,
for example, economic sectors and income distribution is gathered as a by-product.
In the Netherlands, the task of gathering information for policy and scientific purposes
(but also in order to inform commercial companies on economic developments) is
carried out by the CBS (Statistics Netherlands)
187. The CBS was established in 1899 and
is a governmental agency that falls under the Ministry of Economic Affairs. Although
the CBS itself is financed out of the budget of the Ministry of Economic Affairs and the
Minister is responsible for the Bureau, its policy and tasks are determined by the Central
Statistics Commission
188, an independent commission in which various governmental
organizations, scientific institutes and other stakeholders are represented. The Central
Statistics Commission is a ZBO (independent administrative body; see section 5.2.1).
The CBS gathers, processes and distributes information on a variety of subjects,
including macro economic trends (such as economic growth and consumer prices), birth
rates, crime rates, income statistics, etc. This information is traditionally gathered
through surveys, personal interviews or interviews by phone. A recent trend is to gain
access to existing databases; making use of existing databases as a source of data is one
of CBS’s strategic thrusts.
The Income Information System
In 1987, the CBS and the Tax and Customs Administration agreed to set up an
information system, the Income Information System (IIS). This Income Information
System records income data of a (fixed) sample of individuals (a ‘panel’) in terms of
gross income, the Tax and Custom Administration’s preliminary assessment,
declarations, final assessment, appeals and settlements.
In the remaining part of this case description, we will focus on the income information
system as an information asset. It must be noted that there exists a long-time
cooperation between the Tax and Customs Administration and the CBS in terms of
exchanging information. Until the 1990s, the exchange of information about
declarations occurred through the transportation of physical paper forms from the Tax
and Customs Administration’s premises to one of the headquarters of the CBS, where
the paper forms were processed for statistical purpose and eventually sent back without
any changes to the Ministry of Finance for processing for their primary purpose.
Although the Income Information System of that period conforms to our definition of an
interorganizational information system, the information management approach with
respect to such an interorganizational information system is of the information resource
management type rather than information technology management (see section 2.2.3).
The Income Information System implied a lot of manual work in terms of keying in data
from paper declaration forms.
                                                          
187 In Dutch: Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek (CBS).
188 In Dutch: Centrale Commissie voor de Statistiek.176
This situation, however, changed in 1995 when the Income Information System could
use the Tax and Custom Administration’s IBS system
189 as a data source. The following
description will be restricted to the automated exchange that occurred from this time
on
190. The information asset involved is the (now automated) income information
system.
The development of the Income Information System can be characterized by a very
gradual, incremental move from a paper-based exchange to an automated exchange of
information. Representatives of the Ministry of Finance and the CBS met regularly and,
in these meetings, the ownership structure of the Income Information System was
discussed explicitly in terms of information management approaches that could be
adopted.
In fact, a number of alternative information management approaches were identified.
Among them were a bottom-up approach, in which two information systems were
proposed, two top-down approaches (one CBS-owned system, and one Tax and Custom
Administration-owned system) and a mixed approach (one system, relatively
independent of the two participants). Eventually, the participants opted for the
‘independent’ system (in which the costs are shared by the two participants), because
otherwise:
“the Income Information System priorities are continuously related to the actual
activities of the organizations involved”
191 (internal report, Tax and Customs
Administration & CBS).
The CBS and the Tax and Customs Administration signed a contract in which the terms
of exchange of information between them were formalized. The contract consists of
agreements on the following issues:
·  Organization. A special IIS working unit was established and based at the CBS’s
premises. The costs of this working unit were split equally by the Ministry of
Finance and the CBS
192,193. It must be noted here that the working unit only
performed tasks associated with the gathering and processing of raw data for
general policy and managerial purposes; the analyses that were specific to the
Ministry of Finance and the CBS were performed by these participants themselves.
                                                          
189 Income Taxes System, in Dutch: Inkomsten Belasting Systeem (IBS).
190 Although the automated exchange was established in 1995, many of the specific
characteristics of the information exchange date back to the period before 1995.
191 “(…) de prioriteit van het IIS [kan] steeds aan de overige werkzaamheden van de
betrokken organisaties worden gerelateerd”.
192 Additionally, the Ministry invested in conversion software in order to be able to
extract data from its production databases. The CBS also invested in additional
hardware and especially in data-entry software.
193 It was noted by the participants that a lot of the costs are hard to specify. To date, no
disputes have emerged on the matter of costs accounting of the working unit.177
·  Procedure. The role of the Tax and Customs Administration was the supply of
‘raw’ data. The IIS working unit’s task was to make the raw data anonymous and to
manipulate the data that was supplied by the Tax and Customs Administration. The
CBS’s contribution was the expertise of sampling techniques and knowledge of
how to manipulate the data (which was on the level of analysis of individuals) in
order to generate information on the level of analysis of households.
·  Information Use. The Income Information System would be used by the CBS for
the generation of statistics on income distributions, fortune distributions and
purchasing power. For the Ministry of Finance, the information was used for ex
ante and ex post evaluation of fiscal policies and for informing the Parliament. It
must be noted that the eventual use (i.e. functionality) of the Income Information
System differs for the Ministry of Finance and for the CBS.
“The CBS is meant to undertake only those activities that are required for the
tasks as defined by the Central Statistics Commission. The gathering and
manipulation of data and the reporting of statistics clearly is such a task.
Activities related to administrative purposes, on the contrary, are not such a
task”
194 (internal report, Tax and Customs Administration & CBS).
·  Protection of registration
195. Here, it is explicitly stated that the use of the IIS is
restricted to general administrative use (i.e. generation of statistics and policy
evaluation) and that it should never affect individual taxpayers.
·  Privacy. In the contract, it is stated that the working unit fully respects the privacy
of the persons involved in the panel.
In general, the system functions to the satisfaction of both the Tax and Custom
Administration and the CBS. The agreements are dealt with in a very informal manner.
There are no problems associated with the quality of data submitted by the Tax and
Customs Administration to the Income Information System, nor are there problems with
the quality of the output generated by the Income Information System.
5.3.2 Analysis
A distinctive characteristic of the case of the Income Information System is that two
organizations are involved in the Income Information System, but that only one submits
information to it: that is, the Tax and Customs Administration. The CBS contributes to
the system because of its knowledge and experience of sampling techniques and of
transforming data from the level of individual taxpayers to the level of households.
                                                          
194 “Het verzamelen, bewerken en tot cijferopstellingen samenstellen van gegevens in
het kader van de inkomensstatistieken behoort duidelijk tot dat takenpakket. Het
uitvoeren van dezelfde taken ten behoeve van beleidsmatige informatie ten behoeve van
de Belastingdienst behoort daar echter niet toe”.
195 In Dutch: administratieve vrijwaring.178
It must be noted, though, that to the CBS, there is no alternative to the Tax and Customs
Administration in terms of a source of data. The Tax and Customs Administration is the
only organization in the Netherlands that possesses a complete data set of incomes of
taxpayers in the Netherlands. This is what makes the Ministry of Finance indispensable
to the Income Information System.
For the decision-making regarding goals, prioritization, development and use of the
Income Information System, explicit goals were formulated regarding the use of the
interorganizational information system. For the CBS, it should be used for the
generation of statistics, and for the Ministry of Finance for the generation of information
for ex ante and ex post evaluation of fiscal policy. These goals are quite well
circumscribed.
In terms of an architecture, in the decision-making process several alternative
architectures were evaluated. Eventually, a uniform data model was chosen to serve as
the basis for the development of the Income Information System. The development of
the Income Information System was accompanied by a relatively centralized control
strategy. But in fact both the Ministry as well as the CBS participated in the
development of the system. The working unit that was responsible for the development
and operation of the Income Information System consisted of employees of both
organizations.
5.3.3 Review
With respect to the first and third hypotheses, no conclusion is possible because this
case is characterized by the indispensability of one of the organizations involved. The
second hypothesis is supported.  In the presence of indispensability, a top-down
information management approach was adopted; furthermore, the alternative of a
bottom-up approach, which stressed two relatively decentralized information systems at
the premises of the Ministry of Finance and the CBS, was rejected because in such a
case it was expected that the functioning of the system would be very dependent on the
internal priorities of the participating organizations. Hence, the consequences of a
possible hold-up were mitigated by adopting a top-down information management
approach.179
Case: Fiscal Policy
Control/ Involvement of
stakeholders
Development of the system took place in a
centralized way.
Functionality/ Goals Goals were explicitly stated.
I
n
f
o
r
m
a
t
i
o
n
M
a
n
a
g
e
m
e
n
t
A
p
p
r
o
a
c
h
Architecture A common data model served as the
backbone of the development process. The
alternative of a bottom-up architecture was
explicitly rejected.
General characterization Friendly cooperation. No conflicts or
tensions over the years.
Indispensability For the IIS, the Ministry was indispensable
because of its possession of information of
incomes on taxpayers. The CBS has unique
competencies, but these are not
indispensable to the Ministry.
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Complementarity -
HPEIM,1 No conclusion on support.
HPEIM,2 Substantial support. Ministry of Finance is
indispensable to the Income Information
System. The alternative of a bottom-up
information management approach was
rejected, because, in the eyes of the
participants, it would make the information
system too dependent on the priorities of the
organizations involved.
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HPEIM,3 None. There is no complementarity
involved.
Figure 36: Characterization of the Fiscal Policy Case180
5.4  Case 3: Social Security
5.4.1  The Context: Organizations in the field of Social Security
Overview of Acts, Schemes and Organizations
The Netherlands has been described as a welfare state (in Dutch: verzorgingsstaat).
Although in the 1980s and 1990s, a lot has changed (see for example, Hoffmans [1989],
Noordam [1997] and Jacobs [1997]), there still exists an elaborate system of legislation
ensuring citizens of an income in case of sickness, unemployment, disability, death of a
partner, etc. This legislation follows from the Dutch Constitution (Art. 20.2, Art. 20.3)
and in a number of treaties (for a discussion, refer to Noordam [1997]).
In general, the system of legislation is categorized into social insurances (sociale
verzekeringen), financed by premiums, and social services (sociale voorzieningen),
financed by the general fund, that is, by tax incomes. The distinction is not only based
on the way social insurances and social services are financed, but also on the function of
these distinct schemes: social services are meant to guarantee a basic minimum level of
income, whereas social insurances compensate for (often temporary) loss of income.
Hoffmans (1989) adds that social services consist of ‘flat rate’ benefits, whereas social
insurances consist of ‘earnings-related’ benefits. “Primarily, social insurances are to be
addressed by citizens. In case one is not able to lay any claim to these schemes, or if
these schemes do not suffice, one has to resort to the social services”
196 (Noordman,
1997, p. 31).
Social insurances consist of employee benefits (werknemersverzekeringen) and national
insurances (volksverzekeringen). The difference is that the former addresses employees,
whereas the latter addresses every citizen.  A similar distinction is to be found in the
social services: there are schemes with a general domain and schemes that address
special target groups. For an overview, refer to Figure 37.
A.1. Employee benefits A. Social Insurances
A.2. National Insurances
B.1. General domain
Dutch Social Security
B. Social services
B.2. Special target groups
Figure 37: Overview of Dutch Social Security Schemes
Central government is (by definition) responsible for the system of public social
security (Noordam, 1997). However, the execution of the social insurances, in particular
was, until 1997, partly in the hands of a number of organizations which are co-managed
by associations of employees and associations of employers (in Dutch: sociale
                                                          
196 “Primair moet een beroep gedaan worden op de sociale verzekeringen. Slechts indien
men aan dat systeem geen aansparken (meer) kan ontlenen of die aanspraken
onvoldoende zijn, komen de sociale verzekeringen in beeld”.181
partners)
197.  The involvement of these associations is based on the fact that their
members contribute to the system of social insurances through their premiums and that
the system of social insurances is often tightly connected to negotiations on conditions
of employment (Noordam, 1997).
In Figure 38, an overview of organizations active in the social security sector is
presented.
Organization Execution of Acts/Schemes
Industrial Insurance Boards (after
1997: Executive Institutions)
198
Disablement Benefits Act (WAO, [A.1.]),
the Unemployment Benefits Act (WW,
[A.1.]), the Sickness Benefit Act (ZW,
[A.1.]), the General Act for the Disabled
(AAW, [A.2.]), and the Act on Surcharges
(TW, [B.2.])
National Health Service
(Ziekenfondsen)
National Health Services Act (ZFW
199),
General Act on Exceptional Sickness
Benefits (AWBZ, [A.2.])
Social Insurance Bank (Sociale
Verzekeringsbank, SVB)
National Old Age Pensions Act (AOW,
[A.2.]), the National Child Benefits Act
(AKW, [B.1.]) and the National Survivors’
Benefits Act (Anw, [A.2.]).
Municipality Act on Elderly and Partially Disabled
Unemployed Employees (IOAW, [B.2.]),
Act on Elderly and Partially Disabled
Former Self-Employed (IOAZ, [B.2.]), Act
on Facilities for the Handicapped (WVG,
[B.1.]), Social Security Act (Abw, [B.1.])
Figure 38: Overview of Dutch organizations in the social security sector
200
                                                          
197 For example, the Lisv (to be discussed below) has an Executive Board designated by
the Government, which consists of an independent chairman and nine members: three
members representing the unions, three representing the employers’ organizations and
three members by Royal Appointment.
198 In Dutch: bedrijfsverenigingen and uitvoeringsinstellingen, respectively. Examples
of the latter are Cadans, Gak, GUO, Sfb and USZO (since January 1, 1998).
199 See footnote 200.
200 The figures in brackets (e.g. [B.2] refer to the categories in Figure 37. The ZFW is
hard to categorize according to the groupings in Figure 37. For a discussion, see
Noordam (1997).182
Recent developments in the field
Until 1980, the involvement of government in the field of social security showed an
almost continual increase. By 1980, “[the] period of expansion of the system of social
security had ended”
201 (Hoffmans, 1989, p. 93). Not only the importance of decreasing
the number of citizens enjoying social services and benefits was stressed (the so-called
volumebeleid), but also the need for changes in the execution of the legislation:
“Responsibilities are transferred from government to social partners”
202. It is important
to note that the associations of employees and the associations of employers did not fear
these changes (Hoffmans, 1989). In subsequent years, the relations between
organizations in the field of social security were particularly subject to discussion and
compromises. The outcomes of the discussions are characterized as follows: “If the
center of responsibilities is in the private sector, there is a simultaneous increase in the
legislative and controlling activities of the government. If (semi) governmental
organizations are primarily involved in the execution of legislation, the industrial
insurance boards are granted an important position in co-opting the Boards”
 203
(Roebroek, cited in Hoffmans, 1989, pp. 146-147).
“Both government and social partners do not want to give up their positions”, comments
Hoffmans (1989, p. 147). Government and social partners have an interest in
“maintaining their relative autonomy, in repelling changes and, if possible, reinforcing
autonomy”
204 (Roebroek, cited in Hoffmans, 1989, p. 147). In 1989, Hoffmans
commented that few structural changes in the system of social security have occurred
and that the historically-defined positions of the industrial insurance boards delimit the
possibilities of changes in the field.
“Whenever proposals for changes met the resistance of associations of employers and
associations of employees, these proposals were abandoned. The existence of a power
base, formed when employees and employers cooperate, is clear”
205 (Hoffmans, 1989,
p. 148). Buurmeijer (1993) remarks that
                                                          
201 “De tijd van verdere uitbreiding van de sociale zekerheid was voorbij”.
202 See Document of the Dutch Parliament TK 17475, 1982-1983, pp. 10-11.
203 “Waar het zwaartepunt bij het bedrijfsleven kwam te liggen is tegelijk voorzien in
ruime regelgevende en toezichthoudende bevoegdheden van de overheid, en waar
(semi-) overheidsorganen primair met de uitvoering zijn belast, komt het georganiseerde
bedrijfsleven tenminste een belangrijke plaats in de betrokken besturen toe”.
204 “het in stand houden van de eigen, vaak relatief autonome positie, het afweren van
pogingen zodanig veranderingen aan te brengen, dat deze positie in gevaar komt, en het,
waar mogelijk, versterken van de eigen positie”.
205 “Waar wijzigingsvoorstellen stuitten op het gezamenlijk verzet van werkgevers- en
werknemersorganisaties, vonden deze voorstellen dus geen doorgang. Het bestaan van
het eerder geboemde ‘officieuze machtscircuit’, gevormd waneer de werkgevers- en
werknemenrsorganisaties samenwerken, is hier duidelijk aangetoond”.183
“[p]arliament recoiled from fundamental changes in the traditional relationship
between government and social partners”
206 (1993, p. 73). “(…) [I]n general
and in the investigated period, Parliament was either passive, because of which
changes were not stimulated, or was internally divided, because of which
fundamental changes in the system and the organization of the execution of
changes were not able to be accomplished, or unanimously blocked changes”
207
(Buurmeijer, 1993, p. 74).
Furthermore, Parliament was of the opinion that:
“(…) the Industrial Insurance Boards’ autonomy was not to be diminished by
some sort of central institution, occupied with coordination and control”
208
(Buurmeijer, 1993, p. 107).
The social partners were very wary of consolidating this power, which showed in the
way they dealt with information (see Buurmeijer [1993, p. 95]). Illustrative is an
evaluation of the system of social security in 1985 by the Ministry. The Ministry
required data for this evaluation; however, this was refused based on the opinion that
the privacy of citizens would be endangered. Furthermore, the Industrial Insurance
Boards wanted to know beforehand exactly for what purposes these data were to be
used. Buurmeijer (1993) comments:
“[t]he Ministry is of the opinion that the Industrial Insurance Boards did not
want the Ministry to strengthen its grip on the execution of social insurance”
209
(p. 92).
Two Landmarks: The Buurmeijer Commission and the Van der
Zwan Commission
A first change in the field of social security occurred in March 1992, when the
Netherlands Court of Audit issued a report on the functioning of the system of social
insurances. The report raised a lot of turmoil in parliament and it was decided to install
a Parliamentary Research Commission (the so-called Parlementaire Enquete
                                                          
206 “De Tweede Kamer deinsde terug voor fundamentele ingrepen in de traditionele
verantwoordelijkheidsverdeling tussen overheid en sociale partners”.
207 “De commissie concludeert dat de Kamer in de onderzoeksperiode in algemene zin
of passief was, waardoor wijzigingen niet werden gestimuleerd, of verdeeld was,
waardoor fundamentele wijzigingen in het stelsel en de uitvoeringsorganisatie niet
konden worden doorgevoerd, of eensgezind was in het blokkeren van de wijzigingen”.
208 “De autonomie van deze uitvoeringsorganen [bedrijfsverenigingen] mocht niet
worden aangetast vanuit een centraal orgaan dat met coordinatie en toezicht was belast”.
209 “De indruk bij het ministerie bestaat dat de bedrijfsverenigingen niet wilden dat het
ministerie haar greep op de uitvoeringsorganen versterkte”184
Uitvoeringsorganen Sociale Verzekeringen, often referred to as the Commissie
Buurmeijer, named after its chairman). The central question of the Research
Commission was how the industrial insurance boards had implemented the changes in
legislation and policy over the last 10 years.
The main conclusions of the Research Commission were that the execution of social
insurance legislation is primarily in the hands of the executive organizations rather than
the Industrial Insurance Boards, and that, in the execution of legislation, there was a
preference for lawfulness over efficiency and effectiveness. Furthermore, it was
concluded that associations of employers and associations of employers have a mutual
interest in abusing social security schemes (especially the Disability Benefits Act and
Unemployment Benefits Acts) as a redundancy scheme for employees. For example,
with respect to the Unemployment Benefits Acts, it is stated that:
“(…) the system of the Unemployment Benefits Acts and especially the definition
of unemployment are as such executable, but they do offer a certain discretion
and are susceptible to fraud, especially if plotting between employers and
employees is involved”
210 (Buurmeijer, 1993, p. 29).
The Buurmeijer Commission recommended dismantling and privatizing the Sickness
Benefit Act and Disability Benefits Act, and reinforcing private (as opposed to public
responsibilities (i.e., by means of privatization) rather than encouraging hierarchical
control over the Industrial Insurance Boards by issuing supplementary legislation. In
fact, as a result of the recommendations, the Industrial Insurance Boards were closed
down. Furthermore, the Disability Benefits Act and Sickness Benefit Act were replaced
by the Act on Premium Differentiation and Markets in Disability Insurances (in Dutch:
Wet  Premiedifferentiatie en Marktwerking bij Arbeidsongeschiktheidsverzekeringen,
PEMBA) and the Act on Payment of Wages during Sickness (in Dutch: Wet Uitbetaling
Loon bij Ziekte, WULBZ), respectively.  The introduction of the Social Insurance
Organization Act (Osv ‘97) on March 1, 1997 brought with it a number of changes in
the way several social security arrangements are carried out. The responsibilities of
Industrial Social Insurances are now transferred to so-called executive institutes
(uitvoeringsinstellingen), presided over by the Lisv (National Institute for Social
Insurances), an independent administrative body responsible for the execution of Acts
and Schemes and aiming to increase competition between the uitvoeringsinstellingen
211.
                                                          
210 “De systematiek van de Werkloosheidswet en met name het werkloosheidsbegrip
zijn wellicht niet onuitvoerbaar, maar bieden wel op vele plaatsen gebruikersruimte en
zijn fraudegevoelig, met name waar sprake is van samenspanning tussen werkgevers en
werknemers” (Buurmeijer, 1993, p. 29).
211 The Lisv was the successor of the IDSV (and before the IDSV, the TICA), an
umbrella organization of the Industrial Insurance Boards (the TICA and IDSV
represented the Industrial Insurance Boards whereas the Lisv commissions the executive
institutes).185
The executive institutes are now commissioned by the Lisv to carry out the actual
allocation of these benefits: the executive institutes operate on a contract basis. Until the
year 2000, the Lisv will deal with the (now privatized) executive institutes. And also
until the year 2000, these institutes are allowed to deliver other services, such as social
fund management, schemes for Early Retirement (in Dutch: Vervroegde Uittreding,
VUT) and pension schemes, provided that these services are delivered in collaboration
with other organizations.
After the year 2000, the executive organizations have to compete with one another and
with other organizations that would like to enter the market and execute social insurance
legislation. Contracts between Lisv and executive institutes specify which tasks have to
be carried out and at what cost. The Lisv itself is concerned with the correct allocation
of benefits, the management of the funds and, in particular, collaboration with Job
Centers and municipal social assistance offices in order to assist as many unemployed
people as possible to return to the work force
212.
A second change in the field occurred almost simultaneously with the activities of the
Buurmeijer Commission. In the beginning of the 1990s, there were rumors of fraud and
susceptibility to fraud in the way the municipal social services agencies execute the
Social Security Act.
Again, a Parliamentary Research Commission was suggested, but this time the Ministry
of Social Affairs and Employment put an independent Research Committee in office,
the Van der Zwan Committee. Its mission was to investigate the execution of the Social
Security Act by the municipal social security agencies.
In 1993, the findings of the Van der Zwan Committee were published. It concluded that
abuse of services occurs frequently and that there are many opportunities for clients to
deceive (Van Geuns et al, 1993). This was attributed to two categories of reasons:
internal and external reasons. Internal reasons are related to characteristics of the target
group, attitudes of the agency’s professionals, etc. External reasons are related to the
impossibility for many agencies to verify information supplied by clients:
“[t]he information is not always available to the social security offices within an
acceptable period of time”
213 (Van Geuns et al, 1993, p. 161).
In the report, it was observed that:
“[f]irstly, social security agencies do not always make use of the possibilities for
verifying clients’ information. Secondly, possibilities for verification are
                                                          
212 Deputy Minister of Social Affairs and Employment during the parliamentary debate
on the new Social Insurance Organization Act of 1997 in the fall of 1996.
213 “De informatie komt niet in alle gevallen binnen een acceptabele termijn ter
beschikking van de GSD-en”.186
sometimes lacking (…) social security agencies do not have any power to enforce
the legally required exchange of information”
214 (Van Geuns et al, 1993, p. 165).
From the activities of both the Buurmeijer Commission and the Van der Zwan
Committee, and from the subsequent policy developments, it is concluded here that in
the beginning of the 1990s, fighting fraud was put in the spotlight in the field of social
security (see also Jacobs, 1997). Furthermore, it seems that the organizations working in
the field of social security constituted a highly fragmented executive system (see, for
example, Buurmeijer [1993, p. 74]), in which, until 1997, executive organizations
experienced a high degree of autonomy. This autonomy was, as far as the executive
organizations in the field of social security are concerned, reinforced by recent
privatization operations.
In the remainder of the case description, we will focus on the information systems that
contain information on citizens that can be used to detect fraud and we will refer to
these systems as information assets.
The emergence of the RINIS initiative
In the beginning of the 1990s, it was felt within various organizations in the field of
social security that it was necessary to facilitate the exchange of information (especially
client information) in order to handle the newly-emerged issue of fighting fraud.
“The 1980s were the Privacy years; the 1990s are going to be the years of
fighting fraud”
215 (RINIS, 1996, p. 11).
At the time, there had been attempts to verify clients’ information by means of
comparisons of files that were used by various organizations:
“In the first few years, this coupling was more or less manual. First all
administrations had to work with an identical identifier. In Holland, this was the
‘Social Fiscal Number’ (…). Tapes with information were exchanged between
the different organizations. Now this identifier is in place, comparing data with
data from other organizations becomes a routine. Exchanging tapes proved to be
rather labor intensive and inflexible” (Zuurmond, 1998, p. 261).
                                                          
214 “Ten eerste blijkt dat GSD-en niet in alle gevallen waar in principe verificatie- en
valideringsmogelijkheden bestaan informatie over clienten opvragen. Ten tweede blijkt
dat er voor GSD-en op een aantal terreinen mogelijkheden tot verificatie ontbreken. (…)
GSD-en hebben geen machtsmiddelen om de wettelijk verplichte aanlevering van
informatie af te dwingen”.
215 “De tachtiger jaren staan geboekt als de Privacy jaren, de jaren negentig profileren
zich als Controle jaren”.187
The comparisons of files yielded many ‘false-positive’ signals (see also section 2.6.3).
The system of large comparisons of data files had to be replaced by a facility that would
enable executive organizations to check clients’ information before or at the time of
deciding on, for example, their request for a benefit. In other words: the system of ex
post investigation had to be replaced by an ex ante notification system.
The Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor is responsible for legislation in the field of
social security. Any role for the Ministry in the execution of the legislation, however,
did not seem very obvious:
“(…) [a]n initiative from the Ministry (of Social Affairs and Labor) would
certainly have met resistance from organizations working in the field of social
security”
216 (Anonymous interviewee)
Rather, in February 1995, an initiative from the field emerged: RINIS (Institute for
(Inter-) National Routing of Information Flows, in Dutch: RouteringsInstituut voor
[inter]Nationale Informatie Stromen). RINIS is an initiative that originated in the
management level of the Social Insurances Bank, the TICA
217 and the Industrial
Insurance Boards. A deliberate choice was made not to go through the tripartite,
administrative level:
“In this way, the administrative and sometimes political circuit could, for the
moment, be left out of sight”
218 (Anonymous interviewee).
An important aspect of the RINIS initiative is the establishment of so-called authentic
sources of data (in Dutch: authentieke bronnen) (see also Bekkers, 1998b). An authentic
source of data is ‘an organization that is responsible for the operational maintenance,
content, quality and verification of a data element’. For example, an executive
organization is always the authentic source for a data element that results from its
executive process (for example, the Social Insurances Bank is the authentic source for
decisions on the basis of the National Old Age Pensions Act). But organizations may
also be regarded as authentic source for other data elements; for example, the citizens
registration office is an authentic source for a client’s name, date of birth and domicile,
while the Job Centers is an authentic source for the same client’s job seeking history. A
study in 1995 revealed that most of the data elements (about sixty) are ‘claimed’ by one
organization. About thirteen are not claimed by any organization and one data element
is claimed by more than one organization.
                                                          
216 “Een initiatief vanuit het ministerie zou zeker op weerstand stuiten bij de diverse
organisaties in de sociale zekerheid”.
217 The TICA is an umbrella organization, which, at the time, represented the Industrial
Insurance Boards. See also footnote 211.
218 “Op deze wijze kon het bestuurlijke en soms politieke circuit buiten de deur
gehouden worden”.188
RINIS acknowledges that the claimants are, in fact, to be regarded as authentic source
for the data elements involved. This implies responsibility on the part of the
organizations involved for the operational maintenance, content, quality, and
verification of the registers involved. Moreover, other organizations wishing to use the
data of the authentic source may draw up an interchange agreement for the exchange of
data from the authentic source as ‘supplier’ of data to the other organization as ‘buyer’.
The exchange of information in the RINIS infrastructure is based on the SoFi number as
unique identifier. Furthermore, the RINIS initiative presupposes that the field of social
security consists of so-called sectors, ‘coherent groups of organizations that are
responsible for the execution of one Act or Scheme or general societal functions’.
Examples of sectors are: the set of Executive Institutes, the Social Insurances Bank, the
Tax and Customs Administration, the National Health Service, the set of Municipal
Social Security Agencies, etc. Each sector has at its disposal a central verification office
(in Dutch: Sectoraal Aanspreek Punt, SAP) and a RINIS server.
The RINIS initiative consists of a set of playing rules for the exchange of information
between the central verification offices. There are two kinds of information exchanges:
‘regular messages’ and ‘spontaneous notifications’. Regular messages are predefined
EDI messages in which one organization queries another organization for information
on a client
219 (characterized by his or her SoFi number) and the other organization
reports the required information in a predefined message. Spontaneous notifications are
the result of so-called change indicators (in Dutch: afname indicatoren). Once such an
indicator has been installed, it spontaneously issues messages every time a change
occurs in the information of a person characterized by a SoFi number. Both types of
exchanges are guided by the terms of interchange agreements, consisting of
specification of the authentic source, privacy aspects, quality and validity of the
information, use of the information by the receiving party, timeliness of delivery, etc.
As has already been mentioned, the involvement of RINIS is restricted to the exchange
between sectors’ RINIS servers. Sectors are responsible for the way the messages and
notifications are dealt with within the sector. It is possible to install a referral index (in
Dutch: sectorale verwijsindex) at the central verification office, which routes messages
to the actual authenticated sources, but this is not strictly necessary.  In fact, within one
sector, messages and notifications are printed from the server and subsequently sent to
the authenticated sources via fax messages. The organizations serving as authenticated
sources reply to the central verification office, and there the reply is manually keyed in
and sent.
                                                          
219 For each query, only one sector is addressed.189
Figure 39: Communication in the social security domain according to the RINIS
initiative
In 1996, the first information exchange took place between the Social Insurances Bank
and the Executive Institutes. In the pilot project, a change indicator requested by the
Social Insurances Bank was placed at the Executive Institutes’ central verification
office. Using this information exchange, changes in the employment status of
employees or beneficiaries who live outside of the Netherlands but are entitled to
National Child Benefits are reported to the Social Insurances Bank
220.
The RINIS organization authorizes information exchanges, promotes the RINIS
initiative in order to connect sectors to the RINIS infrastructure and acts as an
international forwarding point, but it does not own the infrastructure, nor any
information assets or referral indices.
At the moment, RINIS is a private organization and a foundation in which participants
act as members of an advisory committee. In 1995, it was estimated that ten to fifteen
sectors could be discerned and a couple of hundred information exchanges could be
identified. Today (1998), six sectors participate in the advisory committee of RINIS and
another two are expected to join soon.
It is remarkable that the municipal Social Security Agencies, at the moment of writing,
do not participate in RINIS (as user or as a member of the advisory committee),
although they were criticized severely in the report of the Van der Zwan Committee. In
fact, the Social Security Agencies have had problems organizing a central verification
agency for the 572 municipal Social Security Agencies (in Dutch: Inlichtenbureau voor
de Gemeentelijke Sociale Diensten). The Dutch Association of Municipalities (in Dutch:
Vereniging Nederlandse Gemeenten) proposed the establishment of such a central
verification agency. The agencies’ central verification office would enable the agencies
to mutually check information but also to communicate with the RINIS network.
                                                          
220 See art. 6.1b National Child Benefits Act.
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However, it has also been suggested that the central verification agency would be able
to assist the municipal agencies in deciding on ‘hard cases’. To date, the agencies’
central verification agency has not been established. In March 1997, there was a pilot
project involving the connection of one municipal Social Security Agency with the
RINIS network through a temporary central verification agency, which turned out to be
successful, but at the moment of writing it is not clear if or how this project will be
continued.
At present, the Dutch Ministry of the Interior has embraced RINIS by mentioning
RINIS (after it was established) in the BIOS3 policy document (see also section 1.2.2).
Furthermore, the Ministry of Economic Affairs issued a subsidy for the project.
5.4.2 Analysis
Interorganizational relations
In general, the field of social security in the Netherlands is characterized by Buurmeijer
(1993, p. 74) as a “divergent system of execution”
221.
Historically, the Industrial Insurance Boards (which were abandoned in 1997) were
allowed a rather high degree of autonomy in the way they executed their legally-defined
tasks. Until the beginning of the 1990s, parliament had always chosen not to interfere
with the execution of legislation by the executive organizations on behalf of the
Industrial Insurance Boards. Concerning the relationship between Industrial Insurance
Boards and executive organizations, Buurmeijer (1993) states:
“The reports by the boards confirm the idea of an important role for the
executive organizations (in the actual execution of legislation, VH). (…) The
execution has, in the investigated period of time, always emphasized legal
correctness, completeness and timeliness of the benefits rather than diminishing
the number of benefits paid (pp. 55-56)”
 222
In the 1980s, the Ministry instructed the Industrial Insurance Boards to develop an
Insurance Register (in Dutch: Verzekerdenadministratie, VZA). In 1993, Buurmeijer
commented:
“The Commission is of the opinion that the time it took until the Register was
developed, exemplified the relations in the field”
223 (1993, p. 93).
                                                          
221 “versnipperd uitvoeringssysteem”
222 “De bestuursverslagen bevestigen het beeld van een grote rol van de administratie.
(…) De uitvoering is in de onderzoeksperiode hoofdzakelijk gestuurd op juistheid,
volledigheid en tijdigheid van de uitkeringen, en niet op volumedoelstellingen”.
223 “De commissie acht het tijdsverloop, dat intussen nodig is geweest om tot een VZA
te komen, illustratief voor de verhoudingen in het veld”.191
In the 1990s, the issue of fighting fraud was put on the political agenda and the
Buurmeijer Commission and the Van der Zwan Committee severely criticized the
execution of legislation by Industrial Insurance Boards and municipal Social Security
Agencies. The Buurmeijer Commission’s criticisms, in particular, had major
consequences: the Industrial Insurance Boards were abandoned and the execution of
legislation was turned over to privatized executive organizations, which are
commissioned by the Lisv. The privatized executive organizations are allowed to render
other services and after the year 2000, other organizations may also render services in
the field of execution of social insurances. So, as a result of the findings of the
Buurmeijer Commission, the interorganizational relations were altered from public law,
hierarchical relationships to private law, market-oriented relationships. The executive
organizations are allowed more autonomy, are less dependent on governmental
organizations (because the Lisv is no longer the only source of income) and are
coordinated in a less hierarchical manner.
The position of the municipal Social Security Agencies, to date, has not fundamentally
changed. Social Security is still executed by the municipalities.
In the field of social insurances it must be noted that, over time, and especially since
1997, the relationships have changed. The relationship between the Ministry and the
executive institutes is not hierarchical any more, but rather it is market-like, in which
various executive institutes compete with one another and with possible new entrants.
The autonomy of the executive institutes has been reinforced; they are less resource
dependent on the Ministry.
Information Management Approach
It is noticeable that against the background of the increasing importance of the issue of
fighting fraud, the field of executive organizations in the field of social security at large
has always been able successfully to resist a more prominent role of the Ministry of
Social Affairs and Labor.
In 1995, the RINIS initiative was announced. This initiative originated in the field of
executive organizations and more or less explicitly bypassed the administrative and
political levels. RINIS rests on four pillars: (1) the use of authentic sources of
information,  (2) the RINIS architecture of exchange of information between sectors, (3)
the RINIS organization, which authorizes information exchanges and (4) the use of
standardization in data communication.
In the RINIS initiative, the ‘informational autonomy’ of the organizations is
acknowledged instead of mitigated and authentic sources of information are identified.
With the emphasis on authentic sources, ownership of information assets is reinforced.
By means of interchange agreements, authorized by RINIS, other organizations are
allowed to use (usus property right) some of these assets. However, in the interchange
agreements, it is rather strictly circumscribed to what purposes the assets may be used
and, moreover, the authentic source (by definition) retains the residual rights.192
Bekkers refers to this situation as a:
“way of protecting the informational autonomy of the participating
organizations” (Bekkers 1998b, p. 72).
In the RINIS initiative, the role of stakeholders, that is, (representatives of)
organizations in the field, is quite prominent. In fact, by means of the establishment of
authentic sources, ownership of information assets is emphasized. The organizations are
quite explicitly given responsibility for information and exertion of the usus, usus
fructus
224 and abusus property rights; this is stressed in the RINIS publications.
Integration, defined as the standardization of data definitions and structures through the
use of a common conceptual scheme across a collection of data sources, is not pursued.
Rather, RINIS stresses informational autonomy and cooperation between various
organizations on the basis of recognition of (1) autonomy and (2) responsibility for the
legally-defined organizational tasks.
“The RINIS project shows us that it is possible to develop a common information
architecture between organizations, which respects the autonomy and the
‘checks and balances’ between them. The ownership of data is protected in
RINIS. If an organization wants to use certain data which is gathered and owned
by other organizations, it does not collect the data itself, but it asks (by an
automated reference index) if it may use this data” (Bekkers, 1998b, p. 75).
The RINIS initiative does stress standardization though: explicitly not with respect to
data definitions and structures, but rather with respect to data communication standards.
This, of course, does limit the freedom of choice of the participating organizations to
some degree; there is, in other words, always a tension between (any form of)
standardization and retention of autonomy.
“In the tension between standardization of messages and the retention of
autonomy, the principle of ‘ownership’ of information played an important role.
By means of retention of organizational responsibility for information, threats
were reduced and commitment was strengthened”
225 (Anonymous interviewee).
                                                          
224 For a discussion of the usus fructus property right with respect to the Executive
Organization’s information assets and the use of information assets for other
(commercial) properties, also refer to section 6.5.
225 “Bij het hanteren van het spanningsveld tussen standaardisatie van berichten en
handhaven van autonomie van organisaties speelde het ‘eigendomschap’ van informatie
een grote rol. Door organisaties hun verantwoordelijkheid voor bepaalde gegevens te
laten behouden werd de bedreiging weggenomen en commitment gekweekt”193
Autonomy is an important characteristic because the participating organizations are very
wary of loss of IT investments as have occurred in the past. Furthermore, there is fear of
being held accountable by the Ministry. For example, one interviewee suggested that an
important role of the Ministry within RINIS
“(…) would be the end of the thought that RINIS is ‘our property’. A central
institute that would scrutinize statistics and trends would imply that the
benevolent cooperation of the field of social security would certainly come to an
end”
226 (Anonymous interviewee).
Other statements that characterize the RINIS initiative are its incremental development
(and important success factor, according to several interviewees) and the easy entrance
for new participants.
Concluding, it is asserted that it is more appropriate to characterize the RINIS initiative
as a bottom-up information management approach than as a top-down information
management approach. The position of stakeholders in particular (see section 2.4.2), as
well as the goals and instruments used (especially the absence of an architecture that
stresses integration, see section 2.4.3) support this conclusion.
5.4.3 Review
The first hypothesis stated that if none of the information assets initially owned by
organizations participating in an interorganizational information system is
indispensable, and none of these information assets is complementary, organizations
will choose not to standardize various conceptual schemes for information assets.
Zuurmond (1988) describes the above-mentioned developments in the field of social
security at large as a process of rationalization, in which information technology is
“tying all (…) organizations together” (1998, p. 261).
In section 5.4.1, we described the history of the field of organization in the social
security sector at large. In section 5.4.2 we analyzed recent changes in information
management approaches and interorganizational relations in terms of the Political
Economy of Information Management, which was developed in section 4.3.
From the description of the history of the field and from the analysis, a rather interesting
picture emerges which both illustrates the mechanisms of the Political Economy of
Information Management and enriches its theoretical foundations. Primarily, we would
like to challenge Zuurmond’s observation. The history of the field shows that the
Ministry and the Industrial Insurance Boards operated, until the 1990s, quite
                                                          
226 “Dit zou het einde betekenen van de gedachte dat ‘RINIS van ons allemaal is’. Een
centrale instantie die trends zou gaan ontdekken in statistieken zou het einde betekenen
van de welwillende medewerking van organisaties in het sociale zekerheidsveld”.194
independently of each other and that the Industrial Insurance Boards cherished their
autonomy.
It is interesting to note that the first attempts to fight fraud consisted of setting up
central, temporary databases (see also section 2.6.3). These databases suffered from
poor data quality (many false-positive signals of fraud). In fact, the organizations that
submitted data had no incentives to provide timely and adequate information to these
central, temporary databases. Even the intensification of the theme of fighting fraud
could not persuade the participating organizations to cooperate with the Ministry and to
provide information of a higher quality. Furthermore, an attempt in the 1980s to set up a
central Insurance Register (VZA) was resisted by the executive institutes. Obviously, a
top-down information management approach in the divergent field of executive
organizations was inappropriate. In general, the executive institutes forcefully resisted
any exchange of information, direct or indirect, with the Ministry, let alone any
standardization of their own information assets in order to enable information exchange.
In fact, the first hypothesis is supported by (1) the resistance of the organizations
working in the field of social security and (2) the emergence of the bottom-up oriented
RINIS initiative, in which decentralized control and dispersed ownership are stressed.
The second hypothesis stated that if at least one of the information assets initially owned
by organizations participating in an interorganizational information system is
indispensable, organizations will choose to standardize various conceptual schemes for
information assets.
When the issue of fighting fraud was put on the political agenda, various organizations
realized they could prevent fraud by exchanging information on clients with other
executive institutions. In this way, the information assets owned by various
organizations did not become strictly complementary, but their value for fighting fraud
increased and possible hold-up power increased. Therefore, based on the Political
Economy of Information Management, it could be expected that the organizations
involved accept attenuation of property rights with respect to information assets and
standardize the conceptual schemes in terms of data models and definitions.
Within RINIS, the costs associated with possible hold-up power are not mitigated by
means of attenuation of property rights with respect to information assets, but by means
of co-optation because the RINIS organization is in fact administered by the
organizations participating in the infrastructure. Therefore, the second hypothesis gains
little or no support.
The third hypothesis stated that if information assets initially owned by organizations
participating in an interorganizational information system are complementary, then
organizations will choose to standardize various conceptual schemes for information
assets.
With the identification of authentic sources of data, the information assets involved
become indispensable for the other organizations involved. As there are various195
authentic sources, there are also various indispensable information assets. However, in
this case, contrary to what is stated in the third hypothesis, property rights were not
attenuated and integration by means of standardization of data models and definitions
did not take place.
There are, however, some comments that necessitate further discussion and possibly
adaptation of the Political Economy of Information Management. For example, the
RINIS architecture itself assumes that information exchange takes place between so-
called sectors: groups of organizations that are responsible for the execution of one Act
or Scheme or perform one societal function. The way information is exchanged within
sectors is left to the sector. Some sectors have set up an automatic referral index, but
others have set up alternative ways of treating questions (such as communication by fax
machines).
“Another way of protecting organizational boundaries is the automatic referral
index of the RINIS system. If one organization asks certain data of another
organization, this question is treated by using a referral index. Certain questions
are automatically transferred to the organization in question.  Other questions
get  special treatment if they do not meet the specifications of the protocols. This
index functions as an automatic gatekeeper” (Bekkers 1998b, p. 72).
So, organization into sectors allows organizations to further protect their autonomy.
However, the concept of ‘sectors’ in the RINIS initiative raises some questions. The
first one is the question of what exactly delimits a sector. The first organizations
entering the RINIS initiative already had some sort of network or sector-like
interorganizational structure (the Industrial Boards were represented by the TICA and
the Social Insurances Bank acts as one divisional organization since several Labor
Councils [in Dutch: Raden van Arbeid] merged in 1987). Other organizations met
difficulties with the concept of sectors. For example, the Ministry of Justice has a
number of independent administrative bodies (ZBOs) which have recently split off from
the Ministry and are now considering being organized into a Justice Sector. Another
example is the sector of municipal Social Security Agencies whose collaboration in a
sector presided over by the Inlichtingenbureau has, to date, not been realized because of
struggles over the tasks and responsibilities of such a central verification office.
An elaboration of this and other topics will take place in the epilogue (section 6.5).196
 Case: Social Security – RINIS
Control/
Involvement of
stakeholders
Predominantly decentralized control. Attempts to
centralize control by the Ministry of Social Affairs
and Employment are forcefully (and successfully)
resisted.
Functionality/ goals Fighting fraud is explicitly mentioned as a goal for
the exchange of information.
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Architecture No encompassing architecture stressing integration.
Standardization especially in agreements on
communication between sectors, guided by
interchange agreements.
General
characterization
Before 1997 public law, hierarchical relationships
between Ministry and Industrial Insurance Boards.
However, in practice, execution was mandated to
Executive Institutes, which enjoyed high degree of
autonomy. After 1997, this situation is reinforced
by privatizing executive institutions.
Indispensability The acknowledgement of ‘authentic sources’ has
created indispensability of many organizations.
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Complementarity For Executive Institutes, before the issue of fighting
fraud was put on the agenda, virtually no
complementarity existed. With the emergence of
the issue of fighting fraud, complementarity
increased but is still low.
HPEIM,1 Substantial support throughout the time period
described. In general a move from the use of
temporal central databases to the RINIS system.
HPEIM,2 The acknowledgement of ‘authentic sources’ has
created indispensability of many organizations, but
this has reinforced the decentralized, bottom-up
information management approach, and has not led
to the adoption of a top-down information
management approach.  No support for this
hypothesis.
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HPEIM,3 No conclusion on support.
Figure 40: Characterization of the Social Security Case197
5.5 Summary
In this chapter, the Political Economy of Information Management was confronted with
empirical data from three case studies: one in the field of Higher Education and
Research (especially: exchange of information on research activities between
universities and research institutes and the Ministry of Education), one in the field of
fiscal policy and one in the field of social security. The purpose was to try to inspect
whether the Political Economy of Information Management has any relevance for
information management of interorganizational information systems in practice, and to
see if empirical data necessitates adjustment of the Political Economy of Information
Management.
With respect to relevance, it must be concluded that the central concepts of an
information management approach, characterized by commitment of stakeholders, goals
striven for, instruments used and interorganizational coordination, proved to be very
relevant for analyzing changes in the three cases.
Furthermore, the behavior of organizations in interorganizational relations in terms of
quest for non-accountability and quest for exertion of property rights was very
consistent with the previous case studies described in sections 2.3 and 2.5. However,
there were also phenomena that do not fit the Political Economy of Information
Management. These aspects are dealt with in the conclusion in the next chapter, and
especially in the epilogue on the Political Economy of Information Management.198199
6 Conclusions
6.1 Introduction
In this chapter, the conclusions of the study on interorganizational information
management will be stated. As was noted in sections 1.4 and 1.6, the study has two
parts: a theoretical part (which is emphasized because of the research objective of
theory construction) and an empirical part.
In the current chapter, the outcomes of the theoretical study will be confronted with the
empirical data that were reported in section 2.6 and in chapter five. This confrontation is
used here to shape and possibly refine the theory.
The theoretical conclusions and the results of the confrontation of the theory with the
empirical data will be combined and discussed in the epilogue on the Political Economy
of Information Management. On the basis of this epilogue, theoretical implications and
practical implications will be discussed and further research suggested.
This chapter is structured as follows. In section 6.2, a short recapitulation of the
preceding chapters is presented, in which the original motivation of the study, the
research objective and research questions are restated. Furthermore, the theories used in
the study are briefly re-introduced in order to strengthen the comprehension of the
outcomes of the study.
Section 6.3 states the theoretical conclusions, based on the analysis of information
management and interorganizational relations in the chapters two, three and four. The
empirical conclusions, based on the case analyses of chapter five, are stated in section
6.4.
The theoretical and empirical conclusions are combined in the last section of this
dissertation, in which, furthermore, the findings and results are interpreted in relation to
the original research objective and research motivation. The discussion and
interpretation of the findings are the basis for theoretical and practical recommendations
and for suggestions for research in the field of interorganizational information
management and related issues.200
6.2  Recapitulation: summarizing the argument
This section offers a brief recapitulation of the core motivation and objective of the
research and of its subsequent elaboration into a theoretical model. Its function is to
enhance the understanding of the phenomena under scrutiny and to support the
discussion and interpretation of the findings later on in this chapter.
One of the more pervasive themes in the scientific disciplines of information systems is
the relationship between the supply and demand for information in and between
organizations. In this theme, information technology represents the supply side and
organizational parameters like centralization, formalization and coordination represent
the demand side.
For the situation within organizations, various researchers have scrutinized the
relationship between (information) technological variables and organizational variables
(for a review of studies until 1991, see George & King [1991], refer to Breukel [1996]
for subsequent developments).
For the situation between organizations, the relationship between (interorganizational)
information technological variables and interorganizational variables has been
scrutinized many times (Malone, Yates & Benjamin [1987]; for a review, refer to
Steinfield, Kraut & Plummer [1996]).
Both debates have inspired much scientific work, emphasizing both theoretical and
empirical issues. From these studies, which are discussed in sections 1.2.1 and 1.2.2, the
following observations are stated:
·  Contradictory hypotheses relating technological and organizational variables are
supported by various studies: e.g., that IT leads to centralization in organizations;
that IT leads to decentralization in organizations; that IT does not have any effect
on (de)centralization; that IT leads to more hierarchical relationships between
organizations; that IT leads to more market-oriented relationships between
organizations; that anything goes in the relationship between IT and
interorganizational coordination; or that IT leads to intermediate, network-like
relationships between organizations. Furthermore, the direction of causality in the
hypotheses is questioned.
·  Additional explanatory models have been suggested, like the ‘reinforcement’
explanation (Danziger, Dutton, Kling & Kraemer, 1982, Breukel, 1996).
·  There is criticism of the choice of variables in the model, especially the variable of
locus of control (Steinfield, Kraut & Plummer, 1996). Kubicek refers to this aspect
as  managerial action with respect to information technology: the ‘contextual’
factors of the organization of the development process and involvement of actors
(Kubicek, 1995).
The debates over the relationship between organizational and technological variables
yield divergent results, and, therefore, theory construction is required, aiming at a theory
that:201
(1)  explicitly addresses locus of control, that is, identifies various ways of decision
making with respect to the goals, prioritization, development and use of
information systems in and between organizations (that is, information
management); and
(2)  explains the appropriateness of various information management approaches in
various circumstances.
In this thesis, we investigated decision making with respect to interorganizational
information systems. The objective of the current research was, therefore, to attain more
insight into various combinations of interorganizational information management
approaches and various types of interorganizational relations. The following research
questions were used:
1.  What approaches to information management for interorganizational information
systems can be defined?
2.  What types of coordination between organizations can be defined?
3.  What hypotheses relating interorganizational information management approaches
and characteristics of interorganizational relations can be constructed?
4.  Is there empirical validation for the hypotheses relating information management
approaches and characteristics of interorganizational relations?
Given the research objective of theory construction (i.e. fundamental research),
considerable effort was spent on conceptual analysis of existing theories on information
management and on interorganizational relations (specifically, economic organization
theory and political organization theory). Therefore, information management research,
economic organization theory and political organization theory were analyzed for their
key concepts and key performance indicators used, their hypotheses and, in general, for
the line of reasoning in these theories.
In order to confront the constructed theory with empirical data, data from three case
studies were included in this study in order to be able to verify and possibly to sharpen
the theory.
6.3  Theoretical conclusions
6.3.1  Conclusions with respect to information management
In this study, the focus is on information management of interorganizational information
systems; that is, on decision making regarding goals, prioritization, development and
use of information systems that are embedded in two or more organizations that have no
joint executives. Information management is needed by organizations because they are
often faced with difficulties with accessing data from multiple areas and multiple
sources.202
Information management must be viewed from two points of view: from the
information systems literature and from the organization science literature (especially
strategy formation theories).
From the definition of information management, it is possible to identify characteristics
that underlie various approaches in information management strategy schools:
·  the control strategy used,
·  the architecture used, and
·  the goals that are formulated and the specification of the functionality of the
interorganizational information system.
Two (extreme) information management approaches are identified:
·  top-down information management, which is decision making regarding goals,
prioritization, development and use of information systems between organizations
in which the control strategy emphasizes centralization, in which an elaborate
architecture is used that standardizes a data model (data definitions, data structures)
in order to achieve integration and in which explicit goals are stated for the
eventual interorganizational information system.
·  bottom-up information management, which is decision making regarding goals,
prioritization, development and use of information systems between organizations
in which the control over the interorganizational information system is
decentralized, in which the architecture consists of a set of agreements on
communication between relatively autonomous information systems and in which
goals are loosely stated (or which merely excludes certain uses of the eventual
information system, which is a far less restrictive approach).
In general, information systems theory argues that centralized control is better control,
and for reasons of efficiency, often implicitly, a top-down information management
approach is preferred. However, other authors have criticized the preference for such a
top-down information management approach because the underlying objective is often
incompatible with organizational and interorganizational reality: diversity of definitions
and data models (characteristics of a bottom-up information management approach) is
often the result of deliberate choices so that integration is not always possible or
desirable.
However, information management theory (or, in general, information systems theory)
does not provide a robust explanation of the appropriateness of various information
management approaches in various circumstances.
6.3.2  Conclusions with respect to interorganizational relations
Interorganizational relations occur whenever resources are transacted between
organizations for a certain period of time, but not necessarily for a continuous period.
Two distinct theoretical streams have elaborated on the origins and consequences of203
interorganizational relations: economic organization theory and political organization
theory.
Economic organization theory focuses on costs and benefits of interorganizational
relations to the organizations participating in that relationship. Organizations are
assumed to strive for autonomy, because in that case, they may exert the property rights
of  usus,  usus fructus and abusus, and they are hypothesized to strive to minimize
acceptance of limitations in courses of actions they wish to pursue.
This situation changes, however, if assets are used that are only productive in
conjunction with the other organization’s assets. It is hypothesized that, in such a case,
incentives can be improved by concentrating property rights in the hands of a
centralized authority, so that the possibility of hold-up is reduced and incentives are
restored, because any marginal investment specific to assets has to be divided among
fewer parties than in the case of dispersed ownership.
Political organization theory, on the other hand, assumes that organizations strive to
minimize their dependence on other organizations and to maximize the dependence of
other organizations on themselves. Organizations are hypothesized to strive to avoid
being limited in their courses of action. However, most organizations are, to a certain
degree, limited in their possible courses of action in interorganizational relations. This
form of dependence in interorganizational relations is determined by transaction
attributes and unequal balances between organizations with respect to the concentration
of resources and the importance of these resources to the organizations. In addition to
the means identified by economic organization theory, political organization theory
holds that these means also include co-optation, actively influencing governments and
lobbying for, for example, funding, regulation, etc.
In general, the mechanisms of economic organization theory (that is, property rights
theory) and political organization theory resemble each other. The emphasis, however,
is different. Economic organization theory has a tendency to strive towards somewhat
farsighted yet elegant analyses, while political organization theory seems to stress
descriptions of empirical particulars.
6.3.3  Conclusions with respect to the synthesis
The appropriateness of various interorganizational information management approaches
in various circumstances has been addressed in various frameworks. For example,
Merali and McKiernan (1993) propose a number of ideal types of information
management approaches (preservation, symbiosis, holding and absorption) of
interorganizational information systems. They explicitly relate the appropriateness of
these information management approaches to specific contingencies: the need for
strategic dependence and the need for organizational autonomy. The typology by Merali
and McKiernan shows that integration may not be a universal objective to be pursued in
every possible contingency. However, an explanation of the mechanisms leading to the204
Merali and McKiernan typology is hardly available in organization theory and
information management theory.
Holland and Lockett explicitly relate the appropriateness of an interorganizational
information system’s coordination strategy with characteristics of interorganizational
relations; however, the explanatory power of their framework is low. The same
comment pertains to a comparable framework by Klein (1996).
Building upon the theories and existing frameworks already discussed, an explanation
of the appropriateness of various interorganizational information management
approaches was constructed. It is referred to as the Political Economy of Information
Management and it can be considered a synthesis of information management theory,
economic organization theory and political organization theory.
The basic line of reasoning is as follows: information systems can be regarded as
information assets and the decision making with respect to information assets inevitably
has to take bounded rationality into account. Van Alstyne, Brynjolfsson and Madnick
point to “(…) unreliable software metrics, unknown training requirements, disputed
opportunity costs, and spent political capital” (1995, p. 273), which make it plausible to
assume bounded rationality in decision-making processes concerning information
assets. Bounded rationality here implies that not all costs that are incurred by
information assets are fully verifiable, so that costs cannot be compensated directly.
In section 4.4, it was remarked that bounded rationality in the context of decision
making with respect to information assets implies that all organizations involved
underinvest in information assets. However, the level of underinvestment depends on
the ownership structure. Information assets either:
(1)  Are dispersed over organizations, which means that organizations ‘own’ their
information systems and may, at any time, exercise their usus, usus fructus and
abusus property rights. For instance, in this situation, organizations may re-model
data structures, employ different standards, etc. Inversely, organizations may
exclude any other party from the use of its assets (Brynjolfsson, 1994); or
(2)  Are concentrated, which means that ownership resides explicitly with one of the
organizations involved and that other organizations are allowed to use the
information system. However, usus fructus and abusus property rights reside with
the one organization that ‘owns’ the system.
By using economic organization theory and political organization theory, it is possible
to hypothesize which information management approach (either bottom-up or top-
down) provides the participating organizations with the better incentives to mitigate
underinvestment and hence, to promote the viability of the interorganizational
information system, because subtle intangible costs of low effort (which appears as
distorted, missing or unusable data) are avoided.205
These hypotheses are:
-  If none of the information assets initially owned by organizations participating in
an interorganizational information system is indispensable, and none of the
information assets initially owned by organizations participating in an
interorganizational information system is complementary, organizations will
choose not to standardize various conceptual schemes for information assets.
-  If at least one of the information assets initially owned by organizations
participating in an interorganizational information system is indispensable,
organizations will choose to standardize various conceptual schemes for
information assets.
-  If information assets initially owned by organizations participating in an
interorganizational information system are complementary, organizations will
choose to standardize various conceptual schemes for information assets.
Now that the Political Economy of Information Management has been summarized in
terms of hypotheses, a number of remarks can be stated.
In the introduction, comments by Kubicek were mentioned in which he argued for
attention to locus of control over interorganizational information system development
(e.g., information management), and the study initially benefited from Grijpink’s
argument that (in the terminology used in this thesis) interorganizational information
management and interorganizational characteristics have to align.
The Political Economy of Information Management acknowledges these points of view
and, in general, takes a pluralistic view of information management. In doing this,
parallels can be drawn with the contributions to information systems theory by
Gazendam (1993), de Jong (1994) and Breukel (1996). Breukel’s contribution lies in
rigorous differentiation of the IT variable and the identification and validation of ‘fits’
or ‘Gestalts’ between the variables IT, organizational structure and organizational
strategy. Gazendam and de Jong differentiated the information management variable
into a number of information management approaches.
In the current study, relationships were sought between characteristics of
interorganizational information management approaches and characteristics of
interorganizational relations. It should be clear by now that such an approach, in which
pluralism with respect to information systems, or, more specifically, with respect to
decision making regarding information systems, is elaborated, quite explicitly builds on
the work of the before-mentioned authors.
Furthermore, the line of reasoning of the Political Economy of Information
Management explicitly argues against the intuitive notion set out in the traditional
information systems literature that more control over the development of information
systems is better control. In fact, it is argued that, generally, in the presence of bounded
rationality, the effects of ‘ownership’ of information assets on behavior of organizations
in networks of organization is underestimated and that when ownership is taken into206
account, the ‘traditional’ logic is reversed. In fact, in the Political Economy of
Information Management, it is hypothesized that top-down information management
approaches yield ‘alienation’ of stakeholders from information systems, and that
bottom-up information management approaches increase the involvement of members
of participating organizations. It is acknowledged that this brings along disadvantages
(e.g., relatively messy, unordered decision-making processes), but eventually, these
disadvantages do not outweigh the advantage of viable interorganizational networks that
suffer less from underinvestment by the participating organizations than top-down
information management approaches do because bottom-up information management
approaches provide participating organizations with more intense incentives. Only in
specific circumstances are top-down information management approaches able to
optimize incentives for the organizations involved.
This kind of logic has been described by other authors, but in the current study
considerable effort was spent to provide for an adequate theoretical explanation for
mechanisms, which, to date, has been lacking.
With the identification of various interorganizational information management
approaches in terms of control, architecture used and goals adhered to, the notion of
‘architecture’ is especially highlighted. In the ‘traditional’ information systems
literature, the architecture is a more or less fully developed conceptual scheme for an
information system or interorganizational information systems in terms of data
structures and data definitions. Such a view of an architecture is also used in the top-
down interorganizational information management approach identified in this thesis.
However, recent literature in the field of the discipline of information systems proposes
a different connotation of architecture, namely a set of agreements on how various
information systems can communicate, and it is stated in terms of high-level protocols
and message conventions. This connotation is adhered to in the bottom-up
interorganizational information management approach identified in this study.
It is noted here that the purpose of both connotations is the same: the guidance of the
development of interorganizational information systems. However, the content of the
architecture is completely different. Possibly the latter connotation of architecture refers
to the minimally required vertically-oriented information management approach
proposed by Wassenaar (1995).
In the line of reasoning of the Political Economy of Information Management,
appropriateness (‘fit’, ‘Gestalt’) of various interorganizational information management
approaches in various circumstances has been indicated.
6.4  Confrontation of the theory with empirical data
From the case studies that have been described, the degree to which the hypotheses are
supported can be stated and discussed. Furthermore, it is possible to reflect on the
secondary case material discussed in section 2.6 and to state some general conclusions
with respect to the theories discussed.207
Support for hypotheses from case studies
In section 4.5, the first hypothesis was stated as follows:
-  If none of the information assets initially owned by organizations participating in
an interorganizational information system is indispensable, and none of the
information assets initially owned by organizations participating in an
interorganizational information system is complementary, organizations will
choose not to standardize various conceptual schemes for information assets.
In general, this hypothesis receives considerable support from the cases, especially from
the case of PICA, VIPS and MDSM, which were described in section 2.6, and from the
cases of research information systems and information exchange in the social security
sector, which were described in sections 5.2 and 5.4, respectively.
In PICA, it is clear that the participating organizations resisted the uniform centralized
structure vigorously, although eventually the centralized system was adopted. In the
cases of VIPS and MDSM, resistance by the participating organizations yielded the
abandonment of top-down interorganizational information management approaches,
which is, in the absence of the specific conditions of information asset complementarity
and indispensability, consistent with the first hypothesis of the Political Economy of
Information Management.
In the case of research information systems, the initial top-down information
management approach (i.e. aimed at the establishment of the NOD) proposed by
NBOI/NIWI was opposed by the interest association of the participating organizations
(e.g., universities). The universities feared monitoring and possibly cut-back operations,
and proposed a bottom-up information management approach which essentially aimed
for a federation of OZIS and OIS systems, in which ownership was explicitly delegated
to the participating organizations. The acceptance of the OZIS/OIS systems by all the
organizations involved yields considerable support for the first hypothesis.
In the case of social security, the initial top-down information management approach, in
which temporary central databases were set up by the Ministry of Social Affairs and
Labor in order to detect fraud, was abandoned because the quality of the information
submitted to these databases was poor and resulted in many false-positive cases of
fraud. Obviously, here, the centralized system suffered from lack of incentives for the
participating organizations and hence, underinvestment. The emergence and adoption of
the bottom-up RINIS initiative is quite consistent with the explanation offered by the
Political Economy of Information Management and, therefore, the first hypothesis gains
substantial support from the case of information exchange in the social security sector.
Furthermore, these findings are  broadly consistent with German empirical research
(Killian & Wind, 1998): “In the face of the possibilities of ICT, hierarchical directions
from the top down within vertical, pyramid ‘shaped’ relations between organizations are
often the second best and indeed, occasionally the worst solutions” (Killian & Wind,
1998, p. 274).208
The second hypothesis was stated as follows:
-  If at least one of the information assets initially owned by organizations
participating in an interorganizational information system is indispensable,
organizations will choose to standardize various conceptual schemes for
information assets.
From the secondary case material, no conclusion on support could be drawn as no
information on indispensability of information assets was provided by the authors of
these cases. However, this hypothesis receives moderate support from the second case,
that of organizations exchanging information in the field of Dutch Fiscal Policy. In this
case, the Tax and Customs Administration was, being a monopolist in the sense that it is
the only source for complete and accurate information on incomes of citizens in the
Netherlands, indispensable for the Income Information System. Moreover, in the
decision-making process, a bottom-up information management approach was
considered but rejected.
However, from the Social Security case, there was no support at all. Through the
recognition of authentic sources, at least some indispensability was created with respect
to the activity of fighting fraud, but this did not lead to the adoption of a top-down
information management approach.
In general, the second hypothesis receives moderate support.
The third hypothesis is stated as follows:
-  If information assets initially owned by organizations participating in an
interorganizational information system are complementary, organizations will
choose to standardize various conceptual schemes for information assets.
Surprisingly, not many examples of complementarity of information assets were found
in the cases. There is a weak form of complementarity in the field of social security
because, from the point of view of fighting fraud, with the introduction of ‘authentic
sources’ in the social security network, complementary assets were created. However,
this did not result in the abolition of the RINIS initiative. Therefore, this hypothesis is
not supported.
General comments and conclusions
The general conclusions refer to the following matters.
Firstly, especially in the case studies of higher education (section 5.2) and social
security (section 5.4), information is an object of struggle, and ownership of information
assets plays a very important role in decision making with respect to the goals,
development, prioritization and use of interorganizational information systems. The
hypothesized value of political organization theories and economic organization
theories applied to information management assume prominence.209
Secondly, it must be noted that in our theoretical explanation, we distinguished top-
down information management approaches from bottom-up information management
approaches by pointing at the standardization of various conceptual schemes. However,
especially in the case of higher education, it should be clear that the distinction between
top-down and bottom-up information management approaches does not so much rest on
the distinction between standardized and non-standardized conceptual schemes, as on
the question of who owns the residual property rights with respect to information
systems. Bottom-up information management does not exclude the possibility of
standardization, but rather assumes that participating organizations are ultimately given
the right to exert the abusus property right, which entitles them to adjust the
standardized conceptual model to their own needs.
Concluding, the retreat from top-down interorganizational information management
approaches in general is supported, even in cases where hypotheses from the Political
Economy of Information Management predict that in fact a top-down information
management approach suffices.
The interpretation of this lack of support for hypotheses two and three can take place
according to a number of lines of reasoning.
-  Firstly, it is possible that due to the choice of a limited number of specific cases of
interorganizational information exchange, we were simply confronted with very
idiosyncratic interorganizational information management approaches and that
further research addressing other cases will support the second and third hypothesis
fully.
-  Secondly,  it is possible that organizations always value non-accountability very
highly and that a ‘quest for non-accountability’ (see section 1.1.2) dominates
considerations of efficiency (which, although very broadly defined, are an
important driving force in the Political Economy of Information Management).
This would necessitate a stronger position of political organization theory in the
hypotheses of the Political Economy of Information Management.
-  Thirdly, all our cases have described networks in which very large, multidivisional
organizations exchange information. These networks of network-like organizations
pose problems for the analysis of information exchange, because there are various
levels of analysis to which the theory has to be applied, which renders an
explanation difficult.
-  Fourthly, there is the explanation that due to specific characteristics of information
assets (e.g., its capacity for multiplication at virtually no costs, see Van Alstyne,
Brynjolfsson & Madnick, 1995), organizations over time are able to avoid
complementarities and indispensabilities in exchanges of information. Bakos and
Nault (1998) provide an initial explanation for the way in which, over time, airline
reservation systems evolved from single-vendor-owned centralized
interorganizational information systems to dispersed interorganizational
information systems because the initiators lost their unique expertise to operate the
interorganizational information system and hence, they became less indispensable.210
This is still, however, in terms of the Bacharach criteria discussed in section 4.2, a
very weak explanation, whose development is possibly hampered by the lack of a
clear definition of ‘information asset’. This point will be elaborated upon in the
next section.
6.5  Epilogue: the political economy of information
management
6.5.1  Theoretical implications
Throughout this study, the ‘classical’ literature on information management has been
confronted and enriched with insights from economic organization theory and political
organization theory, among other things inspired by comments by Kubicek (1995),
Grandori (1997) and Knights & Murray (1992).
In general, the ‘classical’ literature on information management starts with the argument
that a common data model (or architecture) can always be conveniently used to drive
the process of interorganizational information management, emphasizing integration of
various conceptual schemes across organizational boundaries. However, such an
approach leans heavily on the assumption that data modeling is a neutral activity. The
literature has argued that, in the absence of this latter assumption, integration is not
always desirable and hence strategic decision making regarding interorganizational
information systems ‘needs to find the right balance between the value of global data
integration versus local flexibility’.
The combination of insights from information systems theory with economic
organization theory and political organization theory results in the Political Economy of
Information Management, which has been developed throughout the chapters 4 and 0.
This theory attempts to provide an explanation of behavior with respect to information
systems as informational resources or information assets, in which behavioral aspects of
ownership are highlighted.
Previously, some (until date, unresolved) controversies in the field of information
systems were described, and reference was made to the lack of differentiation with
respect to  technology, and in general, an alleged lack of theoretical underpinning.
Having outlined the Political Economy of Information Management as a theory
explaining appropriateness of various information management approaches, it might be
interesting to reflect on the controversies mentioned previously in this thesis. By doing
so, contours of future research based on the Political Economy of Information
Management can be sketched.
Controversy 1: the relationship between IT and centralization
In section 1.2.1 the controversy over the relationship between IT and centralization was
depicted. The controversy is summarized in Figure 2 (see this volume, page 10).211
Central to the debate is the fact that various explanations exist: (1) the ‘surveillance’,
‘control’ or ‘pseudo decentralization’ explanation, (2) the ‘empowerment’ explanation,
(3) the ‘reinforcement’ explanation and (4) the social choice explanation.
Using the Political Economy of Information Management does not use properties of the
technology itself to explain effects on organizational parameters. Rather, it focuses on
behavioral aspects of ‘ownership’ of information technology when it is, for reasons of
bounded rationality, impossible to anticipate all kinds of circumstances by means of
agreements.
So, application of information technology in a divisional setting, where the corporate
level, represented by top management, is the ‘owner’ of the information technology
involved, allows top management (by definition) access to residual property rights with
respect to the information technology. These residual usus, usus fructus and abusus
property rights (in the terminology of economic organization theory) enable top
management to set up an apparatus for control and monitoring purposes (in the
terminology of political organization theory), and fosters a trend towards centralization
with residual property rights in the hands of top management.
A completely different situation occurs when the same technology is applied but where
‘ownership’ of the information technology is dispersed over various divisions. By
definition, divisional managers are allowed to exert residual property rights with respect
to information technology, and hence to the potential of adapting (e.g., residual abusus),
for example, existing data models to specific, local needs (when explicit agreements do
not exclude that possibility) in order to create new business opportunities by exploiting
information technology (i.e. residual usus fructus). In this way, a dispersed ownership
with respect to information technology fosters a trend towards decentralization with
residual property rights in the hands of divisional managers.
This application (or mind experiment) of the Political Economy of Information
Management shows that it is possible to reconcile various effects of information
technology on the organizational parameter of centralization, based on the underlying
question of which stakeholder group
227 (see section 2.4.2) is allowed to exert residual
property rights.
So, concluding, for the question of what effects information technology yields with
respect to organizational parameters, residual property rights are decisive (which at least
excludes the very rigorous ‘IT leads to centralization’ and ‘IT leads to decentralization’
explanations). Residual property rights by themselves, however, are not randomly
distributed, according to economic organization theory and political organization
theory, thereby disfavoring social choice explanations. An explanation in which existing
                                                          
227 Based on the comment in section 2.5, it is possible to note that even in a divisional
setting, control of information assets ultimately rests with top management and that
divisional managers’ property rights can always be retracted. However, in many
situations, for example in highly professional organizations like hospitals, this is not a
viable option.212
organizational configurations (in terms of organizational parameters) are reinforced
through exertion of residual informational property rights assumes prominence.
Controversy 2: the relation between ICT and interorganizational
coordination
A second controversy in the field of information systems was discussed in section 1.2.2.
This controversy is summarized in Figure 3 (see this volume, page 13).
Originally, the debate was inspired by the observation that information and
telecommunication technology lowers costs associated with learning and haggling over
the terms of the trade, thus eliminating the need, in many cases, to organize transactions
within hierarchies.
The Political Economy of Information Management, however, assumes that application
of information technology by itself does not automatically decrease transaction costs.
The application of a top-down interorganizational information management approach
may yield distorted, missing or unusable data (and hence result in subtle costs of low
effort), and bottom-up information management approaches may result in costs
associated with mapping various conceptual schemes.
However, in the debate addressed in Figure 3, no attention is given to the important
variables of complementarity and indispensability, nor to matters of incentive intensity.
At this moment in the development phase of the Political Economy of Information
Management, it is impossible to explain how specific interorganizational information
management approaches eventually affect interorganizational relations. However, it is
our expectation that attention to the constructs and variables that are used in the Political
Economy of Information Management eventually will increase the explanatory power of
a more robust and possibly more complex description of the relationship between ICT
and interorganizational coordination.
6.5.2  Further research
Fundamental
It has already been indicated that this research has emphasized theory construction. To
some extent, the Political Economy of Information Management adds explanatory
power to existing discussions of the relationship between IT and organizational
variables, but, obviously, a lot of work must still be done.
Firstly, it was noticed in section 3.2 that the concepts of autonomy, dependence and
coordination are in need of further exploration and more precise operationalizations. In
this thesis, some progress has been made by explicitly stating what the position of these
concepts in economic organization theory and political organization theory is, but
rigorous operationalizations are lacking.
Moreover, we have addressed Kubicek’s comment that many studies can be accused of
not examining the IT phenomenon in an in-depth way, for example by not213
differentiating among different types of technology or by not considering other relevant
contextual factors (Kubicek, 1995).
In the formalization of the property rights application to information management, the
concept of ‘information asset’ was introduced. Acknowledging Kubicek’s comment
(which we do in our study) almost inevitably necessitates a more elaborate study and
definition of the concept of ‘information asset’.
Secondly, all case studies in this study took place in semi- or quasi-public sectors. It
might be interesting to replicate the case studies in private sectors. A promising
perspective is provided by all kinds of activities that are performed under the heading of
‘e-commerce’ or ‘e-business’ (Homburg, Janssen & Wolters, 1998). It might be
interesting to analyze how exchange of information in e-commerce activities takes place
and how various ownership structures affect the viability of e-commerce activities.
Thirdly, in chapter four, an initial formalization of property rights theory applied to
information management was presented. This formalization can be elaborated in various
ways:
·  by the explicit inclusion of elements of political organization theory,
·  by a more elegant formalization of the concepts of ‘indispensability’ and
‘complementarity’, and
·  by including budget restrictions and wealth considerations.
Fourthly, we would like to state that, eventually, the only test for any theory is the
empirical test. In this study, only the working of the theory has been illustrated by
means of case studies. However, once more advanced operationalizations of the
variables used have been developed, and once relations have been explored using
formalization of the Political Economy of Information Management, then hopefully the
Political Economy of Information Management can be tested in quantitative empirical
study.
Applied
However, this study also opens doors for applied research.
Firstly, in this thesis, different information management approaches were identified,
characterized by, among other things, different architectures used. With respect to top-
down information management approaches, methods are available for strategy
formation and architecture specification. In section 6.3, it was concluded that
architecture specification in top-down information management is different from the
specification of architectures to be used in bottom-up information management
(Gazendam, 1997). At this moment, information engineering methods can be used to aid
in the development of ‘top-down’ architectures, but bottom-up information management
approaches lack such methodical support for developing architectures. Heesen,
Homburg and Offereins (1995, 1997) propose architecture specification based on
agreements as to how to communicate, but these proposals need to be elaborated
further.214
Secondly, in networks of organizations that exchange information, a bottom-up
interorganizational information management approach is adopted in many cases. Such
an approach necessitates the design, maintenance and evaluation of agreements on how
information is exchanged. These activities are described as the organizational interface
between organizations. Sometimes a separate organizational interface unit executes
these activities.  However, in general there is a lack of knowledge of how these
interfaces should look and how they should be implemented in the organizations that are
participating in a network of organizations. Here, applied research is in order to provide
guidelines for the development and implementation of these organizational interfaces.215
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Samenvatting
Het onderzoek waarover in dit proefschrift wordt gerapporteerd heeft betrekking op
verschillende vormen van besluitvorming ten aanzien van informatiesystemen die door
meerdere organisaties worden ontwikkeld en gebruikt.
In hoofdstuk één worden aanleiding en motivatie van het onderzoek weergegeven en
wordt het onderzoeksontwerp geschetst.
De aanleiding en motivatie van het onderzoek komt voort uit een tweetal debatten zoals
die al jaren worden gevoerd in de discipline van de bestuurlijke informatiekunde (in het
Engels: information systems, of ook wel management information systems).
Het eerste debat heeft betrekking op de samenhang tussen informatietechnologie (IT) en
organisationele parameters als centralisatie binnen organisaties. Verschillende auteurs
zijn in de loop van de jaren met verschillende, vaak volledig tegenstrijdige verklaringen
gekomen.
Het tweede debat heeft betrekking op de samenhang tussen informatie- en
telecommunicatietechnologie (ICT) en coördinatievormen tussen organisaties. Ook in
dit debat worden verschillende verklaringen voorgesteld.
Aangezien er in verschillende onderzoeken steun wordt gevonden voor strijdige
hypothesen, kan worden geconcludeerd dat de theorie achter de verklaringen niet
voldoende ontwikkeld is. De motivatie voor het huidige onderzoek is om dieper in te
gaan op het tweede debat en theorie te construeren die de relatie tussen ICT en
interorganisationele relaties precisieert.
Het onderzoek naar de relatie tussen ICT en interorganisationele coördinatie wordt wel
bekritiseerd omdat vaak relatief eenvoudige causaliteit wordt verondersteld, terwijl het
ook mogelijk is meer geavanceerde verklaringen te construeren (uitgaande van het
zogenaamde ‘emergent perspective’, waarin de samenhang tussen verschillende vormen
van ICT en verschillende vormen van interorgansationele coordinatie worden
geanalyseerd maar waarin geen uitspraak wordt gedaan over de richting van de
causaliteit). Bovendien wordt vaak weinig aandacht gegeven aan de besluitvorming ten
aanzien van ICT (in termen van ‘locus of  control’) en als dat wel gebeurt, wordt vaak
slechts een bepaalde wijze van besluitvorming verondersteld, namelijk een
gecentraliseerde, geformaliseerde vorm van besluitvorming.240
In het huidige onderzoek wordt daarom ook niet de variabele ‘informatie- en
communicatietechnologie’ bestudeerd, maar de variabele ‘strategische besluitvorming
ten aanzien van interorganisationele informatiesystemen’. Deze variabele wordt in het
onderzoek ook wel aangeduid als ‘informatiemanagement van interorganisationele
informatiesystemen’, of ‘interorgansationeel informatiemanagement’. Op deze wijze is
het mogelijk om niet zozeer de technologie zelf, maar de sturing en het gebruik van de
technologie in een interorganisationele setting te analyseren. De doelstelling van het
onderzoek is om meer inzicht te verkrijgen in combinaties van verschillende
benaderingen in interorganisationeel informatiemanagement en verschillende vormen
van interorganisationele relaties.
De onderzoeksvragen die zijn afgeleid uit deze doelstelling luiden als volgt:
1.  Welke informatiemanagementbenaderingen met betrekking tot interorganisationele
informatiesystemen kunnen worden gedefinieerd?
2.  Welke coördinatievormen tussen organisaties kunnen worden onderscheiden?
3.  Welke hypothesen ten aanzien van informatiemanagementbenaderingen en
kenmerken van interorganisationele relaties kunnen worden geconstrueerd?
4.  Is er empirische validatie voor de hypothesen waarin
informatiemanagementbenaderingen en kenmerken van interorganisationele relaties
worden gerelateerd?
Het doel van het onderzoek is om te komen tot theorieconstructie en is daarom meer
fundamenteel dan toepassingsgericht. Dit gebeurt door:
·  bestaande theoriefragmenten te analyseren en waar mogelijk tot een synthese te
komen
·  gedurende het proces van theorieconstructie verklaringen te confronteren met de
empirie.
Aangezien er op voorhand geen bestaande theorie beschikbaar is, en de mogelijkheden
tot manipulatie in de praktijk ontbraken, is er met betrekking tot de confrontatie van de
theorie met de empirie de keuze gemaakt voor de ‘case study’ als onderzoeksstrategie.
Deze strategie biedt bovendien veel mogelijkheden om theorieconstructie te
ondersteunen en is erg geschikt voor het onderzoeken van situaties waarin snel
veranderende technologieën een grote rol spelen.
In  hoofdstuk twee worden de variabelen ‘interorganisationeel informatiesysteem’ en
‘interorganisationeel informatie management’ gedefinieerd om een antwoord op de
eerste onderzoeksvraag te kunnen geven. Een interorganisationeel informatiesysteem
wordt gedefinieerd als een informatiesysteem dat (1) is ingebed in twee of meer
organisaties die geen gemeenschappelijke leidinggevenden hebben en (2) gezamenlijk
wordt ontwikkeld en gebruikt door de betrokken organisaties. ‘Interorganisationeel
informatiemanagement’ is de (strategische) besluitvorming met betrekking tot de241
doelstellingen, prioritisering, ontwikkeling en gebruik van informatiesystemen die zijn
ingebed in twee of meer organisaties die geen gezamenlijke leidinggevenden hebben.
Zowel vanuit de organisatietheorie (met betrekking tot ‘strategische besluitvorming’)
als uit de informatiesysteem-literatuur (met betrekking tot ‘informatiesystemen’) is het
mogelijk informatiemanagement te analyseren. De organisatietheorie, of, meer
specifiek, de literatuur over strategievorming, geeft aan dat er verschillende ‘scholen’
van strategievorming bestaan, zoals de ‘design school’, ‘planning school’, ‘positioning
school’, ‘entrepreneurial school’, ‘cognitive school’, ‘learning school’, ‘political
school’, ‘cultural school’, ‘environmental school’, en de ‘configuration school’. In de
informatiesysteem-literatuur worden ook verschillende scholen onderkend, zoals de
‘engineering school’, ‘strategic school’, ‘adaptive evolutionary school’, ‘organizational
school’, ‘sociotechnical school’ en de ‘organizational school’.
Deze twee soorten ‘scholen’ blijken echter niet onafhankelijk van elkaar te zijn. Op
basis van de achterliggende variabelen ‘besturingsmodel’, ‘functionaliteit en
doelstellingen’ en ‘architectuur’ blijkt het mogelijk een spectrum te onderscheiden met
als polen ‘top-down’ informatiemanagement en ‘bottom-up’ informatiemanagement.
‘Top down’ informatiemanagement heeft betrekking op besluitvorming ten aanzien van
doelstellingen, prioritisering, ontwikkeling en gebruik van informatiesystemen tussen
organisaties waarbij de autoriteit over het informatiesysteem is geconcentreerd en er een
nadruk is op standaardisatie van gegevensdefinities en -structuren door het gebruik van
een overkoepelend conceptueel kader.
‘Bottom-up’ informatiemanagement heeft betrekking op besluitvorming ten aanzien van
doelstellingen, prioritisering, ontwikkeling en gebruik van informatiesystemen tussen
organisaties waarbij de autoriteit over het informatiesysteem is verspreid en waarin het
behoud van verschillende conceptuele kaders voor verschillende
gegevensverzamelingen wordt benadrukt.
Overigens moet opgemerkt worden dat de beide benaderingen ‘uitersten’ vormen op een
spectrum. De literatuur geeft indicaties in welke omstandigheden welke vorm van
informatiemanagement wordt geprefereerd, maar een verklaring voor deze voorkeur
ontbreekt. Geconcludeerd kan worden dat de literatuur een variëteit aan
informatiemanagementbenaderingen weergeeft en dat de voorkeur in de literatuur voor
een gecentraliseerde, geformaliseerde benadering (‘top-down’ informatiemanagement)
geen duidelijke theoretische onderbouwing kent.
In  hoofdstuk drie worden interorganisationele relaties en interorganisationele
coördinatie behandeld om de tweede onderzoeksvraag te beantwoorden.
Een interorganisationele relatie wordt gedefineerd als een terugkerende transactie van
hulpbronnen tussen twee of meer organisaties. In de literatuur worden
interorganisationele relaties vaak beschreven met de begrippen autonomie,
afhankelijkheid en coördinatie.242
Een theorie die specifiek ingaat op interorganisationele relaties is de economische
organisatietheorie, die bestaat uit de agentschapstheorie (‘agency theory’),
transactiekostentheorie (‘transaction cost economics’) en economische theorie van de
eigendomsrechten (‘property rights theory’).
In economische organisatietheorie wordt onder autonomie verstaan: die toestand waarin
onbeperkt eigendomsrechten met betrekking tot activa (‘assets’) kunnen worden
uitgeoefend, hetgeen krachtige prikkels (‘incentives’) met zich mee brengt.
Afhankelijkheid is een toestand waarin activa alleen in combinatie met andere activa
productief kunnen worden gemaakt en coördinatie is dát mechanisme dat de prikkels
voor betrokkenen optimaliseert.
De verklaring voor het vóórkomen van verschillende coördinatievormen is dat steeds
dát coördinatiemechanisme wordt gekozen dat de prikkels van participanten (en
daarmee de overall efficiëntie) optimaliseert.
Een andere theorie die ingaat op de problematiek van ‘managing interdependence’ is de
politieke organisatietheorie (ook wel theorie van de afhankelijkheid van hulpbronnen of
‘resource dependence theory’).
Deze theorie gaat ervanuit dat organisaties politieke entiteiten zijn (d.w.z. bestaan uit
coalities van soms samenwerkende, soms conflicterende groepen). Organisaties kunnen
samenwerken en een gedeelte van hun autonomie opgeven om afhankelijkheid of
beheersing door een derde organisatie te voorkómen of te bestrijden. In het algemeen
wordt verondersteld dat elke organisatie streeft naar het minimaliseren van de
afhankelijkheid ten opzicht van andere organisaties en het maximaliseren van de
afhankelijkheid van andere organisaties op zichzelf. In politieke organisatietheorie
wordt autonomie gedefinieerd als ‘self-containment’ of capaciteit om zelfvoorzienend te
zijn. Afhankelijkheid is de situatie waarin een andere organisatie noodzakelijke
hulpbronnen beheerst en daardoor invloed heeft op het gedrag van de oorspronkelijke
organisatie. Coördinatie refereert aan een inperking van de bewegingsvrijheid van
organisaties.
De verklaring voor het vóórkomen van verschillende coördinatievormen is dat
organisaties onzekerheid vanuit de omgeving reduceren door het minimaliseren van
afhankelijkheid op andere organisaties en het maximaliseren van de afhankelijkheid van
andere organisaties op zichzelf.
Een nadere beschouwing leert dat de redeneringen achter de economische
organisatietheorie en de politieke organisatietheorie veel gelijkenis vertonen. In het
algemeen heeft coördinatie, in beide theorieën, te maken met eigendom van activa (of
hulpbronnen). Een (extreme) coördinatievorm is de situatie waarin activa zijn verspreid
over een aantal eigenaren (‘owners’), waarbij iedere eigenaar bij definitie gerechtigd is
eigendomsrechten uit te oefenen met betrekking tot deze activa of hulpbronnen, hetgeen
krachtige prikkels met zich meebrengt, waarbij overigens wel geldt dat afspraken over
uitwisselingen tussen organisaties soms moeizaam tot stand komen.243
Een andere coördinatievorm is de situatie waarin alle activa (of hulpbronnen) in handen
zijn van één eigenaar. Dit heeft als voordeel dat afspraken over uitwisselingen veel
gemakkelijker tot stand komen. Als nadeel geldt dat er minder sterke prikkels voor de
betrokkenen zijn.
In  hoofdstuk vier wordt getracht tot een synthese te komen van de theorie van
informatiemanagement en de theorie van interorganisationele coördinatie. Deze
synthese wordt aangeduid als de ‘politieke economie van informatiemanagement’
(‘Political Economy of Information Management’). De synthese refereert aan de
uitwisseling van informatie tussen organisaties waarbij economische en politieke
aspecten een rol spelen.
Op basis van de analyse de theoriefragmenten over informatiemanagement,
economische organisatietheorie en politieke organisatietheorie wordt een verklaring
voor het vóórkomen van verschillende informatiemanagementbenaderingen in
verschillende typen interorganisationele relaties voorgesteld. Een balangrijk element in
deze theorie is het beschouwen van interorganisationele informatiesystemen als een
‘portfolio of information assets’.
De ‘politieke economie van informatiemanagement’ is weergegeven in de vorm van een
aantal assumpties, een propositie en een aantal hypothesen. De redenering achter de
synthese wordt onderbouwd met een formalisatie op basis van de Grossman-Hart-
Moore benadering van de economische theorie van de eigendomsrechten.
De ‘politieke economie van informatiemanagement’ bouwt voort op vier assumpties:
1.  de assumptie van beperkte rationaliteit;
2.  de assumptie dat het gedrag van organisaties niet geheel door de organisatie wordt
gedetermineerd; met andere woorden, er wordt gesteld dat organisaties in ieder
geval enige bewegingsvrijheid hebben;
3.  de assumptie dat de theorie betrekking heeft op organisaties die informatie
uitwisselen of gaan uitwisselen met behulp van informatie- en
communicatietechnologie
4.  de assumptie dat de theorie vooralsnog alleen een verklaring kan bieden voor
uitwisselingen in netwerken van publieke of quasi-publieke organisaties.
De basispropositie is dat de mate van afhankelijkheid tussen ‘information assets’ de
voorkeur voor een bepaalde interorganisationele informatiemanagementbenadering
bepaalt. Deze afhankelijkheid komt voort uit complementariteit van ‘information assets’
(uit de economische theorie van de eigendomsrechten) en/of op onmisbaarheid van
organisaties (uit de economische theorie van de economische eigendomsrechten en de
politieke organisatietheorie).
De volgende hypothesen kunnen worden afgeleid:244
HPEIM,1:   Als geen enkel ‘information asset’ dat onderdeel is van een
interorganisationeel informatiesysteem, onmisbaar is, en ‘information asset’ niet
complementair zijn, zullen organisaties niet kiezen voor het standaardiseren van
conceptuele kaders (door het invoeren van een gemeenschappelijke architectuur en het
afdwingen ervan door een gecentraliseerd besturingsmodel).
HPEIM,2:   Als minimaal één ‘information asset’ van een organisatie die deelneemt aan
een interorganisationeel informatiesysteem, onmisbaar is, zullen organisaties kiezen
voor het standaardiseren van conceptuele kaders (door het invoeren van een
gemeenschappelijke architectuur en het afdwingen ervan door een gecentraliseerd
besturingsmodel).
HPEIM,3:   Als ‘information assets’ die aanvankelijk eigendom zijn van organisaties die
deel participeren in een interorganisationeel informatiesysteem, complementair zijn,
zullen organisaties kiezen voor het standaardiseren van conceptuele kaders (door het
invoeren van een gemeenschappelijke architectuur en het afdwingen ervan door een
gecentraliseerd besturingsmodel).
Met de ‘politieke economie van informatiemanagement’ wordt een verklaring
voorgesteld voor het vóórkomen van verschillende
informatiemanagementbenaderingen, waarbij nadrukkelijk is gestreefd naar het
voortbouwen op bestaande theoriefragmenten. Bovendien is getracht om zowel de
falsifieerbaarheid (‘falsifiability’) als de verklaringswaarde (‘explanatory power’) van
die fragmenten te vergroten.
In hoofdstuk vijf worden de propositie en de afgeleide hypothesen geconfronteerd met
drie beschrijvingen (‘case studies’) van besluitvormingsprocessen die betrekking
hadden of hebben op het ontwikkelen en gebruik van interorganisationele
informatiesystemen.
De eerste case study heeft betrekking op besluitvorming in het Nederlandse veld van
Hoger Onderwijs en Onderzoek. In dit veld is een aantal organisaties actief. Er is het
Ministerie van Onderwijs, Cultuur en Wetenschappen, de universiteiten, de
belangenbehartiger van de universiteiten, de Vereniging van Samenwerkende
Nederlandse Universiteiten (VSNU), onderzoeksinstellingen, en de Koninklijke
Nederlandse Academie van Wetenschappen (KNAW).
Centraal in deze deelstudie staat een centrale databank met onderzoeksgegevens, de
Nederlandse Onderzoeks Databank (NOD), die wordt beheerd door de KNAW.
De universiteiten krijgen in de loop van de jaren steeds meer beleidsvrijheid. Gedurende
dit verzelfstandigingsproces groeit het protest tegen de NOD. De universiteiten
protesteren tegen het feit dat ze moeten betalen voor het gebruik van ‘hun’ gegevens, en
vrezen dat het Ministerie op basis van de NOD de recent verworven zelfstandigheid
weer kan inperken. De vullingsgraad van de NOD blijft achter bij de verwachtingen.
De universiteiten lanceren daarop, via de VSNU, een alternatief interorganisationeel
informatiesysteem: het CombiFormat (of ‘CombiSearch’) initiatief, een systeem waarbij245
onderzoeksdata decentraal wordt opgeslagen (in zogenaamde OIS of OZIS systemen),
en het eigenaarschap van de informatie nadrukkelijk aan de universiteiten zèlf wordt
toegekend. Gemeenschappelijke afspraken betreffen een initieel datamodel, waarvoor
nadrukkelijk wordt gesteld dat het mag worden aangepast aan ‘lokale behoeften’, en een
set communicatieafspraken.
Het CombiFormat / CombiSearch alternatief wordt thans ondersteund door alle
participanten. De KNAW erkent dat de NOD in de toekomst een geheel andere rol zal
gaan spelen, waarbij de nadruk ligt op het beschikbaar stellen van decentraal opgeslagen
onderzoeksinformatie aan buitenlandse onderzoeksinstellingen.
De tweede case study heeft betrekking op een uitwisseling tussen het Ministerie van
Financiën en het Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek. Het Ministerie van Financiën, of,
meer specifiek, de Belastingdienst, heeft als enige organisatie in Nederland de
beschikking over een bestand met accurate gegevens van inkomens van ingezetenen in
Nederland. Het CBS stelt statistieken op voor de personele inkomensverdeling van
Nederland.
Al jaren wisselen Belastingdienst en CBS gegevens uit. Sinds 1995 worden de
statistieken opgesteld met behulp van het zogenaamde Inkomens Informatie Systeem
(IIS). Het CBS kan op deze wijze gebruik maken van accurate inkomensgegevens uit
het IBS systeem van de Belastingdienst, en het Ministerie van Financiën krijgt
informatie over de personele inkomensverdeling terug die het kan gebruiken voor de ex-
ante of ex-post evaluatie van fiscaal beleid.
Het IIS kent een relatief gecentraliseerde opzet. In het besluitvormingsproces zijn
nadrukkelijk bottom-up varianten geanalyseerd, maar er is gekozen voor een top-down
informatiemanagementbenadering omdat een dergelijke werkwijze minder gevoelig zou
zijn voor een wijziging in de prioriteiten bij één van beide partijen.
De derde case study heeft betrekking op het systeem van uitvoering van sociale
zekerheidswetgeving in Nederland. Hierbij is een groot aantal partijen betrokken: het
Ministerie van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid als opdrachtgever, verschillende
uitvoeringsinstellingen, gemeentelijke sociale diensten, de Sociale Verzekeringsbank,
ziekenfondsen, et cetera.
Tot ongeveer begin jaren tachtig is de uitvoering van werknemersverzekeringen in
handen van bedrijfsverenigingen, bestuurd door werkgevers en werknemers. Als het
thema van de fraudebestrijding op de politieke agenda komt, stuiten pogingen van het
Ministerie om te komen tot bestandsvergelijking op weerstand. Bovendien leveren de
bestandsvergelijkingen die worden uitgevoerd, veel fout-positieve meldingen op; de
bestanden die worden gebruikt voor de vergelijking, blijken niet accuraat te zijn.
In de jaren negentig worden de uitvoeringsinstellingen langzamerhand geprivatiseerd.
Verschillende uitvoeringsorganisaties nemen dan het initiatief tot een bottom-up
interorganisationeel informatiesysteem in de vorm van de RINIS infrastructuur. Dit
initiatief benadrukt de ‘informationele autonomie’ van de betrokken partijen, stelt246
communicatieafspraken tussen sectoren voor en wijst nadrukkelijk integratie als
doelstelling af.
Het RINIS initiatief wordt thans breed geaccepteerd.
In  hoofdstuk 6 worden conclusies van dit onderzoek samengevat en wordt
vervolgonderzoek voorgesteld.
Met gebruikmaking van economische organisatietheorie en politieke organisatietheorie,
en met het beschouwen van interorganisationele informatiesystemen als ‘portfolios of
information assets’ kon een synthese tot stand worden gebracht tussen theorieën met
betrekking tot informatiemanagement en theorieën over interorganisationele relaties.
Met gebruikmaking van economische organisatietheorie en politieke organisatietheorie
kon inhoud worden gegeven aan het aspect van ‘locus of control’ in de besluitvorming
over interorganisationele informatiesystemen en konden ‘fits’ of ‘Gestalts’ worden
geïdentificeerd tussen kenmerken van interorganisationele relaties (in termen van
onmisbaarheid, complementariteit) en informatiemanagementbenaderingen (in termen
van top-down, bottom-up benaderingen).
Na analyse van de case studies is het mogelijk uitspraken te doen in welke mate de
theorie wordt ondersteund door de empirische data. De eerste hypothese wordt
bevestigd door case study één (Hoger Onderwijs en Onderzoek) en door case drie
(Sociale Zekerheid). De tweede hypothese werd gesteund door de observaties in case
twee (Fiscaal Beleid). De derde hypothese kon niet worden bevestigd. Er is een geringe
mate van complementariteit in case drie (Sociale Zekerheid), maar de organisaties
bleken hier geen top-down informatiemanagement toe te passen.
In het algemeen blijken de belangrijke elementen van de politieke economie van
informatiemanagement (politieke en economische aspecten, specifiek eigenaarschap van
‘information assets’) een belangrijke en aanwijsbare rol te spelen in de besluitvorming
over interorganisationele informatiesystemen.
Toekomstig onderzoek in het verlengde van de politieke economie van
informatiemanagement zou zich kunnen richten op fundamentele en toegepaste
aandachtspunten.
Fundamentele aandachtspunten zijn:
·  verdere precisiering en operationalisering van de begrippen ‘autonomie’,
‘afhankelijkheid’ en ‘coordinatie’ in de context van interorganisationeel
informatiemanagement;
·  verdere precisiering en operationalisering van het begrip ‘information asset’
·  het toepassen van de inzichten van de politieke economie van
informatiemanagement in het opkomende gebied van de ‘e-commerce’ of ‘e-
business’;
·  uitbreiding van de formalisatie van interorganisationeel informatiemanagement; en
·  het testen van de hypothesen van de politieke economie van informatiemanagement
in een grootschalige, kwantitatieve studie.247
Toegepaste aandachtspunten zijn:
·  verdere ontwikkeling van bottom-up architecturen als stelsels van afspraken over
informatieuitwisseling en communicatie; en
·  het geven van ondersteuning aan het ontwikkelen, onderhoud en evalueren van
stelsels van afspraken over het uitwisselen van informatie en het inbedden van deze
activiteiten in organisaties (de zogenaamde interface-functie).248STELLINGEN
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26 APRIL 19991.  De complexe relatie tussen interorganisationele coördinatiemechanismen en
informatie- en communicatietechnologie kan worden verklaard uit de pluriformiteit
van het informatiemanagement van de samenwerkende organisaties.
Dit proefschrift, hoofdstukken 2, 3 en 4.
2.  De stelling, dat toepassing van informatie- en communicatietechnologie leidt tot
vervanging van hiërarchische coördinatie door het marktmechanisme is onjuist.
Dit proefschrift, hoofdstukken 1 en 6.
Voor:
Holland, C.P., G. Lockett. (1994). Strategic Choice and Interorganizational
Information Systems. Proceedings of the Twenty-Seventh Annual Hawaii
International Conference on Information Systems. pp. 1628-1644.
Tegen:
Malone, T.W., J. Yates, R.I. Benjamin. (1987). Electronic Markets and Electronic
Hierarchies. Communications of the ACM. pp. 430-440.
Brynjolfsson, E., T.W. Malone, V. Gurbaxani, A. Kambil. (1993). Does
Information Technology Lead to Smaller Firms? Management Science. pp. 1628-
1644.
3.  Politieke organisatietheorie wordt in de organisatiekunde ten onrechte
afgeschilderd als een subversieve theorie.
Dit proefschrift, hoofdstuk 3.
Tegen:
Donaldson, L. (1995). American Anti-Management Theories of Organization.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
4.  De ‘Political Economy of Information Management’ toont aan dat de klassieke
organisatietheorie van Mintzberg en Williamson van betekenis is voor het
ontwerpen van een IT-infrastructuur.
Tegen:
Stelling zeven behorende bij het proefschrift van D.J. Kiewiet (Formalisatie van
informatieplanning, 1996).
5.  De kwaliteitscriteria voor theorieën van Bacharach zijn strenge maar bruikbare
criteria in het proces van theorieconstructie.
Dit proefschrift, hoofdstuk 4.
Voor:
Bacharach, S.B. (1987). Organizational Theories: Some Criteria for Evaluation.
Academy of Management Review. pp. 496-515.6.  Bij het ontwerpen van interorganisationele informatiesysteemarchitecturen kan met
vrucht gebruik worden gemaakt van inzichten uit de Linguïstiek en de Artificiële
Intelligentie.
Voor:
Heesen, H.C., V.M.F. Homburg, M. Offereins. (1997). An agent view on law.
Artificial Intelligence & Law. Pp. 323-340.
7.  Regelmatige bestudering van hippe computertijdschriften als WIRED leidt niet tot
dieper inzicht in de maatschappelijke effecten van nieuwe informatie- en
communicatietechnologie maar wel tot consumptiedwang met betrekking tot deze
technologie.
Zie:
D. Rushkoff. The Fall of Wired UK. http://www.levity.com/rushkoff/wireduk.htm
8.  Verschillen tussen de disciplines bestuurskunde en bedrijfskunde zijn niet zozeer
terug te voeren op inhoudelijke of methodische verschillen van inzicht maar kunnen
vooral worden verklaard uit culturele verschillen tussen bestuurskundige en
bedrijfskundige onderzoeksgroepen.
9.  De kritiek van Andreski tegen het post-modernisme is vanuit
bruikbaarheidsoogpunt een valide argument om de bedrijfskunde niet tot de sociale
wetenschappen te rekenen.
Zie:
Andreski, S. (1972). Social Sciences as Sorcery. London: André Deutsch.
10.  Het regelmatig uitwisselen van ervaringen met collega-promovendi, zoals dat
plaatsvindt gedurende Edispuut bijeenkomsten, dient zowel de efficiëntie,
effectiviteit als zingeving van het promotietraject.
11.  In ambtelijke omgeving wordt de uitspraak ‘Bedenk een list!’ vaak vertaald met
‘Schrijf een nota!’.
12.  Met betrekking tot de laatste fase van een promotietraject kan worden gesteld: geen
daden maar woorden!
13.  In een overspannen arbeidsmarkt is het kunnen schrijven van een goed
ontslagverzoek van minstens zo groot belang als het kunnen schrijven van een
goede sollicitatiebrief.